State v. Gorham

• Decision Date: 19 March 1920
• Docket Number: 15692.
• Citation: 110 Wash. 330,188 P. 457
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. GORHAM.

188 P. 457

110 Wash. 330

STATE v. GORHAM.

No. 15692.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 19, 1920

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; Hugo E. Oswald, Judge.

C Gorham was convicted of violation of the speed ordinances of the city of Hillyard, and he appeals. Reversed, and cause remanded, with instruction to discharge defendant.

Joseph B. Lindsley and Fred J. Cunningham, both of Spokane, for appellant.

C. C Upton, of Hillyard, for the State.

FULLERTON J.

The appellant was convicted of a violation of the speed ordinances of the city of Hillyard. The facts are stipulated and are in substance these: The city named lies within and forms a part of the county of Spokane. The appellant is a duly appointed, qualified, and acting deputy sheriff of such county. On June 3, 1919, a charge of grand larceny was preferred against one William Agnew, and a warrant issued for his arrest. This warrant was given to the appellant for execution. The specific charge was the larceny of an automobile, and on inquiry the appellant was informed by a police officer of the city of Spokane that the accused had been seen on that day on the downtown streets of the city driving an automobile bearing the license number of the stolen automobile. Upon further inquiry the officer found a young man who knew the accused and who stated to the officer that he had seen the accused only a few moments before that time driving an automobile 'at a good rate of speed' toward the city of Hillyard on the main highway leading from the city of Spokane to that city. The officer immediately took up the pursuit of the accused on a motorcycle, and in passing through the city of Hillyard rode the motorcycle at a greater rate of speed than its ordinances permitted.

In this court the appellant makes two principal contentions: First that the ordinances which the appellant is accused of violating are invalid because in conflict with the statutes of the state; and, second, that a sheriff is exempt from the operation of city ordinances regulating the speed at which a motor vehicle may be driven when he is in the pursuit of a person accused of felony for whose arrest he has a warrant. The conclusion we have reached on the second contention makes it unnecessary to discuss the first.

The sheriff is made by state the chief executive officer and conservator of the peace of the county. By statute also it is made his duty to keep the public peace, and to arrest and confine all persons who commit violations of the law, and especially is it made his duty to execute all process issued to him by a court of justice. His duties in these respects are public duties necessary to the safety of the state and its people, and necessary for the preservation of public and private property. In the performance of these duties the sheriff has many privileges not accorded to a private individual, and statutes and ordinances directed against the individual do not generally apply to him when so performing them, expecially where their enforcement would hamper and hinder performance.

That the enforcement of statutory or ordinance provision limiting the speed at which a motor-propelled vehicle shall be driven over a public highway against a peace officer would have a tendency to hamper him in the performance of his...