State v. Gordon

• Decision Date: 31 July 1908
• Citation: 117 N.W. 483,105 Minn. 217
• Parties: STATE v. GORDON.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

105 Minn. 217

117 N.W. 483

STATE

v.GORDON.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 31, 1908.

Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; Frederick V. Brown, Judge.

Ben Gordon was convicted of receiving goods, knowing them to have been stolen. From an order denying his motion to set aside the verdict and to grant a new trial, he appeals. Affirmed.

Appellant was indicted for buying and receiving from Brooks and Burton copper wire of the value of $30, knowing the same to have been stolen. On trial these 18 year old boys appeared as witnesses for the state, testifying that they took from an open platform of the Twin City Rapid Transit Company five coils of copper wire. On the following evening, between 7 and 8 o'clock, they carried the coils of wire to the back yard of defendant. Defendant examined the wire, but refused to buy it, except at his shop. The boys threw the wire into defendant's wagon in the yard. At their request he took it to his shop the next day. The next morning the boys called at the shop, weighed the copper, and sold it to him. Two or three days before the sale they asked if he would buy copper wire scrap. He said he would buy it, if he saw it. He refused to go to Hopkins to get it. He said something about looking out for the policeman. Both boys testified that they did not tell defendant that the wire was stolen. The officer who took the boys into custody on the next day went with one of the witnesses on trial to defendant's shop. Defendant denied having any wire, or having bought any within the last six months. ‘He denied buying any copper wire until we got him in front of these boys, and afterwards he admitted it to the county attorney.’ He admitted the purchase. Subsequently wire was found in defendant's place. There was controversy as to the identity of the wire. This appeal was taken from an order denying defendant's motion to set aside the verdict of guilty and to grant a new trial.

Syllabus by the Court

To sustain a conviction on an indictment for buying and receiving stolen goods, the state must bear the burden of showing that defendant bought the property described, that the property received was stolen, and that the defendant knew it to be stolen when he bought it.

A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless sufficiently corroborated. Section 4744, Rev. Laws 1905.

The general test to determine whether a witness is or is not an ‘accomplice’ is, could he himself have been indicted for the offense, either as principal or accessory? If he could not, then he is not an accomplice. State v. Durnam, 78 Minn. 165, 75 N. W. 1127, followed and applied.

Guilty knowledge on the part of the accused need not be directly proved. It may be shown by circumstances. In determining whether the fact existed, the jury will be justified in presuming that the accused acted rationally, and that whatever would have conveyed knowledge or induced the belief in the mind of a reasonable person would, in the absence of countervailing evidence, be sufficient to apprise the prisoner of the like fact and to induce in his mind the like impression and belief.

The fact that property was taken to the accused at an unusual hour of the night is a circumstance indicating guilty knowledge.

The evidence in this case is held sufficient to sustain the conviction of the defendant for having received copper wire from two boys who stole it. Geo. Harold Smith and F. H. Morrill (A. B. Jackson, of counsel), for appellant.

E. T. Young, C. S. Jelley, and Al. J. Smith, for the State.

JAGGARD, J. (after stating the facts as above).

The pivotal question is whether the court properly received the testimony of the boys, Brooks and Burton. The offense charged consists of three factors, each of which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by competent evidence, and not alone on the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices (section 4744, Rev Laws 1905), to sustain a conviction: First, that defendant bought the property described; second, that the property bought was stolen; third, that defendant knew it to be stolen when he bought it. The first of these factors is admitted. Whether the state sufficiently bore the burden of proving the other two factors depends primarily upon the legal propriety of the admission by the trial court of the evidence of the boys, Brooks and Burton. The defendant insists that they were accomplices, that their testimony was uncorroborated, and that therefore the conviction could not stand. This position we regard as untenable. State v. Lawlor, 28 Minn. 216, 224, 9 N. W. 698, 702. ‘The general test to determine whether a witness is or is not an accomplice is, could he himself have been indicted for the offense, either as principal or accessory? If he could not, then he is not an accomplice.’ State v. Durnam, 73 Minn. 165, 75 N. W. 1127. ‘A person who steals property and one who afterwards receives it from him knowing it to be stolen are guilty of separate offenses, and, unless more...