State v. Goodrich

• Decision Date: 15 July 1977
• Docket Number: No. 46101,46101
• Citation: 256 N.W.2d 506
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. William Charles GOODRICH, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 506

256 N.W.2d 506

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. William Charles GOODRICH, Appellant.

No. 46101.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 15, 1977.

Syllabus by the Court

The inventory search of defendant's automobile was constitutionally impermissible and the evidence obtained thereby inadmissible where impoundment of the automobile, which justified the inventory, furthered no reasonable police purpose.

Defendant's appeal is not moot.

C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Jeanne L. Schleh, and Robert J. McNulty, Jr., Asst. Public Defenders, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Richard G. Mark, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frederick S. Suhler, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Randolph T. Brown, County Atty., Long Prairie, for respondent.

Heard before ROGOSHESKE, PETERSON, and MacLAUGHLIN, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.

PETERSON, Justice.

On the basis of evidence obtained during an "inventory" of defendant's automobile, which had been impounded when defendant was arrested for "driving under the influence," Minn.St. 169.121, subd. 1(a), defendant, William C. Goodrich, was found guilty of two counts of possession of controlled substances, Minn.St. 152.09, subd. 1(2). On appeal, defendant asserts that the evidence was inadmissible, being the fruit of an unconstitutional search. We hold that where police assumed custody of defendant's automobile for no legitimate state purpose other than safekeeping, and where defendant had arranged for alternative means, not shown to be unreasonable, for the safeguarding of his property, impoundment of defendant's automobile was unreasonable and, therefore, the concomitant inventory was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. We accordingly reverse.

While on duty the evening of Friday, August 30, 1974, Officer Dwaine Winter of the Staples Police Department received from the police dispatcher two complaints of erratic driving. Responding to these complaints, the officer followed an automobile being driven by defendant. After about a block and a half, during which time the officer noticed nothing wrong with defendant's driving, defendant drove his automobile off the road and into a gasoline service station. The officer followed parked his vehicle, got out, and approached defendant to tell him about the complaints. The officer testified that defendant appeared "disheveled, mussed up, blear(y)-eyed." His eyes were "blood shot, watery, pupils were large, dilated," his speech was "not normal," and he moved in a staggered, uncoordinated way. In contrast, five other witnesses testified that defendant's appearance was not unusual, nor did he appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

After confronting defendant, Officer Winter arrested him for "driving under the influence," Minn.St. 169.121, subd. 1(a). He proceeded to search through defendant's automobile over defendant's objections that he had no right to do so. The officer asked defendant to open the locked glove compartment, but defendant, who retained possession of the keys, refused.

During this period, a computer check revealed that the automobile was not registered to defendant. Officer Winter testified that he questioned defendant about this and that defendant responded that he had recently purchased the automobile. Defendant testified that he was never asked about ownership of the automobile.

Upon defendant's request, Officer Winter permitted him to cross the street to make a telephone call while the officer remained at the service station. Finding the telephone occupied, defendant returned to the service station and, from there, called his brother. Soon after, defendant's brother and mother arrived. Defendant testified that he called his brother because the officer had indicated that he was going to impound the automobile and defendant hoped to avoid the towing and storage fees by arranging for his family to take the automobile home. Staples is a small town and Officer Winter knew defendant and his family. Defendant's brother asked Officer Winter if he could take the automobile. The officer, who had already called the garage owner under contract with the city to tow vehicles, refused the brother's request.

Defendant's automobile was towed to the impoundment lot and placed in a locked garage. Defendant was taken to the police station and then to the hospital, after he consented to the administration of tests for alcohol and drug consumption. After the tests, defendant was taken to jail. The tests subsequently showed negative results.

Officer Winter had been on duty alone and did not have time to inventory the automobile before impounding it. The following morning, the owner of the garage in which the automobile was parked notified Officer Winter that he wished to remove it from the garage to make room for his own vehicle. Officer Winter arranged for Chief Henry Michael Carr of the Staples Police Department to meet him at the garage to inventory the contents of the automobile.

The two police officers searched the automobile thoroughly. On the floor of the automobile, under some candy wrappers, they found a white tablet. Although the glove compartment was described as "locked," Chief Carr stated that he put his fingers on it and "it popped open." In the glove compartment the officers found some more white tablets, which proved to be amphetamines, and a small quantity of LSD.

Officer Winter testified that his practice is to impound a vehicle whenever the vehicle is in a public place and the driver is taken into custody. His reason is that:

" * * * (Y)ou are responsible when you are taking a man in custody, for his car or whatever he might have with him; you are responsible to see that is properly taken care of. You don't leave it on the street. You are responsible for any valuables or anything in his personal possession."

An impounded vehicle is taken to either of two places: If the driver will allow a police officer to drive the vehicle, the vehicle is driven to the police station parking lot, locked, and left there; otherwise, the vehicle is towed to a privately owned lot pursuant to a contract between the city and the owner of the lot. In either event, an inventory is taken. When first asked, Winter explained that he impounded defendant's automobile because defendant would not allow anyone to drive it to the police station parking lot.

Chief Carr testified that the impoundment policy of the Staples Police Department is that an officer impounds a vehicle if and when, in that officer's discretion, impoundment is necessary. The department had issued no written regulations, but Chief Carr said the described policy had been in effect during the 4 years of his tenure with the department. He described the purpose of impoundment as "(m)ostly for security and safety purposes."

At the conclusion of the Rasmussen hearing, the trial court made oral findings and held the evidence admissible. It found that the impoundment and inventory were "the usual procedure" in the city of Staples and that it was reasonable for the officers to have conducted the inventory when they did. The court then stated:

" * * * I think this need to impound in that sense is discretionary with the officer. There is argument that both the defendant's brother and mother were responsible persons. That very likely is true. There has been no evidence at this hearing to indicate that however, or more importantly to indicate that the officer knew that at the time.

"There is also the question of the ownership of the car, and I think the officer would have some problems justifying his actions if he had turned the car over to even a relative if it turned out not to be a responsible person.

"I might add to the comments I previously made that there was no evidence on the part of the officer that at the time the defendant's brother and mother appeared at the filling station that they were intoxicated or otherwise incompetent to drive an automobile; it doesn't appear the officer made any inquiry; the fact they appeared there by automobile would give some indication that at least one of them was a licensed driver, although there is no specific evidence on the matter, and as I said it does not appear the officer made any such inquiry, in fact I think the testimony from their request to take the car his answer was 'no.' I could add to that, it appears that whether or not the defendant's mother or brother were licensed drivers is not a factor in the officer's determination not to release the car to them since he made no inquiry."

Defendant argues that the evidence is inadmissible because (1) the "investigatory stop" of defendant was unconstitutional, rendering illegal the arrest and the impoundment and inventory conducted pursuant to that arrest; (2) the search of defendant's automobile violated his Fourth Amendment rights where reasonable alternatives to impoundment existed. We find the latter argument determinative and do not reach defendant's alternative issue that the "inventory" was merely a pretext for an investigatory search.

The United States Supreme Court, in the case of South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976), recently considered the reasonableness of warrantless, nonconsensual, automobile "inventory" searches. Because the state had conceded the applicability of the Fourth Amendment, a majority of the court did not reach the issue of whether automobile inventories are searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The supreme court held that inventories of automobiles impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody are reasonable when conducted pursuant to standard police procedures "aimed at securing or protecting the car and its contents." 428 U.S. 373, 96 S.Ct. 3098, 49 L.Ed.2d 1007.

In Opperman, defendant's unoccupied automobile was impounded after it was ticketed twice for over-time parking violations while parked overnight in a restricted zone....