State v. Ritz
Decision Date | 09 May 2018 |
Docket Number | A152111 |
Citation | 422 P.3d 397,291 Or.App. 660 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Randall Ray RITZ, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, and Jonah Morningstar, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the opening brief for appellant. On the supplemental brief were Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, and Anne Fujita Munsey, Deputy Public Defender.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General, and Joanna L. Jenkins, Assistant Attorney General filed the answering brief for respondent. On the supplemental brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Peenesh Shah, Assistant Attorney General.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and DeVore, Judge, and Garrett, Judge.
This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court, which reversed our decision in State v. Ritz , 270 Or. App. 88, 347 P.3d 1052 (2015) ( Ritz I ), rev'd and rem'd , 361 Or. 781, 399 P.3d 421 (2017) ( Ritz II ). In Ritz I , we affirmed defendant’s conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), ORS 813.010, and driving while suspended, ORS 811.182. Id. at 101, 347 P.3d 1052. In holding that the police did not violate defendant’s constitutional rights when they forcibly entered his home without a warrant, we concluded that the officers' reasonable belief that evidence of defendant’s blood alcohol content (BAC) would dissipate before the officers could obtain a warrant constituted an exigency justifying the entry. Id. at 98-99, 347 P.3d 1052. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the dissipation of defendant’s BAC did not constitute an exigency under the circumstances. Ritz II , 361 Or. at 799, 399 P.3d 421. On remand, the issue is whether the warrantless entry was nevertheless justified by other exigent circumstances on which the trial court relied. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that it was not. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
When reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we are bound by the facts found by the trial court that are supported by evidence in the record. State v. Marshall , 254 Or. App. 419, 421, 295 P.3d 128 (2013). Whether those facts describe circumstances that justify a warrantless search is a question of law. State v. Dahl , 323 Or. 199, 205, 915 P.2d 979 (1996). In accordance with that standard, we recite the facts and pertinent procedural history from Ritz I , including additional undisputed facts that are relevant to our decision on remand:
Id. at 90, 347 P.3d 1052. The Brookings officers formed a perimeter around the trailer, which was a small, 26-foot travel trailer. Lorentz and Spini discussed what to do next.
The trial court agreed with the state and denied defendant’s motion, concluding:
On appeal, defendant assigns error to the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the warrantless entry violated his rights under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In Ritz I , we affirmed on the ground that the state had proven exigency by showing that the officers reasonably believed that defendant’s BAC would have lost all evidentiary value if officers waited to obtain a warrant. 270 Or. App. of 98-99. In light of that conclusion, it was unnecessary to address the other justifications—hot pursuit and officer safety—cited by the trial court and the state. Id. at 93, 347 P.3d 1052.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded our decision, reasoning that, "at the time that officers entered defendant’s home, they had no reason to think that obtaining a warrant to enter the home would delay a consensual search for defendant’s BAC evidence, because they had no reason to think that defendant would consent to such a search." Ritz II , 361 Or. at 796, 399 P.3d 421. The Supreme Court did not discuss other possible exigencies justifying the warrantless entry, leaving that to be addressed on remand. The parties have submitted supplemental briefing.
Both Article I, section 9, and the Fourth Amendment protect persons against unreasonable searches by police. Under those provisions, a warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless the search falls within one of the "few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions" to the warrant requirement. Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed. 2d 576 (1967) ; State v. Baker , 350 Or. 641, 647, 260 P.3d 476 (2011). One exception to the warrant requirement is the "exigency" exception, under which the state must show that police had probable cause to believe that defendant committed a crime and that an exigency exists. State v. Snow , 337 Or. 219, 223, 94 P.3d 872 (2004). Exigent circumstances are those that "require[ ]police to act swiftly to prevent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall a suspect’s escape or the destruction of evidence." State v. Stevens , 311 Or. 119, 126, 806 P.2d 92 (1991). Defendant does not dispute that police had probable cause to believe that defendant had committed the crime of DUII;...
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State v. Hawthorne
...omitted). Whether the facts here justify a warrantless search due to exigent circumstances is a question of law. State v. Ritz , 291 Or. App. 660, 662, 422 P.3d 397 (2018). In evaluating whether the warrantless search was justified, we are bound by the trial court's findings of historical f......
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