State v. Gordon, 86-471

Citation539 A.2d 528
Decision Date31 March 1988
Docket NumberNo. 86-471,86-471
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
PartiesSTATE v. David N. GORDON, Jr. C.A.

James E. O'Neil, Atty. Gen., Annie Goldberg, Thomas Dickinson, Asst. Attys. Gen., for plaintiff.

Barbara Hurst, Paula Rosin, Asst. Public Defenders, for defendant.

OPINION

FAY, Chief Justice.

On September 30, 1983, following retrial, the defendant, David N. Gordon, Jr., was convicted of first-degree arson and conspiracy to commit arson. 1 The fire for which a Superior Court jury found the defendant culpable occurred on June 22, 1981. The conflagration destroyed Turilli's Furniture Company, which had been located on Warwick Avenue in Warwick, Rhode Island. The trial justice rejected the state's recommendation of a twenty-five-year sentence, which consisted of fifteen years on the arson count to be served concurrently with ten years' imprisonment for the conspiracy count, followed by a ten-year suspended sentence remaining for the arson. Instead the trial justice sentenced Gordon to fifty years for the arson, ensued by ten years to serve for the conspiracy.

In State v. Gordon, 508 A.2d 1339 (R.I. 1986), this court denied and dismissed defendant's first appeal, which challenged the merits of his conviction. 2 Subsequent to that disposition, defendant moved pursuant to Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure to reduce his sentence. 3 In that motion, defendant urged the same trial justice who had formulated the sentence to reexamine its proportionality. This case comes before us again, this time on appeal from the trial justice's denial of the motion to reduce.

The defendant contends that the trial justice pronounced a sentence that is grossly disparate to those imposed in other first-degree arson cases and that he unduly emphasized the financial and emotional loss on the part of the Turilli family. The defendant argues that had he accepted the prosecution's original plea bargaining agreement, he would have served only five years. 4

Although we realize the devastating impact a sixty-year term would have on any person, we hold that the trial justice remained within the parameters of his discretion in formulating the sentence. The arson statute, G.L. 1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 11-4-2 reads in pertinent part:

"Any person who knowingly causes, procures, aids, counsels or creates by means of fire or explosion, a substantial risk of serious physical harm to any person or damage to any building the property of himself or another, whether or not used for residential purposes, which is occupied or in use or which has been occupied or in use during the six (6) months preceding the offense or to any other residential structure, shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than five (5) years and may be imprisoned for life and shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) or both * * *."

The statute plainly permits life imprisonment for the crime. Given our narrow scope of review in appeals based on Rule 35, we affirm the trial court decision.

In State v. Fortes, 114 R.I. 161, 173, 330 A.2d 404, 411 (1975), this court explained that it has appellate power to review actions of other Rhode Island courts as part of its general supervisory control. We determined that even absent express statutory authority, this court has the power to review a sentence alleged to be excessive although within the statutory limit. Id. at 172, 330 A.2d at 411. Recognizing the strong policy against interfering with the decisions of the trial justice, we warned, however, that "[w]e should use this power only when the record points convincingly to the conclusion that the sentencing justice has without justification imposed a sentence which is grossly disparate from sentences generally imposed for similar offenses." Id. at 173, 330 A.2d at 411; see also State v. Ouimette, 479 A.2d 702, 704 (R.I. 1984); State v. Giorgi, 121 R.I. 280, 282, 397 A.2d 898, 899 (1979). The defendant bears the burden of proving that the sentence violates this standard. State v. Ouimette, 479 A.2d at 704. We believe that defendant has failed to fulfill his burden of proof.

The analysis begins with the proposition that the trial justice has the power to impose a more severe punishment than the prosecution recommends. Leonardo v. State, 444 A.2d 876, 877 (R.I. 1982); see also G.L. 1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 12-19-2 (permitting the court to select, in its discretion, the punishment to be imposed). It is therefore within his discretion to increase the term to suit the circumstances of the particular crime involved. Although in arriving at his decision a trial justice may use benchmarks as a guide to the proportionality of a term, he is bound only by the statutory limits. See Sentencing Study Committee, Rhode Island Supreme Court, Report of the Sentencing Study Committee (January 1981). Defense counsel's thorough examination of other arson sentences may reveal a norm, but not a mandate. In formulating a fair sentence, the trial justice bears the affirmative duty to treat each defendant separately, focusing on the individual's unique background and character. State v. Bertoldi, 495 A.2d 247, 253 (R.I. 1985). He should consider the gravity of the crime, the possibilities for defendant's rehabilitation, deterrence to others, and the appropriateness of the punishment for the crime. Id. (citing State v. Upham, 439 A.2d 912 (R.I. 1982)); State v. Ouimette, 479 A.2d at 705. In estimating the ability to be rehabilitated, the sentencing judge examines a defendant's attitude toward society, his sense of remorse, as well as his inclination and capacity to take his place as an honest and useful member of society. State v. Bertoldi, 495 A.2d at 253.

An examination of the transcript indicates that the trial justice considered all these relevant factors. He was cognizant of defendant's youth and aware that his record indicated...

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18 cases
  • State v. Thornton
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • June 27, 2002
    ...justice is bound only by the statutory parameters established by the Legislature. Bettencourt, 766 A.2d at 394 (citing State v. Gordon, 539 A.2d 528, 530 (R.I.1988)). After reviewing the presentence report, letters from the victim, her family, the chaplain atthe ACI, and Thornton's extensiv......
  • State v. Marini
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • March 8, 1994
    ...114 R.I. 161, 173, 330 A.2d 404, 411 (1975). In imposing sentences, trial justices are bound only by statutory limits. State v. Gordon, 539 A.2d 528, 530 (R.I.1988). Past arson sentences provide a norm or benchmark for sentencing, not a mandate. Id. The sentencing justice may impose a more ......
  • State v. Tiernan
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • July 12, 1994
    ...society, his sense of remorse, as well as his inclination and capacity to take his place as an honest and useful member of society." Gordon, 539 A.2d at 530; see also Bertoldi, 495 A.2d at 253. Likewise, a defendant's giving of false testimony may be probative of his attitude toward society......
  • Gordon v. Vose
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
    • January 3, 1995
    ...Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion to reduce sentence which was denied by the trial justice. This denial was affirmed. State v. Gordon, 539 A.2d 528 (R.I.1988). Subsequently, petitioner filed for postconviction relief which was denied by the trial justice. On appeal, the Rhode Island Sup......
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