State v. Goff, 2009 Ohio 4914 (Ohio App. 9/14/2009)

• Decision Date: 14 September 2009
• Docket Number: No. 07CA17.,07CA17.
• Citation: 2009 Ohio 4914
• Parties: State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Megan Goff, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 1

2009 Ohio 4914

State of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Megan Goff, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07CA17.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Lawrence County.

File-stamped date: September 14, 2009.

Paula Brown, William Bluth, Kristopher Haines, and Richard R. Parsons, Kravitz, Brown & Dortch, LLC, Columbus, Ohio, for appellant.

J.B. Collier, Jr., Lawrence County Prosecutor, and Robert C. Anderson, Lawrence County Assistant Prosecutor, Ironton, Ohio, for appellee.

DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

KLINE, P.J.

{¶1} Megan Goff appeals her aggravated murder (with gun specification) conviction after a bench trial in the Lawrence County Common Pleas Court. On appeal, Goff contends that the trial court violated her right against self-incrimination by ordering her to submit to a psychiatric examination. Because Goff initially retained her own psychiatrist to undergo an evaluation to prove her mental condition (battered woman syndrome) as part of her defense before the court granted the State's request for its psychiatric examination to rebut Goff's claim, we disagree and find that Goff's use of her own psychiatric testimony at trial waived her privilege against self-incrimination. Goff next contends that the trial court improperly ruled that evidence regarding the battered woman syndrome was relevant only to the imminent harm element of self-defense. We disagree. Goff next contends that the trial court erred when it failed to control the prosecutor, who led the state witnesses, and repeatedly crossed the line of adversarial representation. Because Goff failed to object at trial, and because Goff cannot demonstrate that any of the leading questions or other conduct of the prosecutor, either in isolation or combined, affected the outcome of the trial, we disagree. Goff next contends that the trial court erred in many of its evidentiary rulings. Because we find that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion regarding the evidentiary rulings, we disagree. Goff next contends that the trial court erred when it allowed the State's expert witness to testify regarding her motive and state of mind. Because Goff's expert witness testified to her motive and state of mind, we disagree. In addition, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because Goff's state of mind was a critical issue as it related to Goff's self-defense claim involving the battered woman syndrome. Goff next contends that the trial court's finding that she did not act in self-defense is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Because substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding, we disagree. Goff next contends that the evidence regarding "prior calculation and design" is insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated murder. Because, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements (including prior calculation and design) of the crime of aggravated murder proven beyond a reasonable doubt, we disagree. Goff next contends that she was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel because of numerous errors and omissions. Because Goff cannot show how any of the alleged deficiencies prejudiced her, we disagree. Finally, Goff contends that the trial court erred when it failed to record all of the proceedings. Because Goff has failed to show that: (1) she either requested that the trial court record the proceedings at issue or objected to the trial court's failure to comply with the recording requirements; (2) she made an effort on appeal to comply with App.R. 9 and to reconstruct what occurred or to establish its importance; or (3) material prejudice resulted from the trial court's failure to record the proceedings at issue, we disagree.

{¶2} Accordingly, we overrule all nine of Goff's assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I

{¶3} In 1995, fifteen-year old Goff and her family moved into the house next door to the forty-year old victim. Over the next two years, Goff and the victim developed a romantic relationship that ultimately culminated in their marriage in late 1998. During their marriage, they had two children.

{¶4} On March 18, 2006, Goff shot the victim fifteen times in the head and chest area, resulting in his death. After the shooting, Goff dialed 911 to report the shooting, explaining to the 911 dispatcher that she "just killed" her husband because "[h]e said he was gonna kill my babies." Goff further explained that despite having shot the victim, she feared he would still get up and kill her. Goff remained on the phone until former Lawrence County Sheriff's Deputy Robert Van Keuren arrived.

{¶5} When Van Keuren arrived, Goff remained hysterical and kept repeating that the victim was going to kill her. Shortly thereafter, Lawrence County Sheriff's Detective Aaron Bollinger spoke with Goff. Goff explained to him that she shot her husband because he threatened to kill her and the children in two days, i.e., on Monday, March 20, 2006.

{¶6} A Lawrence County Grand Jury subsequently indicted Goff for aggravated murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A), with a firearm specification. Goff pled not guilty and asserted the affirmative defense of self-defense. In support of the self-defense theory, Goff contended that, during the course of her marriage, she was a "battered woman" as the result of enduring psychological abuse by the victim; and that, on the night of the shooting, she believed her actions were justified because the victim threatened to kill her and her children two days later. Goff retained a psychiatrist and underwent an evaluation to support her defense.

{¶7} The State then made several motions. First, it moved for an order requiring that Goff submit to a psychiatric examination conducted by an expert retained by the State. Goff opposed the motion, arguing that compelling her to submit to a State psychiatric examination would violate her right against self-incrimination. The court granted the State's motion. Next, the State moved for an order determining that "as a result of the death of the victim any attorney-client privilege that existed between the victim and his divorce attorneys no longer exists." With Goff's counsel agreeing, the court granted the motion.

{¶8} Finally, the State moved for an order requiring Goff to submit or proffer some evidence supporting her self-defense theory before allowing the presentation of expert testimony regarding the battered woman's syndrome. Goff initially opposed this motion, arguing that such an order would, in essence, dictate Goff's trial strategy, i.e., the order would dictate the order of her witnesses, and specifically, would require that Goff testify before her psychiatrist. However, in the end, Goff's counsel stated that he had no problem putting Goff on the stand before her psychiatrist. The court then determined that it would admit evidence concerning battered woman syndrome at trial to prove that Goff reasonably believed she was in imminent danger at the time of the offense so long as she first: (1) offered evidence that she was not at fault in creating the situation; and (2) that she did not violate any duty to retreat or to avoid the danger.

{¶9} At trial, Goff did not dispute that she killed her estranged husband, but instead sought to prove that she killed him because he had threatened to kill her and the children. The state, however, presented abundant testimony that largely discredited Goff's claims.¹

{¶10} The trial judge subsequently found Goff guilty of aggravated murder and guilty of the firearm specification. The court found that she had not proven self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The court observed that she had claimed to be immensely fearful that her husband was going to kill her, yet went to his house on the evening of March 18. The court also noted that two prosecution witnesses testified regarding the March 17, 6:00 p.m. phone call and stated that at no time did the victim threaten Goff, as she claimed in her testimony.

{¶11} The court sentenced Goff to three years on the firearm specification and to a life sentence on the aggravated murder conviction, with the possibility of parole after thirty years.

{¶12} At the sentencing hearing, the court specifically stated that it did not believe some of Goff's claims regarding her husband's abusive behavior, especially her claim that he dangled mangled kittens in front of her child's face. The court thought that she was not truthful.

{¶13} Goff appeals the trial court's judgment and asserts the following nine assignments of error. "I. The trial court violated appellant's right against compulsory self-incrimination when it ordered her to submit to a compelled psychiatric examination in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, Art. I, Section 10, of the Ohio Constitution, and Section 2901.06 and Section 2945.371 of the Ohio Revised Code." "II. The trial court erred when it used the wrong standard and compelled appellant to submit to an independent psychiatric evaluation, and analogized this case to a civil proceeding." "III. The trial court erred when it failed to control the prosecutor, who led the state witnesses, and repeatedly crossed the line of adversarial representation." "IV. The trial court erred in many of its evidentiary rulings during trial, any one of which merits reversal. Looked upon cumulatively, the errors require reversal of the appellant's conviction under even a plain error standard of review." "V. The trial court erred by admitting those portions of Dr. Resnick's testimony that dealt with motive and state of mind over the objection of appellant in violation of Ohio Rule of Evidence 702(A) and State v. Wilcox (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 182." "VI. The trial judge's finding that appellant did not act in self-defense was against the manifest weight of the evidence." "VII. The evidence is...