State v. Goode, 1679
| Decision Date | 15 April 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 1679,1679 |
| Citation | 305 S.C. 176,406 S.E.2d 391 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Melvin Edward GOODE, Appellant. . Heard |
Assistant Appellate Defender Daniel T. Stacey, of South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellant.
Attorney Gen., T. Travis Medlock, Asst. Attys. Gen., Harold M. Coombs, Jr., and Amie L. Clifford, Columbia and Sol. W. Townes Jones, IV, Greenwood, for respondent.
This is an appeal from a conviction on two counts of felony driving under the influence (felony DUI). On September 1, 1988, a car being driven by Melvin Edward Goode collided head on with another being driven by a young mother who was accompanied by her small child. The mother died at the scene; the child died a short time later. Goode was injured and was pinned in his car by the wreckage. Officers on the scene smelled a strong odor of alcohol on Mr. Goode, particularly around his face. Goode was transported to a nearby hospital. As a routine emergency procedure, medical personnel drew a sample of his blood. The laboratory analysis revealed Goode's blood contained alcohol. At trial there was no testimony translating the blood alcohol content into a degree of impairment. The jury found Goode guilty on two counts of felony DUI. He appeals that conviction. We affirm.
Goode presents two arguments on appeal. First, he asserts the trial judge erred in allowing two highway patrol officers to testify about the circumstances of the accident because they were not qualified as experts. Second, he contends it was error for the judge to deny his motion for directed verdict since the State was unable to prove impairment.
We first address the argument that the judge erred in admitting the officers' testimony.
Goode challenges the admission of the testimony of Officer McMahan to the extent he was allowed to give opinion testimony as to the lane of impact. McMahan testified that he observed a "gouge mark" in the victim's lane, thus "indicating to [him] that the collision had taken place in [the victim's] lane." Goode did not object to McMahan's opinion. After the State asked McMahan to explain the basis of his opinion, counsel for Goode stated, Overruling the objection, the court qualified McMahan as an expert, but advised the State to lay a foundation as to experience.
We discern no error in the court's qualification of McMahan as an expert on the "lane of impact" issue. Qualification of a witness as an expert rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge. State v. Childs, 299 S.C. 471, 385 S.E.2d 839 (1989). His decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse. McCown v. Muldrow, 91 S.C. 523, 74 S.E. 386 (1912). There is no abuse of discretion as long as the witness has acquired by study or practical experience such knowledge of the subject matter of his testimony as would enable him to give guidance and assistance to the jury in resolving a factual issue which is beyond the scope of the jury's good judgment and common knowledge. Botehlo v. Bycura, 282 S.C. 578, 320 S.E.2d 59 (Ct.App.1984). There is no exact requirement concerning how knowledge or skill must be acquired. Honea v. Prior, 295 S.C. 526, 530, 369 S.E.2d 846, 849 (Ct.App.1988).
McMahan testified that he had received twelve weeks training in the South Carolina Highway Department Academy, including specific training on determining the point of impact in accident investigations; that he had spent one week in on the road training with a municipal police force; and that he had been a state trooper with four to five months experience at the time of the accident. In light of this training and experience, which could have provided guidance and assistance to the jury on the question of "point of impact," it cannot be said the trial judge abused his discretion in qualifying Officer McMahan as an expert on that issue.
For similar reasons, we reject Goode's challenge to the judge's qualification of the second officer, Officer Coster. Goode argues that Coster should not have been allowed to testify as to Goode's post impact speed because he was not qualified to give expert testimony on that issue.
Coster testified that at the time he investigated this accident he was a sixteen year veteran with the Highway Patrol; he had...
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