State v. Goza

• Decision Date: 10 November 1958
• Docket Number: No. 1,No. 46322,46322,1
• Citation: 317 S.W.2d 609
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Sammie Gene GOZA, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 609

317 S.W.2d 609

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Sammie Gene GOZA, Appellant.

No. 46322.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

Nov. 10, 1958.

Donald C. Littleton, Martin Schriewer, St. Louis, for appellant.

John M. Dalton, Atty. Gen., Arthur M. O'Keefe, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

DALTON, Judge.

Defendant was charged, tried and convicted of murder in the first degree and, in conformity to the jury's verdict, he was sentenced to be confined in the state penitentiary for the period of the remainder of his natural life. See Sections 559.010 and 559.030 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. He has appealed and assigns error on the giving of Instruction No. 4, requested by the State, and the refusal of Instruction 'B' requested by defendant.

On arraignment, defendant had entered a plea of 'not guilty', but he offered evidence tending to show that the alleged unlawful act could have been the product of mental disease or defect. The court construed this evidence to support the defense of 'not guilty by reason of insanity.' The jury was instructed with reference to that defense by the giving of Instruction No. 4. This instruction defined insanity, authorizing an acquittal, as 'a physical disease located in the brain, which disease so perverts and deranges one or more of the mental and moral faculties as to render the person suffering from this affliction incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, in reference to the particular act charged against him, and incapable of understanding that the particular act in question was a violation of the law.' Instruction 'B' offered by defendant and refused by the court would have told the jury that '* * * The test for determining insanity is simply that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease of defect. * * * If you believe he was suffering from a disease or defective mental condition when he committed the act, but believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was the product of such abnormality, then you must find the accused not guilty by reason of insanity.'

The State's evidence tended to show that about 6:00 p. m., on May 20, 1956, the defendant went to the home of his estranged wife Dortha Mae Goza, 2946 North Fourteenth Street, St. Louis, Missouri, and was there arguing with her about money. He said he needed money to go across the river. His wife was ironing in the front room and a neighbor lady, Liza Hedrick, her two children and another child were present in the room. Defendant had been drinking, as was indicated by his walk, talk, appearance and conduct, and his wife told him to go into the bedroom and 'sleep it off.' He went to the bedroom, but returned within a minute or two and shot his wife in the back. The bullet passed through her left lung. As she ran out of the door, defendant shot her twice more, one bullet striking her in the arm and another in the sternum. She collapsed and died on the steps of a house across the street. Death was caused by the gunshot wound in her left lung. Immediately after defendant's wife ran from the room, defendant turned and shot Mrs. Liza Hedrick three times and then left the house. He placed the gun in an ash can at Thirteenth and Wright streets from which it was later recovered by the police. Defendant then took a taxicab to a tavern in East St. Louis, Illinois, but returned to St. Louis the same day and was arrested as he walked north on Broadway, about 8:19 p. m.

In a written statement given the police after his arrest, defendant stated that he had the .22 caliber revolver in his inside jacket pocket when he went to the house; that he expected to find his wife's ex-husband there and he was going to shoot him, if he found him. The wife's ex-husband had recently been released from the penitentiary and defendant said that he had been coming, about four times per week, to the house to see his children (children born to defendant's wife during her prior marriage). Defendant said that, when he (defendant) arrived at the house, his wife told him to 'shove off', she didn't want to see him any more, and that he went in and laid down on the bed and started thinking about what she had said, and the more he thought about it the madder he got, so he pulled out the gun and shot her.

Defendant did not take the stand in his own behalf. He offered one witness, who testified that defendant's reputation was good, and he then called Dr. Lawrence M. McCullough, a psychiatrist at Malcolm Bliss Psychiatric Hospital, as a witness. Dr. McCullough testified that, from his examination of the defendant and from the hospital reports, it was a possibility that defendant at time of the crime had a seizure and was incapable of understanding the nature of his act or whether it was right or wrong. In rebuttal, the State called Dr. Val Satterfield, a psychiatrist, who testified that he had examined the defendant and the hospital records, and that in his opinion the defendant at the time of the offense knew the difference between right and wrong.

While counsel for appellant have approved, as 'substantially correct' and as 'a reasonable statement concerning the facts of the case,' the respondent's statement of facts in substantially the form hereinbefore set out, we think the statement inadequate to a full understanding of the particular issues presented.

Dr. McCullough's testimony further tended to show that defendant was admitted to Malcolm Bliss Hospital for examination on two occasions and two electroencephalograms were made or taken of defendant and reports issued thereon. The witness said 'Well, the electroencephalogram is very similar to the electrocardiogram, except that the electrodes are placed in various points in the scalp, this then by means of a machine which amplifies these electric brain patterns; it shows the electricity that is given off by the brain and makes a record of it on the paper so that it can be looked at. And with various different kinds of brain disturbance you get different patterns. The normal brain gives a certain kind of pattern, and the disturbed brain gives different kinds of patterns.' As to the report of the first electroencephalogram taken, the witness stated: 'The waking record is not remarkable, but during drowsiness there are one or two spike discharges, a single and multiple. ' Impression: There is probable paroxysmal, nonfocal dysrhythmia. The record will have to be repeated to confirm this, and preferably with more seconal at the start.' This means that on the record there were several spikes which were abnormal, and this showed up particularly after the patient was given some sedation which slowed down the brain, and this brings out--often brings out things that will not be seen on a waking record.'

With reference to the term 'paroxysmal dysrhythmia' the witness said: 'That means there is a dysrhythmia in the brain; in other words, it isn't a normal rhythm of the electrical pattern; and paroxysmal means that it comes in bursts or at intervals; it is not a consistent or constant thing, but you see them as bursts in the record.' This report also indicated an old scar in defendant's scalp from a 1948 accident.

The report of the second electroencephalogram made under Dr. McCullough's supervision showed 'During the drowsiness and light sleep there are spike discharges, mostly bilateral, a few on one side or the other. Sometimes these are multiple, or accompanied by large slow waves. * * * The Impression: Paroxysmal dysrhythmia with no persistent focus, highly consistent with organic cerebral involvement, and/or a convulsive disorder, including one manifested by psychomotor or atypical attacks.'

The witness further said that the report indicated definite evidence of some sort of involvement in the brain causing the abnormal brain waves which were consistent with some brain damage, 'or it is consistent with a type of epilepsy.' The witness gave it, as his opinion, that the condition shown by the report of January 1957 had also existed at the time of the crime. He further said that alcohol 'would certainly make a patient more apt to have one of these kind of seizures * * * Now, as to whether he had one at that particular time, that I don't know, it would be impossible to tell definitely. * * * I would say that it is certainly a possibility that this could have occurred.' He further stated: 'In other words, a patient with alcohol may go on and have a seizure or make the seizure more apt to occur, and also if--if there is some--some perhaps emotional distress or psychological stress, this is more apt to cause a patient to have a (psychomotor) seizure also.'

As to the amount of brain damage, he said: 'This is not a large area that is involved: It appears that it is rather nonfocal, no one particular one spot that is involved, it seems to be on both sides. * * * Well, I would say that it certainly is indicative that there is something wrong there, and that he could well have a type of seizure. * * * It--well, not exactly brain damage, but it indicates abnormal electricity coming out of the brain, and this is usually caused by brain damage. * * * Yes, the psychomotor epilepsy could possibly be a manifestation of the brain pattern like this, yes.'

The witness also said that 'psychosis is the medical term for insanity' and that the defendant was not psychotic at the time he was examined or when the report was prepared.

Dr. Val Satterfield, a physician (M.D.) specializing in psychiatry, who had examined defendant, testified on behalf of the State that defendant was not psychotic; also that he had examined the graphs, the electroencephalographs taken of defendant. He said: 'The irregularities of the electroencephalographic tracings are not significant. The neurological examination is normal. Many individuals have similar irregularities and criminal behavior cannot be attributed to these common findings without other significant symptoms. * * * Yes,...