State v. Hawkins
| Decision Date | 17 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 38532.,38532. |
| Citation | 305 P.3d 513,155 Idaho 69 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Faron Raymond HAWKINS, Defendant–Respondent. |
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General argued.
Brady Law Chtd., Boise, for respondent. Eric D. Fredericksen argued.
This is a permissive interlocutory appeal from the district court's determination that the law of the case doctrine prohibited it from making a retroactive determination of Faron Hawkins's mental competency when he stood trial in January 2008.
In January 2008, a jury convicted Faron Hawkins of two counts of robbery. He appealed his conviction and the Idaho Court of Appeals issued a decision on December 30, 2009, vacating the conviction and remanding the matter for a new trial. The Court of Appeals determined that the district court erred by not having Hawkins undergo a mental health evaluation during his jury trial to determine whether or not he was competent to proceed. Specifically, the Court of Appeals stated:
State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 782–83, 229 P.3d 379, 387–88 (Ct.App.2009).
On remand, the district court ordered Hawkins to undergo a competency evaluation pursuant to I.C. §§ 18–211 and 18–212. Licensed psychologist Dr. Chad Sombke and licensed psychiatrist Dr. Michael Estess evaluated Hawkins and testified that based on their interactions with him, his responses to testing, and information regarding his social and institutional history, Hawkins was competent to stand trial. Dr. Estess was a consulting psychiatrist for the Ada County Jail and had a clinic there with three masters-level social workers on staff throughout the two-year period Hawkins was incarcerated at the Ada County Jail. Dr. Estess testified that he interacted with Hawkins individually during this time period on several occasions and also spoke often with social workers and jail staff who had more frequent contact with him. Between 2006 and 2008, neither he nor his staff believed that Hawkins suffered from any mental illness. Dr. Estess testified at Hawkins's 2010 competency hearing that, based on the documents he reviewed, the interviews he conducted, and his interactions and his staff's interactions with Hawkins prior to trial, he believed Hawkins was "perfectly competent to understand the nature of the proceedings, to confer with an attorney in his own defense and understand what was going on" at the time he was tried in January 2008. It is unclear whether the Court of Appeals knew of Dr. Estess's interactions with Hawkins when it reviewed his appeal from his 2008 conviction. Based on the totality of the evidence presented to it, "including admitted exhibits and testimony presented during the competency hearing," the district court found that Hawkins was both presently competent to stand trial and had been competent to stand trial in January 2008. However, the court found that the law of the case required it to retry the case.
The State timely moved to file an interlocutory appeal from this decision, which the district court granted. The State then requested this Court's permission to appeal from the district court's December 6, 2010 Order, which this Court granted.
The State appeals the district court's determination that the law of the case doctrine required it to follow the Court of Appeals's directive that Hawkins is entitled to a new trial. In relevant part the Court of Appeals stated, "Because it is not possible to retroactively make a determination as to Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried, we must vacate the judgment of conviction and leave the state free to retry Hawkins if he is found to be competent to stand trial." Hawkins, 148 Idaho at 783, 229 P.3d at 388. The question before this Court is whether this language prohibits the district court from making a retroactive determination of Hawkins's mental competency when he stood trial in 2008. Hawkins first argues that this language prohibits the district court from retroactively determining his competency and, in the alternative, that such a determination would violate his due process rights.
"The credibility of witnesses, the weight of their testimony, and any inferences drawn are matters resolved by the district court and will not be set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous." Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 494, 36 P.3d 1278, 1282 (2001) (Stuart IV ). As to questions of law, this Court exercises free review. Id. at 494–95, 36 P.3d at 1282–83.
The State argues that the district court incorrectly determined that the law of the case prevents the court from making a retroactive competency determination. Hawkins responds that both I.A.R. 38 and the law of the case doctrine require the district court to follow the directive of the Court of Appeals and only allow the State to retry Hawkins. Additionally, Hawkins contends that the State waived any challenge to whether or not a retroactive competency evaluation is possible in his case by failing to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Hawkins argues that the State is precluded from now arguing that this Court should consider whether a retroactive competency determination is permissible. He contends that because the State has already had two opportunities to address the issue of retroactive competency determinations as a remedy and neglected to do so, the State has waived any further challenges regarding the issue.
Hawkins explains that in his first appeal he briefed the Court of Appeals on why a new trial was the proper remedy if it found that the district court erred, but the State failed to address this argument in its briefing. The Court of Appeals did address the issue in its decision, concluding that "[b]ecause it is not possible to retroactively make a determination as to Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried, we must vacate the judgment of conviction and leave the state free to retry Hawkins if he is found to be competent to stand trial." Hawkins, 148 Idaho at 783, 229 P.3d at 388. Hawkins argues that by failing to address this conclusion in its Petition for Review, the State waived any challenges as to the possibility of making a retroactive determination of Hawkins's competency. The State responds that it is not asking the court to consider this question, just whether or not the Court of Appeals's statement is the law of the case. The State concedes that if this Court determines that this statement is the law of the case, then a retroactive determination of Hawkins's competency should not be allowed.
Hawkins correctly cites that the law of the case doctrine "prevents consideration on a subsequent appeal of alleged errors that might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier appeal." Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709, 201 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2009). Therefore, the issue is: could the State have raised the question of whether the Court of Appeals's statement was the law of the case in its petition for review to the Supreme Court?
In its decision on Hawkins's first appeal, the Court of Appeals never discussed with factual recitation or legal argument why a retroactive competency determination would be impossible in Hawkins's case. We read the conclusion that a retroactive competency determination was impossible as indicating that such a determination could not be decided based on the record before the Court of Appeals. The State could have appealed the original Court of Appeals's decision that a retroactive competency determination was impossible, but this is not the issue the State is now presenting. Therefore, the State did not waive the issue of whether a retroactive competency hearing is the law of the case for the trial court.
The State argues that the Court of Appeals did not establish the law of the case in Hawkins when it stated "[b]ecause it is not possible to retroactively make a determination as to Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried, we must vacate the judgment of conviction and leave the state free to retry Hawkins if he is found to be competent to stand trial." Hawkins, 148 Idaho at 783, 229 P.3d at 388. The State argues that this statement is not the law of the case for three reasons: (1) it was not necessary to the only issue being raised on appeal; (2) there is no discussion as to why a retroactive determination is impossible; and (3) the statement is contrary to the facts that have been developed on remand.
The law of the case doctrine states that "upon an appeal, the Supreme Court, in deciding a case...
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...raised nor decided below, this decision has not been resolved and does not constitute the law of the case. See State v. Hawkins , 155 Idaho 69, 72, 305 P.3d 513, 516 (2013). ...
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