State v. Goetz
| Decision Date | 31 March 1863 |
| Citation | 34 Mo. 85 |
| Parties | STATE, Respondent, v. AUGUSTA GOETZ AND CATHERINE MARTIN, Appellants. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis Criminal Court.
T. G. C. Davis, for appellants.
The defendants, Goetz and Martin, were indicted for stealing some lockets and breastpins from Eugene Jaccard, in the store of said Jaccard, on Fourth street, in the city of St. Louis.
I. The court erred in permitting the circuit attorney to prove that a gold chain was found on the person of the husband of the defendant Goetz, and that she confessed she put it into his pocket. There was no evidence tending to show that the chain was the property of Jaccard, or had ever been in his possession or in his store. The possession of the gold chain by the husband of the defendant Goetz, and her confession in relation thereto, tended only to prove a separate offence unconnected with that for which the defendants were indicted, and so to prejudice the minds of the jury against the defendants. Evidence of a separate and distinct larceny from that for which a defendant is indicted and tried is not receivable against such defendant for any purpose whatever.
II. The court erred in permitting the witness Gray to answer the question propounded to him by the circuit attorney in relation to cuffs, the property of said witness, because the witness' testimony tended to prove the defendants guilty of an offence unconnected with that for which they were indicted and being tried.
III. The court erred in instructing the jury “that evidence upon the matter of other larcenies than the matter of the larceny of the property of Mr. Jaccard was admitted for their consideration solely as tending to throw light or bear upon the question as to whether the property of Mr. Jaccard, if taken at all by the defendants, was taken by them with a felonious purpose; or as to whether the property of Jaccard was taken by children of tender years, in the company of the defendants, without their knowledge, consent or connivance; but that the evidence might and should be regarded by them as throwing light upon the question.” Evidence of such larcenies as are wholly unconnected with that for which a defendant is indicted is inadmissible for any purpose whatsoever; and the court consequently erred in charging the jury that evidence of other larcenies than the alleged larceny of Jaccard's property should be considered by them upon the question of intention; or upon the question whether the defendants stole the property of Jaccard, or it was taken by children of tender years then in company with defendants.
Voullaire, for respondent.
I. The possession of stolen property raises only the presumption of guilt, which may be removed by evidence of good character, &c. (Barb. Crim. L. 184.)
II. So that in larceny, it becomes necessary to prove the felonious intent; that the taking was not done through mistake; that the goods were not put in possession of defendant unknown to him, &c. and this felonious intent, or animus furandi, or quo animo, must be proved by circumstances connected directly or indirectly with the larceny, or by other crimes or acts committed by defendant distinct from the offence with which he is charged -- but showing, or tending to show, such felonious intent; all of which must be governed according to circumstances. In this case, defendants having shown their defence to be good character by the depositions filed on their behalf in the case, and in their application for a continuance, and from the testimony of the witnesses, that their children had taken the property unknown to them, &c., the State was forced to adduce different acts of defendants to explain and negative their defence, and substantiate their guilt. In fact, all the larcenies were committed within the space of one and a half blocks, within one hour, in the same manner, forming one continuous act, and one common scheme to commit larceny.
The defendants, together with one Elizabeth Wohlman, were indicted for stealing various articles of jewelry from the store of Eugene Jaccard, in the city of St. Louis, on the 7th of November, 1861. Upon the trial, it was shown that defendants, accompanied by two small children, were, on that day, in the store of Jaccard examining and pricing goods, and while so engaged the clerk missed several articles which he had placed upon the counter for their inspection; and, suspecting that defendants had taken them, procured their arrest; whereupon several articles of jewelry, such as lockets and breastpins, of considerable value, were found in their possession, or dropped by them on the street on their way to the prison. The theory of the defence was that the property was taken by the children, and placed by them about the persons of the defendants.
Against the objections of the defendants, the State gave evidence tending to prove that, on the same day, and near the same hour, and at stores in the vicinity of Jaccard's, the defendants had feloniously taken other articles from other persons. The admission of this evidence is the principal ground of error relied upon for a reversal of the judgment.
As a general rule, evidence of matters other than those charged in the indictment are inadmissible; and the reason of the rule is obvious enough, for when a party...
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