State v. Gonzalez, 54423-9
| Decision Date | 16 June 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 54423-9,54423-9 |
| Citation | 110 Wn.2d 738,757 P.2d 925 |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. Leandro Osuna GONZALEZ, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
James Kaufman, Whitman County Prosecutor, Colfax, for appellant.
Aitken, Schauble, Patrick, Neill & Charawell, Bruce A. Charawell, Pullman, for respondent.
Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Robert S. Lasnik, Chief of Staff, Rebecca J. Roe, Senior Deputy, Seattle, amicus curiae, for Washington Ass'n of Prosecuting Attorneys for appellant.
Patrick K. Stiley, Jeffry K. Finer, Spokane, amicus curiae, for Idaho-Washington Sexual Assault Coalition, Alternative to Violence, Complaining Witness, Nat. Organization for Women, for appellant.
Marcia B. Ruskin, Betsy R. Hollingsworth, Seattle, amicus curiae, for Northwest Women's Law Center for appellant.
The issue in this case is whether an alleged rape victim is required to reveal the names of her previous sexual partners when questioned in a pretrial deposition. The State argues that Washington's rape shield statute, which limits questioning about sexual history at trial, should be extended to provide similar protections for pretrial discovery matters. RCW 9A.44.020. Although we determine that the rape shield statute itself is not applicable to discovery matters, we find that the statute's underlying policies are helpful in interpreting the body of law that does apply, i.e., Washington's rules of criminal procedure. In the context presented here, these rules require the defendant to show that the requested information is material, and to show further that his interest in gathering exculpatory evidence outweighs the interests in protecting the alleged victim's privacy. We conclude that the defendant in the instant case has failed to show that the names of the alleged victim's sexual partners would be material to his defense.
The parties have stipulated to an agreed statement of the facts. On August 10, 1986, the complaining witness was 16 At approximately midnight, the complaining witness and a friend, Eloisa Hidalgo, left the party, stating that they were going to spend the night at the home of the complaining witness' sister. The two girls began hitchhiking and were eventually picked up by Leandro Gonzalez, a 27-year-old acquaintance of Eloisa. The complaining witness had never met Gonzalez prior to that night. The three drove to Clarkston, Washington, where the girls went swimming at a local park. Eloisa's boyfriend, Roy Varner, joined them at the park. An altercation broke out between Gonzalez and Varner, after which Eloisa and her boyfriend left the company of Gonzalez and the complaining witness.
years old and lived with her mother in Lewiston, Idaho. She had a 1 1/2-year-old child, born out of wedlock. On that day, she asked her mother for permission to go swimming with some friends. She was supposed to return home by 11 p.m. that evening. Around noon, she left with her friends. Instead of going swimming, they traveled to Pullman, Washington, where they went to a restaurant and then attended a barbecue and party at a friend's house
The defendant and the complaining witness disagree as to what happened next. The stipulation of facts reveals Gonzalez' version as follows:
At this point, Leandro states that the complaining witness suggested that they go back to the park where they had initially been swimming. Leandro agreed and indicates that after arriving at the park, he and the complaining witness engaged in consensual sexual intercourse in the backseat of his automobile. Leandro further asserts that at the conclusion of their sexual relations, the complaining witness expressed concern that she might become pregnant due to the fact that he had not withdrawn soon enough and that she already had one baby. Leandro states that the complaining witness said, "Every time I do this I get pregnant." Leandro further asserts that the complaining witness advised him that she couldn't go home because she didn't have a good explanation for her whereabouts and her mother would be angry. Leandro asserts that she asked him to take her The stipulation presents the complaining witness's account of these events in the following manner:
to the Moscow-Pullman area so she could spend the night with her sister.
The complaining witness alleges that they did not go back to the park after Roy Varner and Eloisa exited Leandro's automobile. Instead, she claims that Leandro began to drive back to Pullman and said that he was going to drop her off there in order to teach Eloisa and Roy Varner a lesson. She further states that she wanted Leandro to drop her off at her home in Lewiston. However, it is not clear from the statement the complaining witness gave to the police how or when that was communicated to Leandro or that she protested when Leandro drove through Lewiston and up the grade to Pullman.
* * *
The complaining witness further alleges that on the way back to Pullman Leandro stopped his car on a rural road near Uniontown, Washington, where they had sexual intercourse. The complaining witness asserts that the sexual intercourse took place in the backseat of his car in essentially the same fashion as Leandro described took place at the park in Clarkston. However, the complaining witness claims she engaged in intercourse because she felt she was being threatened by Leandro, including the implied threat that he had a gun in the glove compartment.
Afterwards, they went to Gonzalez' apartment in Pullman, the complaining witness alleging that she was forced to do so. Gonzalez twice left the apartment, once to get cigarettes from a neighbor and once to get a fan from another apartment. Gonzalez states that both trips were at the complaining witness's request and that both times she was left alone. The complaining witness asserts that she was left alone only once. They both fell asleep in his apartment.
In the morning, Gonzalez said he would take her home before going to work. On his way, he stopped at a gas station and began pumping gas. The complaining witness got out of the car and refused to rejoin the defendant. He left her there and went to work.
Gonzalez was charged with first degree rape and first degree kidnapping. At an omnibus hearing, Gonzalez sought permission to depose the complaining witness, to which the prosecutor did not object.
At her deposition, the complaining witness was asked to reveal the names of all individuals with whom she had previously engaged in sexual intercourse, consensual or otherwise. She refused to answer, even after being informed by the trial court that she could be jailed for civil contempt.
The defense moved to suppress the complaining witness's testimony at trial or alternatively to have her judged in contempt of court. The trial court concluded that her actions had "deprived [defense counsel] of the opportunity to make a reasonable investigation for purposes of developing evidence which would be admissible at a rape shield hearing and possibly at trial." The trial court also determined that the appropriate sanction was to suppress the complaining witness's testimony. In so holding, it noted that the practical effect of the court's ruling was to terminate the case against Gonzalez.
The State appealed this ruling to Division Three of the Court of Appeals. See RAP 2.2(b)(2). The case was transferred to this court pursuant to RCW 2.06.030.
This case pits an alleged rape victim's interest in keeping private her past sexual behavior against a defendant's right to gather information in preparing his defense. The State, as well as amici curiae, contend that forcing a victim to answer such questions in a deposition will discourage rape prosecutions, contrary to the policy behind the rape shield statute. Gonzalez argues, on the other hand, that he must be allowed to inquire into the complaining witness's sexual history at the discovery level because of the heavy burden he faces in a rape shield hearing of proving that the complainant's past sexual behavior is admissible.
Discovery in criminal cases is governed by the Superior Court Criminal Rules. See CrR 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7. CrR 4.6(a), which deals specifically with depositions, provides:
Upon a showing that a prospective witness may be unable to attend or prevented from attending a trial or hearing or if a witness refuses to discuss the case with either counsel and that his testimony is material and that it is necessary to take his deposition in order to prevent a failure of justice, the court at any time after the filing of an indictment or information may upon motion of a party and notice to the parties order that his testimony be taken by deposition ...
(Italics ours.) Thus, our threshold inquiry is whether the information Gonzalez seeks is material to his defense.
Gonzalez maintains that he need not show that the deposition answers would themselves be material to his defense; he argues that he need only show that the names of the complaining witness's sexual partners would be reasonably calculated to lead to material information. He intends to have an investigator contact the sexual partners in order to determine if any past events would be relevant to his contentions that the complainant consented to have sex with him and that she had a motive to falsely charge him with rape. To support his position, Gonzalez relies on Superior Court Civil Rule 26(b)(1), which provides in relevant part:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party ... It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of...
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