Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, 78-55-M
| Decision Date | 03 July 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 78-55-M,78-55-M |
| Citation | 416 A.2d 673 |
| Parties | 40 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1591 ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC. v. RHODE ISLAND COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. P. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
The defendant Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights (commission) filed a petition for certiorari pursuant to G.L.1956 (1977 Reenactment) § 42-35-16, seeking review of a Superior Court judgment that dismissed the commission's administrative proceedings against the plaintiff Roadway Express, Inc. (Roadway). We issue the writ and have the pertinent records before us.
The facts leading to dismissal of the commission's proceedings are undisputed. On November 27, 1972, Robert J. Garedo filed a charge with the commission, alleging that Roadway had violated the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act when it fired him on August 9, 1972. The commission investigated that charge and in 1973 undertook two unsuccessful attempts to settle the matter. In December 1974 the commission initiated administrative proceedings against Roadway based on the charges filed by Garedo. Invoking its authority under G.L.1956 (1968 Reenactment) § 28-5-18, 1 the commission issued and served a complaint on Roadway in January 1975.
Shortly after receiving the complaint, Roadway filed a motion to dismiss the commission's proceedings based on the time limitation of § 28-5-18. Roadway claimed that the commission did not have jurisdiction over the complaint because it failed to issue it within the time limit imposed by § 28-5-18, which provides in part: "(a)ny complaint issued pursuant to this section must be so issued within one (1) year after the alleged unfair employment practices were committed." Although the complaint in this case was issued more than two years after the alleged unfair employment practices, the commission denied Roadway's motion to dismiss. Roadway appealed from denial of that motion to the Superior Court.
The Superior Court sustained Roadway's appeal because it interpreted the one-year provision of § 28-5-18 to operate as a bar to adjudication of complaints issued after that time. The commission then petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari. We issued the writ to review the interpretation of § 28-5-18 adopted by the Superior Court.
The intention of the Legislature controls our consideration of the mandatory or directory character of statutory provisions. See Atlantic Refining Co. v. Director of Public Works, 98 R.I. 167, 169, 200 A.2d 580, 581 (1964); State v. Muldoon, 67 R.I. 80, 92, 20 A.2d 687, 692 (1941); see also Beauchesne v. David London & Co., 118 R.I. 651, 660-61, 375 A.2d 920, 924-25 (1977); Tiverton v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge # 23, 118 R.I. 160, 165, 372 A.2d 1273, 1276 (1977); Morton C. Tuttle Co. v. Carbone, 84 R.I. 375, 384, 125 A.2d 133, 138 (1956). If the words used in a statute are unambiguous and convey a clear and sensible meaning, we look only to those words to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. State v. Ciarlo, R.I., 409 A.2d 1216 (1980); Little v. Conflict of Interest Commission, R.I., 397 A.2d 884 (1979). Words used in a statute are accorded their plain and ordinary meaning unless a contrary intent appears on the face of that statute. Id., Roe v. Affleck, R.I., 390 A.2d 361 (1978).
The Legislature has used the word "must" in conjunction with the time period provided in § 28-5-18: "(a)ny complaint * * * must be so issued within one (1) year * * *." In common usage, the word "must" means commanded or compelled. Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1961). If we accord to the word "must" in § 28-5-18 its ordinary meaning, it appears clear that the Legislature intended the one-year period to operate as a mandate. See Milwaukee Police Association v. Milwaukee, 92 Wis.2d 175, 181, 285 N.W.2d 133, 136 (1979) ()
The commission contends that if we view § 28-5-18 in light of § 28-5-17, 2 it is evident that the Legislature did not use the word "must" in its ordinary, imperative sense. Section 28-5-17 requires the commission to "endeavor to eliminate such unlawful employment practices by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion * * *." According to the commission, the first sentence of § 28-5-18 prohibits issuance of complaints until those informal efforts to conciliate disputes have failed. In light of that requirement, the commission argues that the Legislature could not have reasonably intended the one-year period provided in § 28-5-18 as an absolute bar to issuance of complaints after that time has passed. In the commission's view, that interpretation of § 28-5-18 would achieve harsh, unintended results because in many cases conciliation efforts will not have failed within the period prescribed for issuing complaints. The commission thus concludes that the Legislature did not use the word "must" in its usual, mandatory sense.
We are not persuaded by this argument. Viewed as a whole, § 28-5-18 prescribes an orderly procedure for the issuance of complaints by the commission. The first clause of § 28-5-18, "(i)f the commission fails to effect elimination of such unlawful employment practices and to obtain voluntary compliance with this chapter * * * (it) shall have the power to issue * * * a complaint * * *," incorporates into the complaint process the legislative preference expressed in § 28-5-17 for consensual elimination of unfair employment practices. In most cases, therefore, the commission will investigate alleged violations of, and seek voluntary compliance with, the Act before it institutes formal proceedings under § 28-5-18. The second and third clauses of § 28-5-18 empower the commission to vary that preferred sequence of events in individual cases. Those clauses provide that "if the circumstances warrant, in advance of any such preliminary investigation or endeavors (to obtain voluntary compliance), the commission shall have the power to issue * * * a complaint * * *." Section 28-5-18 does not indicate how extensive informal efforts to conciliate charges must be before those efforts are deemed failed. Nor does it indicate what circumstances warrant departure from the preferred sequence of investigation, conciliation, and complaint. Thus, contrary to its assertions, the commission may exercise discretion on a case-by-case basis to determine at what point a complaint should issue.
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