State v. Gonsalves
| Decision Date | 01 May 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 83-261-C,83-261-C |
| Citation | 476 A.2d 108 |
| Parties | STATE v. Ralph GONSALVES, Jr. A. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
The defendant, Ralph Gonsalves, Jr., was charged by information with the fraudulent use of a credit card, in violation of G.L.1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 11-49-4. The case was tried before a justice of the Superior Court, sitting with a jury, which returned a verdict of guilty against the defendant. His motion for a new trial was denied, and he is now before us on appeal.
The record discloses that on December 29, 1980, defendant was a customer in the Casual Male Clothing Store in East Providence. The defendant, then nineteen years of age, approached the counter to purchase a pair of jeans, presenting a credit card and a license that indicated that he was approximately forty-five years of age. After this discrepancy and an apparent alteration of the credit card were noticed, a check was made to determine the card's validity. The defendant thereupon proceeded to another register where he paid for the purchase in cash and then immediately left the store. When it was learned that the card had expired, an unsuccessful attempt was made to follow defendant.
The defendant's father, Ralph Gonsalves, Sr., testified that he had given the credit card, which he knew to be altered, to one Ronald Thomas. Mr. Gonsalves further stated that he was present at the Casual Male Store on the day in question and that it was Thomas, and not his son, who had attempted to use the card.
The defendant testified that at the time of the incident he was rehearsing with his band and that he had not attempted to use the credit card.
A trial date was set for September 27, 1981. On September 23, four days before trial and prior to the impaneling of the jury, defendant's attorney filed a motion to withdraw from the case. Defense counsel informed the trial justice that he represented the individual who had actually committed the crime for which defendant was being tried, and that such dual representation constituted a conflict of interest. Without addressing the merits of the motion, the trial justice dismissed it on the ground of untimeliness.
On appeal, defendant raises several issues. However, due to our disposition of two of the issues submitted, it will be unnecessary to address all the questions raised. The issues we will consider are: (1) whether the trial justice erred in denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal; and (2) whether the trial justice was in error in denying defense counsel's motion to withdraw on the grounds of a conflict of interest.
The defendant contends that because he paid cash for the jeans, the evidence supported only the conclusion that he merely attempted to fraudulently use a credit card. The defendant argues that the language of § 11-49-4 is unambiguous and conveys a clear and sensible meaning. When each word of the statute is given its "plain and ordinary meaning," this type of conduct is not covered. Rather, it is the intent of the statute to cover only the situation whereby a defendant actually receives goods by virtue of the fraudulent use of a credit card, and not the mere attempt to do so. The defendant furthermore impliedly argues that because the statute does not contain a penalty for the attempted fraudulent use of a credit card, such action does not constitute a violation of the statute. We disagree with defendant's reading of § 11-49-4.
Section 11-49-4 provides in part:
(Emphasis added.)
We must be guided initially by the basic principle of construction which states that statutes should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, R.I., 416 A.2d 673, 674 (1980); State v. Healy, R.I., 410 A.2d 432, 434 (1980); Lynch v. King, 120 R.I. 868, 873, 391 A.2d 117, 120 (1978). We must in construing a statute ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. In ascertaining that meaning, we should "give effect to all parts of the statute, if reasonably possible, in keeping with its declared purpose." Rhode Island Chamber of Commerce v. Hackett, R.I., 411 A.2d 300, 303 (1980).
Applying these principles, we find that the provisions of § 11-49-4 proscribe two forms of conduct: (a) conduct involving mere use of the card for the purpose of obtaining goods, regardless of whether goods are actually obtained, or (b) conduct on the part of an individual who actually obtains goods by falsely representing himself to be the cardholder. However, in setting the sanction for violation of the statute, the penalty provision refers solely to the value of goods actually obtained, with no reference to goods sought to be obtained. Recognizing the principle of law which holds that a statute containing prohibitive language without providing for a penalty is a nullity, we therefore take the view that the task before us is one of statutory construction of an ambiguous statute. See People v. Gibson, 99 Ill.App.3d 616, 619, 55 Ill.Dec. 24, 26, 425 N.E.2d 1197, 1199 (1981).
Although legislative intent is primarily sought from the language used in the statute, we must look to the statutory purpose. This court should not adopt a construction that would defeat the evident purpose of the statute. Coletta v. State, 106 R.I. 764, 770, 263 A.2d 681, 684 (1970). Although penal statutes are to be strictly construed, they should not be interpreted in a manner that would thwart a clear legislative intent. State v. Dussault, 121 R.I. 751, 754, 403 A.2d 244, 246 (1979). Moreover, we will not attribute to the Legislature a meaningless or absurd result. Beaudoin v. Petit, R.I., 409 A.2d 536, 540 (1979); Kingsley v. Miller, 120 R.I. 372, 376, 388 A.2d 357, 360 (1978).
It is clear from a reading of the statute that the Legislature intended to prohibit the unlawful use of a credit card with intent to defraud even where that attempt is unsuccessful. The statute falls within the chapter entitled "Credit Card Crime Act," the obvious purpose of which is to impose criminal sanctions upon those who engage in the unauthorized use of credit cards. Section 11-49-4 by its very terms provides that use of a credit card if fraudulent violates the statute. Ascribing to the word 'use,' its plain and ordinary meaning, it is obvious that the actions of an individual in presenting a stolen or falsified card with the intent to defraud fall within the prohibition of the statute.
The Illinois Supreme Court, when confronted with a similar statute, noted the absurdity of applying the statute only to those who actually succeed in obtaining goods. That court, in disposing of the issue stated:
People v. Gibson, 99 Ill.App.3d at 621, 55 Ill.Dec. at 27, 425 N.E.2d at 1200.
We further recognize the principle that when necessary, in order to achieve the purpose of a statute, this court may supply, modify, or delete those words necessary to effectuate the intended meaning of the Legislature. Mason v. Bowerman Bros., Inc., 95 R.I. 425, 433, 187 A.2d 772, 777 (1963). Therefore, in order to carry out the intent of the Legislature that individuals whose unlawful use of a credit card is unsuccessful fall within the provisions of § 11-49-4, we conclude that the statutory language should be expanded to include goods obtained or sought to be obtained. Thus, the transgressor would be subject to penalties dependent upon whether the value of the goods obtained or "sought to be obtained" exceeds the amount of $100 over a six-month period.
The defendant next argues that his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel was...
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State v. Clark
...573 (R.I.1998). Nor should penal statutes "be interpreted in a manner that would thwart a clear legislative intent." State v. Gonsalves, 476 A.2d 108, 111 (R.I.1984). After employing this analysis, we are more than satisfied that the words "permanent" and "disfigurement" carry no ambiguity.......
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State v. Martin
...of criminal codefendants, the defendant in the present case is entitled to no less constitutional protection. See State v. Gonsalves, 476 A.2d 108, 113 (R.I.1984). "These principles concerning conflict of interest [announced by the court in Holloway and Cuyler ] are not restricted to cases ......
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State v. Henton
...882 (1983) (conflict due to defense counsel's concurrent representation of defendant and key prosecution witness); State v. Gonsalves, 476 A.2d 108, 110 (R.I. 1984) (conflict because defense counsel previously represented individual who actually committed crime for which defendant being tri......
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State v. Pineda
...rulings of a trial justice are reviewable on direct appeal.’ ” State v. Page, 709 A.2d 1042, 1046 (R.I.1998) (quoting State v. Gonsalves, 476 A.2d 108, 112 (R.I.1984)). Here, because Pineda's challenge to her counsel's effectiveness stems from the trial justice's approval of her signed stip......