State v. Glodowski
| Decision Date | 06 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 47131 |
| Citation | 463 P.3d 405,166 Idaho 771 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. David Charles GLODOWSKI, Defendant-Appellant. |
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for Appellant. Andrea Waye Reynolds argued.
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. Kenneth Jorgensen argued.
David Charles Glodowski appeals from the judgment of conviction entered against him for failing to update his sex-offender registration in violation of Idaho Code section 18-8309. He argues that the district court erred by ruling that his prior conviction under a Wisconsin statute was "substantially equivalent" to Idaho statutes that require sex-offender registration in Idaho. His appeal reaches this Court on petition for review after the Court of Appeals affirmed.
In March 2006, Glodowski pleaded guilty to third-degree sexual assault in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.225(3) (the "Wisconsin Conviction"). Wisconsin law required Glodowski to register as a sex offender in Wisconsin.
Nearly twelve years later, in January 2014, Glodowski relocated to Idaho. At some point in the six months following his relocation, the Idaho Bureau of Criminal Identification (the "Bureau") reviewed his Wisconsin conviction to determine whether he was legally obligated to register as a sex offender in Idaho. On July 1, 2014, the Bureau issued a written decision informing Glodowski that he was required to register as a sex offender in Idaho. The Bureau found that Glodowski had been convicted of one count of third-degree sexual assault under Wis. Stat. § 940.225(3) and that the victim of that offense was 14 years old at the time. The Bureau concluded that the elements of Wisconsin's third-degree sexual-assault statute are "substantially equivalent" to Idaho Code section 18-1508 (). Concluding that the Wisconsin conviction equated to an aggravated offense under Idaho Code section 18-8303(1), the Bureau informed Glodowski that he would be ineligible to petition a district court to exempt him from the duty to register under Idaho Code section 18-8310. (If Glodowski had been convicted of an offense characterized as less than an "aggravated offense," he could have sought exemption from the obligation to register from a district court.) The Bureau served Glodowski with the decision by mail on the same day it was issued. The decision advised Glodowski that either he could file a motion for reconsideration or appeal the Bureau's decision to the district court within specified time frames.
Glodowski registered as a sex offender in Idaho. As part of his registration, Glodowski was required to return an address-verification form sent to his home every 4 months to confirm he was living at his listed address. In May 2016, a verification form sent to Glodowski's last reported address was returned as undeliverable. The State's investigation revealed that Glodowski's home appeared unoccupied and his last reported phone number had been disconnected. On July 7, 2016, Detective Todd Jackson was able to contact Glodowski via phone and asked him to come to the Kootenai County Sheriff's Office to update his registration. Around a half-hour later, Glodowski met Detective Jackson at the sheriff's office. Glodowski explained that he had moved to Post Falls, Idaho, in the last week of April and had changed his phone number in February. While there, he signed a written statement in which he admitted to failing to update his registration and filled out a form to update it. The State later charged Glodowski with "failure to notify of address change" in violation of Idaho Code section 18-8309.
Before trial, in an effort to prove that Glodowski was required to register in Idaho, the State filed a motion in limine seeking a pre-trial ruling that Glodowski's Wisconsin conviction is substantially equivalent to either Idaho Code section 18-1508 () or section 18-6101 (defining rape). The State's motion, memorandum in support, and attachment are not included in the record on appeal. The district court held a telephonic hearing on the motion. The State explained that its motion was "just to get a pretrial ruling on whether the statute under which Mr. Glodowski was convicted in Wisconsin is substantially equivalent to an Idaho statute that would require him to register here in Idaho." The State argued that, even though the Wisconsin statute was broader than Idaho's rape statute, it was substantially equivalent because "in Idaho, rape is essentially nonconsensual intercourse" and the Wisconsin statute had similar subsections on consent. The State also referenced the Bureau's decision to explain why it advanced section 18-1508 as an additional ground to support the motion in limine. Glodowski objected and argued that the Wisconsin conviction was not substantially equivalent to either statute based on differences between statutory elements. He also argued that the State had not presented any underlying facts that could make the conviction substantially similar. The district court granted the State's motion by orally ruling that Glodowski's Wisconsin conviction is substantially equivalent to both Idaho Code sections 18-1508 and 18-6101 for purposes of sex-offender registration. It later entered a written order to that effect.
At the April 2017 trial, the State called two witnesses: Detective Jackson and Lynn Wolfe, the records specialist who processed Glodowski's updated registration on July 7, 2016. The State introduced four exhibits into evidence: (1) an annual "Sex Offender Registry" form that Glodowski filled out on January 13, 2016; (2) the Judgment of Conviction for his Wisconsin conviction; (3) Glodowski's written statement; and (4) an annual "Sex Offender Registry" form that Glodowski filled out on June 7, 2016. After the State rested, Glodowski unsuccessfully moved for acquittal and then rested his case without presentation of additional evidence. The district court instructed the jury that a violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.225(3) is substantially equivalent to Idaho Code sections 18-1508 and 18-6101. The jury returned a guilty verdict.
Glodowski timely appealed. He argued that the district court erred in ruling that a conviction under Wis. Stat. § 940.225(3) was substantially equivalent to Idaho Code sections 18-1508 and 18-6101. His appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed, but determined that the district court was without authority to redetermine whether Glodowski's Wisconsin conviction was substantially equivalent to an Idaho offense requiring registration in light of the Bureau's final decision. This Court granted Glodowski's timely petition for review.
When considering a case on review from the Court of Appeals, we do "not merely review the correctness of the decision of the Court of Appeals." State v. Young , 138 Idaho 370, 372, 64 P.3d 296, 298 (2002) (citations omitted). Instead, "this Court acts as though it is hearing the matter on direct appeal from the decision of the trial court; however, this Court does give serious consideration to the decision of the Court of Appeals." Id.
"The trial court's judgment concerning admission of evidence shall ‘only be disturbed on appeal when there has been a clear abuse of discretion.’ " State v. Hill , 161 Idaho 444, 447, 387 P.3d 112, 115 (2016) (quoting State v. Perry , 150 Idaho 209, 218, 245 P.3d 961, 970 (2010) ). Accordingly, such decisions are subject to the four-part Lunneborg standard:
Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life , 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).
Whether an out-of-state conviction is "substantially equivalent" to an Idaho statute requiring sex-offender registration is a question of statutory interpretation, and thus, a question of law, over which this Court exercises free review. Doe v. State , 158 Idaho 778, 782, 352 P.3d 500, 504 (2015).
The issues on appeal in this case evolved over its appellate lifetime. We find it necessary to explain how we reach the issue we decide in this opinion. As originally presented in the briefing, the issues on appeal were (1) whether the district court properly concluded that Glodowski's Wisconsin conviction is "substantially equivalent" to an Idaho offense requiring sex-offender registration under Doe v. State , 158 Idaho 778, 782, 352 P.3d 500, 504 (2015), and (2) whether the jury was properly instructed on the mens rea element of knowledge under Idaho Code section 18-8311(1).
We need not, and do not, address the jury-instruction issue. In its brief, the State argued that Glodowski cannot prevail on this issue under the invited-error doctrine because he asked for the complained-of instruction below. In his reply brief, Glodowski explicitly conceded that the State's argument is correct. We accept this concession. See State v. Godwin , 164 Idaho 903, 925, 436 P.3d 1252, 1274 (2019) (). We express no opinion on the merits of this issue.
Glodowski's concession left the district court's substantially equivalent analysis as the only disputed issue in the briefing. However, the Court of Appeals decided the appeal on a different basis. Rather than addressing the substance of the district court's analysis, the Court of Appeals determined that the district court was without authority to conduct the analysis in the first place. Citing the lack of evidence in the record showing a successful appeal of the Bureau's final...
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