State v. Glover

• Decision Date: 02 May 1893
• Citation: 17 S.E. 525,112 N.C. 896
• Parties: STATE v. GLOVER.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

17 S.E. 525

112 N.C. 896

STATE v. GLOVER.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

May 2, 1893

Appeal from criminal court, Buncombe county; Carter, Judge.

A. G Glover was indicted for embezzlement, and from a judgment sustaining his plea to the jurisdiction of the court the state appeals. Reversed.

A fugitive from justice, surrendered by one state to another may be tried in the state to which he is returned for any other offense than that specified in the requisition for his rendition; and in so trying him, against his objection, no right, privilege, or immunity secured to him by the constitution and laws of the United States is thereby denied.

The Attorney General, for the State.

Cobb & Merrimon and W. W. Jones, for appellee.

SHEPHERD C.J.

The defendant was indicted in the criminal court of Buncombe county for the embezzlement of certain funds which came into his possession while he was acting as the agent or servant of the Asheville Kaolin Company. Upon his arraignment he pleaded, among other things, that the court had no jurisdiction of his person, and the court, upon demurrer sustained the said plea, and ordered that the defendant be discharged from custody. From this judgment the state through its solicitor, appealed to this court.

It is a general principle of law, as laid down by the English and adopted by the American courts, that when one is within the jurisdiction of a court, and there properly charged with crime, the court may hold him, and proceed to his trial, without any reference to the circumstances under which he was brought within such jurisdiction; and so firmly established is this principle that the supreme court of the United States has held that it would give no relief even where a person had been kidnapped in a foreign country and brought by force (without reference to any extradition treaty) within the jurisdiction of the state whose laws he had violated. And it was remarked by the court that "there are authorities of the highest respectability which hold that such forcible abduction is no sufficient reason why the party should not answer when brought within the jurisdiction of the court which has the right to try him for such offense, and presents no valid objection to his trial in such court." Kerr v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225; Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 8 S.Ct. 1204; State v. Smith, 1 Bailey, 283.

It is insisted, however, by the defendant, that the principle above stated does not apply to his case, for the reason that he was surrendered by the state of Pennsylvania to answer a charge of obtaining money from the said Asheville Kaolin Company under false pretenses, and he urges that the charge cannot be varied, and that he cannot be arrested or put upon trial for the embezzlement of the money of the said company, or, indeed, for any other offense, until the particular charge upon which he was extradited has been disposed of, and he has had reasonable time and opportunity to return to the state from whence he was taken. In support of this position we have been able to find but two cases in which the precise question now presented has been decided in this country. These are State v. Hall, 40 Kan. 338, 19 P. 918, and Ex parte McKnight, (Ohio Sup.) 28 N.E. 1034; and an examination of the opinions will disclose that they are founded upon a supposed analogy to the case of U.S. v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 7 S.Ct. 234, in which it is decided that the principle contended for prevails in cases where fugitives from justice have been surrendered by foreign countries under the stipulations of extradition treaties. There are two other cases (In re Cannon, 47 Mich. 481, 11 N.W. 280; Compton v. Wilder, 40 Ohio St. 130) in which a similar view was taken, but, as they related to arrests in civil actions of persons who had been extradited for criminal offenses, they cannot be considered in point. In response to these it may be said that "a controlling distinction to be noted is that a person against whom it is sought merely to establish or enforce a civil liability has personal rights which are violated by his being brought into the jurisdiction by fraud, while an offender against the criminal laws of the state acquires no right by his flight or absence from the jurisdiction which the courts, in the administration of those laws, are bound to regard when he is again found within the jurisdiction." Lascelles v. State, (Ga.) 16 S.E. Rep. 949.

In opposition to the foregoing cases there is a very great preponderance of judicial authority. Ham v. State, 4 Tex App. 645; State v. Stuart, 60 Wis. 587, 19 N.W. 429; People v. Cross, 135 N.Y. 536, 32 N.E. 246; Com. v. Wright, (Mass.) 33 N.E. 82; In re Miles, 52 Vt. 609; In re Noyes, 17 Alb. Law J. 407. We are relieved, however, of the duty of passing upon the merits of these conflicting views, as the...