State v. Gissendanner, CR-09-0998
Decision Date | 10 February 2017 |
Docket Number | CR-09-0998 |
Parties | State of Alabama v. Emanuel Aaron Gissendanner, Jr. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
Appeal from Dale Circuit Court
(CC-01-350.60)
On Return to Remand
The State initially appealed from the order of Dale Circuit Court granting the request of Emanuel Aaron Gissendanner, Jr., for Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., postconviction relief; in that order, the circuit court set aside Gissendanner's capital-murder convictions and sentences of death. This Court remanded the case to the circuit court, requiring the circuit court to consider certain issues it had not considered because it had granted postconviction relief on another basis. See State v. Gissendanner, [Ms. CR-09-0998, October 23, 2015] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2015). As set forth in more detail below, this case is now before this Court on return to remand.
In 2003, Gissendanner was convicted of murdering Margaret Snellgrove during the course of a kidnapping and during the course of a robbery and of possessing or uttering a forged instrument. He was sentenced to death. Gissendanner's capital-murder convictions and sentences of death were affirmed on direct appeal. See Gissendanner v. State, 949 So. 2d 956 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006).
In August 2007, Gissendanner filed a timely postconviction petition pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., attacking his capital-murder conviction and sentences. In March 2010, the circuit court found that Gissendanner had been denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance ofcounsel during the guilt phase of his capital-murder trial and granted Gissendanner postconviction relief. The State appealed that ruling. See Rule 32.10(a), Ala. R. Crim. P.
In December 2014, this Court reversed the circuit court's ruling and directed that court to reinstate Gissendanner's capital-murder convictions and sentences of death. On application for rehearing, however, this Court withdrew its original opinion, determined that the circuit court had erred in ruling that counsel were ineffective at the guilt phase of Gissendanner's trial, and remanded the case to the circuit court with directions to make specific findings of fact on certain claims that Gissendanner had raised concerning the penalty phase of his trial that had not been specifically addressed in the circuit court's order granting postconviction relief. See State v. Gissendanner, ___ So. 3d at ___.
This case is now before this Court on return to remand. Gissendanner requested, and was granted, leave to file a brief on return to remand. We now address these issues raised in that brief.
Gissendanner's capital-murder trial was presided over by, and his Rule 32 was originally assigned to, Judge Kenneth Wesley Quattlebaum; however, Judge Quattlebaum retired from the bench in March 2015 while this case was pending on application for rehearing, and the case was reassigned to Judge Kimberly Clark. Thus, when this Court remanded the case to the lower court, the judge who had presided over Gissendanner's capital-murder trial and the proceedings on Gissendanner's Rule 32 petition could not consider the issues on remand. In fact, in our previous opinion remanding this case, this Court directed Judge Clark to base her decision on the existing record. ___ So. 3d at ___. In Ex parte Hinton, 172 So. 3d 348 (Ala. 2012), the Alabama Supreme Court stated that when a lower court bases a decision on certain claims on a "cold ... record" the lower court is in no better position than a reviewing court and, thus, that the appellate court will review those claims using the de novo standard of review. 172 So. 3d at 353. "The de novo standard gives no deference to the lower court's findings." State v. Gamble, 63 So. 3d 707, 711 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).
In considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the standard announced by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The petitioner must establish: (1) that counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) that the petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance.
"E.g., Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 960 (11th Cir. 1992) () . "
Ray v. State, 80 So. 3d 965, 981-82 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011), quoting Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1518 (11th Cir. 1995).
The Ray Court further explained:
80 So. 3d at 983-84. With these principles in mind, we review the claims raised by Gissendanner in his brief on return to remand.
Gissendanner argues that the circuit court failed to comply with this Court's remand instructions because, he says, the court failed to make specific findings of fact on each penalty-phase ineffective-assistance claim that had not been previously addressed in the court's original order granting postconviction relief. However, Gissendanner does not request that this Court remand this case so that the circuit court may fully comply with this Court's instructions. Instead, Gissendanner requests that we reverse the circuit court's order on remand determining that those claims of ineffective of assistance of counsel were without merit. (Gissendanner's brief on return to remand, p. 40.)
This Court gave the following instructions to the circuit court when remanding this case:
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