State v. Gorringe

• Decision Date: 17 February 2021
• Docket Number: Docket No. 46554
• Citation: 481 P.3d 723
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Max J. GORRINGE, Defendant-Appellant.

481 P.3d 723

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Max J. GORRINGE, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 46554

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, November 2020 Term.

Opinion Filed: February 17, 2021

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant Max J. Gorringe. Erik R. Lehtinen argued.

Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent State of Idaho. Justin R. Porter argued.

STEGNER, Justice.

Defendant Max Gorringe appeals from the district court's order amending a no contact order. A no contact order was originally entered against Gorringe after he was initially charged with attempted strangulation in 2011. Upon acceptance of Gorringe's guilty plea to that charge in 2012, the district court rescinded the existing no contact order and in its place included no contact provisions in the Judgment and Commitment.

In 2018, Gorringe was charged with a misdemeanor for allegedly violating the no contact provisions contained in the original Judgment and Commitment. Gorringe sought clarification of the existing provisions from the district court that originally entered the judgment. Gorringe moved the district court to modify the no contact provisions, and the parties stipulated to an amendment of the order in exchange for the dismissal of Gorringe's misdemeanor charge. Although the district court expressed reservations regarding its jurisdiction to amend the no contact provisions that had been incorporated into the prior Judgment and Commitment, the district court nonetheless amended the 2012 no contact order based on the parties’ stipulation and the State's assurance that the victim did not object to the amendment.

Gorringe appeals the district court's order amending the no contact provisions, asserting that the no contact provisions included in the 2012 Judgment and Commitment are invalid. Gorringe also asserts that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to amend the order in 2018. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the district court's order amending the no contact provisions.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 1, 2011, Gorringe pleaded guilty to attempted strangulation after a domestic dispute with his partner. Prior to the entry of his guilty plea, the district court entered a no contact order prohibiting Gorringe, from contacting both his partner and their child. During Gorringe's sentencing, the district court rescinded the existing no contact order. However, instead of entering a new separate no contact order on the court form then used in the Third Judicial District, the district court incorporated the no contact provisions into its Judgment and Commitment, which was entered on January 30, 2012. The new no contact provisions stated: "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall have No Contact with [S.Y.], the victim in this case. Third party contact may occur with [S.Y.] to wit; by contacting [K.M.] solely for the purposes of arranging visitation with [R.G., their child.]"

Gorringe appealed his conviction. The case was assigned to the Idaho Court of Appeals. On appeal he argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for a violation of Idaho Criminal Rule 5.1. Gorringe argued that the time to conduct a preliminary hearing had been exceeded. See I.C.R. 5.1(a). Notably, Gorringe did not challenge the no contact provisions contained in the Judgment and Commitment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of Gorringe's motion to dismiss on March 13, 2013, and a remittitur issued on March 28, 2013. See State v. Gorringe , No. 39638, 2013 WL 5988408, at *1 (Idaho Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2013) (unpublished).

In December 2017, Gorringe was charged with a misdemeanor in the magistrate court for allegedly violating the no contact provisions entered in 2012.¹ Gorringe moved the district court that originally entered the judgment for clarification of the terms of the no contact order.² The parties concurrently filed a stipulation clarifying the terms of the previously issued no contact provisions, including setting forth an expiration date which the prior order did not include. The stipulation was apparently in exchange for a dismissal of the misdemeanor charge, which accused Gorringe of violating the long-standing no contact order. At the hearing, Gorringe's counsel explained the need to clarify the terms of the no contact order, noting that a civil protection order regarding the same dispute and victim existed concurrently with the criminal no contact order at issue.³ The district court then candidly acknowledged that it had "no jurisdiction or authority to change the material terms of the judgment." The district court expressed doubt regarding its authority to modify the 2012 no contact order:

I was concerned about my authority to do anything with the no contact order portion of this judgment, but no contact orders now are required to be entered on a separate form that the Supreme Court has set out, and my interpretation of the judgment is that when this was entered on January 30 of 2012 that portion was not intended to be res judicata but rather was included in the judgment for convenience and was intended to be modifiable, including on the motion of the victim at a later date should the victim want the order to be modified.

So I think that's the only thing that I have found in this judgment that I actually have jurisdiction to change is that one portion of that no contact portion, but, you know, I'm not positive about that. And I would have been very reluctant to do it in the absence of additional legal authority except that the parties stipulated in this case. And because there's been a stipulation and the approval of the victim, I'm comfortable going forward because I don't want all of your lives to be tied up with the technicalities of the legal system. I want you to be able to just live your lives as best you can given the limitations of the case here.

The district court entered the amended no contact order pursuant to the parties’ stipulation.

Gorringe filed a pro se notice of appeal which, pursuant to the prison mailbox rule,⁴ was timely.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"[T]he issue of whether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, over which we exercise free review." Valiant Idaho, LLC v. VP Inc. , 164 Idaho 314, 332, 429 P.3d 855, 873 (2018) (quoting Slavens v. Slavens , 161 Idaho 198, 201, 384 P.3d 962, 965 (2016) ). "An order entered without subject matter jurisdiction is void." State v. Vaughn , 156 Idaho 13, 15, 319 P.3d 497, 499 (Ct. App. 2014) (quoting State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 610, 612–13, 226 P.3d 552, 554–55 (Ct. App. 2010) ).

"Subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time." Ackerschott v. Mountain View Hosp., LLC , 166 Idaho 223, 237, 457 P.3d 875, 889 (2020). "The Court exercises free review over interpretation of statutes and the Idaho Criminal Rules." State v. Hillbroom , 158 Idaho 789, 791, 352 P.3d 999, 1001 (2015).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The law of the case doctrine does not bar Gorringe from claiming that the 2012 no contact provision is unenforceable.

In February 2012, Gorringe appealed his conviction alleging that the district court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss due to a violation of Idaho Criminal Rule 5.1(a). Gorringe did not challenge the validity of the no contact order set forth in the 2012 Judgment and Commitment in his 2012 appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of Gorringe's motion to dismiss and made no mention of the no contact provision set forth in the judgment. See Gorringe , No. 39638, 2013 WL 5988408, at *1.

On appeal, Gorringe asserts that the 2012 no contact order was invalid from the time it was first issued because it did not comply with Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2(a). In response, the State contends that Gorringe is barred from challenging the validity of the no contact order contained in the 2012 judgment because he "did not raise [this claim] in his appeal from the judgment." The State relies on the law of the case doctrine, which "prevents consideration on a subsequent appeal of alleged errors that might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier appeal." State v. Hawkins , 155 Idaho 69, 72, 305 P.3d 513, 516 (2013) (quoting Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709, 201 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2009) ).

Gorringe responds by noting that the original no contact order entered on May 25, 2011—after Gorringe had been charged, but prior to his pleading guilty or sentencing—had an expiration date of May 25, 2012.⁵ Therefore, at the time Gorringe appealed in February 2012, "there was no reason to challenge the no contact order on appeal because [Gorringe] had been led to believe the no contact order expired later that year [in 2012]."

The law of the case doctrine, which is well settled in Idaho,

requires that when an appellate court, in "deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision , such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal[.]"

Berrett v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 161 , 165 Idaho 913, 921, 454 P.3d 555, 563 (2019) (quoting Regan v. Owen , 163 Idaho 359, 363, 413 P.3d 759, 763 (2018) (italics in original)); see also Swanson v. Swanson , 134 Idaho 512, 515, 5 P.3d 973, 976 (2000). "The underlying purpose of the doctrine is to ‘maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of a single, continuing lawsuit. ...’ " Berrett , 165 Idaho at 922, 454 P.3d at 564 (quoting State v. Dunlap , 155 Idaho 345, 375–76, 313 P.3d 1, 31–32 (2013) ).

Here, the Court of Appeals did not consider the validity of the 2012 no contact provisions, let alone set forth a "principle or rule of law necessary to [its] decision" regarding those provisions. See Berrett , 165 Idaho at 921, 454 P.3d at 563 (italics removed); see also Gorring...