State v. Gomez-Alas
| Decision Date | 02 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 46724 |
| Citation | 477 P.3d 911,167 Idaho 857 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Klaus Nico GOMEZ-ALAS, Defendant-Appellant. |
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for Appellant. Andrea Reynolds argued.
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. Kenneth Jorgensen argued.
BEVAN, Justice In December 2017, Klaus Nico Gomez-Alas was charged with two felony counts: rape and infamous crime against nature. At trial, he was acquitted on the first count of rape, but convicted of simple battery as an included offense. On the second count, the jury found Gomez-Alas guilty of an infamous crime against nature. After the verdict, Gomez-Alas moved the district court for a new trial pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule (I.C.R.) 34, arguing the district court misled the jury by giving an improper "dynamite" instruction. Gomez-Alas also moved the district court for judgment of acquittal on the second count pursuant to I.C.R. 29, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the infamous crime against nature charge. The district court denied both post-trial motions. Gomez-Alas appeals, arguing: (1) the act of cunnilingus does not constitute an infamous crime against nature under Idaho Code sections 18-6605 and 18-6606 ; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the infamous crime against nature charge; and (3) the district court misled the jury by providing an improper dynamite instruction. We affirm.
On December 25, 2017, after receiving a report of rape, an officer with the Sun Valley Police Department responded to the Sun Valley Company Moritz Dormitory and met with the alleged victim. The victim explained to the officer that she had awoken to an unidentified man, later identified as Gomez-Alas, having sexual intercourse with her in the top bunkbed of her dormitory room. The victim also stated Gomez-Alas "did oral sex to [her]" and "got [her] up and made [her] do oral sex to him for like a minute." Based on these allegations, Gomez-Alas was charged with two felonies: rape, and an infamous crime against nature. After a seven-day trial, the jury found Gomez-Alas guilty of battery, a lesser included misdemeanor offense of rape, and the infamous crime against nature, based on penetration, however slight, of Gomez-Alas’ tongue into the vaginal opening of the victim against her will.
After the verdict, Gomez-Alas moved the district court for a new trial pursuant to I.C.R. 34, alleging the district court mislead the jury by giving an improper dynamite instruction. The district court was unpersuaded and denied Gomez-Alas’ motion, finding the jury had not declared itself deadlocked. Gomez-Alas also moved the district court for judgment of acquittal pursuant to I.C.R. 29, arguing there was insufficient evidence of: (1) penetration and (2) the act of cunnilingus being committed against the victim's will. The district court also denied Gomez-Alas’ motion for judgment of acquittal, finding sufficient evidence of penetration from testimony that Gomez-Alas had licked the victim's clitoris and/or vagina. The district court also found sufficient evidence showed that the act was committed against the victim's will, based on testimony about the victim's level of intoxication. Gomez-Alas timely appealed.
1. Whether the act of cunnilingus constitutes an infamous crime against nature under Idaho Code sections 18-6605 and 18-6606 ?
2. Whether the district court erred in finding there was sufficient evidence of penetration and that the act of cunnilingus was committed against the victim's will to support Gomez-Alas’ conviction for the infamous crime against nature charge?
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Gomez-Alas’ motion for a new trial after finding it did not mislead the jury by giving an improper dynamite instruction?
"[T]he interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review." State v. Osborn, 165 Idaho 627, 629, 449 P.3d 419, 421 (2019) (quoting City of Idaho Falls v. H-K Contractors, Inc., 163 Idaho 579, 581, 416 P.3d 951, 953 (2018) ).
"Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope." State v. Betancourt , 151 Idaho 635, 638, 262 P.3d 278, 281 (Ct. App. 2011). "This Court will uphold a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict so long as there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could conclude that the prosecution proved all essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Tryon , 164 Idaho 254, 257, 429 P.3d 142, 145 (2018) (quoting State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 572, 388 P.3d 583, 586 (2017) ). "In conducting its analysis, the [C]ourt is required to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, [and] will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury on issues of witness credibility, weight of the evidence, or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence." State v. Taylor , 157 Idaho 186, 190, 335 P.3d 31, 35 (2014) (internal quotations omitted).
"The denial of a motion for new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Ellington , 157 Idaho 480, 485, 337 P.3d 639, 644 (2014). This Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by considering whether the district court: "(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason." State v. Villa-Guzman, 166 Idaho 382, 384, 458 P.3d 960, 962 (2020) (quoting Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018) ).
Gomez-Alas alleges three errors on appeal. First, Gomez-Alas argues the district erred in interpreting Idaho Code sections 18-6605 and 18-6606 to prohibit the act of cunnilingus. Second, Gomez-Alas argues the district court erred in finding there was sufficient evidence of penetration and that the act of cunnilingus was committed against the victim's will. Third, Gomez-Alas argues the district court abused its discretion in denying Gomez-Alas’ motion for a new trial relative to the alleged dynamite instruction. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
The district court found Idaho Code sections 18-6605 and 18-6606 prohibited the act of nonconsensual cunnilingus. Gomez-Alas argues the district court erred as a matter of law in interpreting Idaho Code sections 18-6605 and 18-6606. According to Gomez-Alas, the statutes are ambiguous because they do not provide an enumerated list of prohibited acts. Alleging ambiguity, Gomez-Alas maintains the Legislature did not intend these statutes to prohibit conduct such as cunnilingus because the statutes only apply to acts involving male sexual organs. Gomez-Alas also argues corpus linguistics supports his interpretation, as the phrase "crime against nature" has never included the act of cunnilingus in Idaho.
"Our objective when interpreting a statute is to derive the intent of the legislative body that adopted the act." Osborn , 165 Idaho at 629, 449 P.3d at 421 (internal quotations omitted). Interpretation begins with the statute's plain language. Id.
This Court considers the statute as a whole, and gives words their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. When the statute's language is unambiguous, the legislature's clearly expressed intent must be given effect, and we do not need to go beyond the statute's plain language to consider other rules of statutory construction.
Id. (quoting State v. Owens , 158 Idaho 1, 3, 343 P.3d 30, 32 (2015) (internal citations omitted)). When a statute is ambiguous, "the [C]ourt looks to rules of construction for guidance ... and may consider the reasonableness of proposed interpretations." Ada Cnty. v. Gibson , 126 Idaho 854, 856, 893 P.2d 801, 803 (Ct. App. 1995). A statute is ambiguous "where reasonable minds might differ or be uncertain as to its meaning." State v. Doe , 140 Idaho 271, 274, 92 P.3d 521, 524 (2004). When ambiguity exists, "the intent of the drafters may be ascertained by considering, first, the express language and, in addition, the context in which the language is used, the evils to be remedied and the objects in view." Gibson , 126 Idaho at 857, 893 P.2d at 804.
Idaho Code sections 18-6605 and 18-6606 are unambiguous; thus, rules of construction, including the use of corpus linguistics, are not required in resolving the first issue presented. Idaho Code section 18-6605 provides: "[e]very person who is guilty of the infamous crime against nature, committed with mankind or with any animal, is punishable by imprisonment. ..." Although the issue presented here is a matter of first impression, this Court has subjected section 18-6605 to "authoritative judicial construction" on numerous occasions. See State v. Carringer, 95 Idaho 929, 930, 523 P.2d 532, 533 (1974). Over 100 years ago this Court explained, "it was not the intention of the Legislature to limit prosecutions to the crime of sodomy and to omit the inhibition and punishment of other infamous crimes against nature." State v. Altwatter, 29 Idaho 107, 108, 157 P. 256, 257 (1916). Construing the infamous crime against nature statute1 liberally, this Court held the language "is sufficiently broad to include not only the crime of sodomy, but also all unnatural carnal copulations ." Id. (emphasis added). All unnatural carnal copulations includes acts "committed per os2 or per anum ." State v. Johnson , 120 Idaho 408, 412, 816 P.2d 364, 368 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing Altwatter, 29 Idaho at 107, 157 P. at 256 ).
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