State v. Graf
| Decision Date | 27 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | A22-0269 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Richard James Graf, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
Kandiyohi County District Court File No. 34-CR-20-933
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Shane D. Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Gina D Schulz, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and Wheelock, Judge.
In this direct appeal from a judgment of conviction for felony fifth-degree assault, appellant argues that (1) the state's circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove the element of venue, (2) the prosecution committed prosecutorial misconduct by misstating the evidence and the law, and (3) the district court erred by admitting irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of appellant's drug use and other dangerous behavior. Because we conclude that the state's evidence was sufficient to prove venue, and neither the prosecutor's conduct nor the district court's admission of evidence was plain error, we affirm.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Richard James Graf with felony violation of a harassment restraining order (HRO), threats of violence, and fifth-degree assault; and gross-misdemeanor fourth-degree assault and obstruction of legal process. The district court held a jury trial in July 2021. The following facts summarize the evidence presented at trial.
Graf lived in the upper level of a duplex residence. S.B. lived in the lower level of the duplex and had an HRO against Graf. On the evening of October 11, 2020, S.B. reported to law enforcement that Graf had violated the HRO.
S.B.'s testimony established the house number and street of her duplex residence and that she had an HRO against Graf, she called law enforcement on October 11, and officers responded to her address. Her testimony did not establish the reason she called law enforcement that day, however, and she testified that she could not recall the reason because she has mental-health issues that affect her memory.
A Willmar police officer testified that he was the first officer to arrive at the residence in response to S.B.'s report. He spoke with S.B. and determined that he had probable cause to arrest Graf for violating the HRO. Two other police officers arrived to assist the first officer. The officers knocked on Graf's door, but Graf refused to open the door and instead yelled accusations about S.B. at the officers from inside his residence.
After Graf refused entry to law enforcement, the first officer drafted and obtained a warrant to enter the residence and arrest Graf. The other officers remained at Graf's apartment and continued to knock on Graf's door during the time it took to obtain the warrant.
Once they obtained the search warrant, the officers knocked on Graf's door again and announced that they had a warrant and would force the door open if Graf did not open the door. Graf refused to comply, and an officer pried open the door. The first officer entered Graf's residence with his taser drawn and told the second officer to have his firearm out to cover him.
The officers encountered Graf kneeling in his living room. The first officer testified that Graf saw the second officer's firearm and yelled, "Are you going to f-cking shoot me?" The officers ordered Graf to put his hands up. Graf yelled at the officers to stay away and then appeared to begin lifting himself off the floor "in a way that indicated that he was going to come towards [the officers] or resist." The first officer tased Graf, and the second officer holstered his firearm and moved towards Graf.
The first officer testified that the taser did not affect Graf, and Graf punched the second officer. Graf then continued to struggle with the officers as they moved further into the living room. The first officer stated that at some point during this struggle, Graf said, "Hey, whichever one of you I punched, I'm sorry." Officers were eventually able to handcuff Graf after spraying him with a substance similar to pepper spray. Approximately one minute of the first officer's body-camera footage, which depicted the officers' entry into Graf's apartment and the beginning of the struggle, was admitted into evidence.
The second officer's testimony regarding their entry into Graf's apartment was consistent with the first officer's testimony. The second officer testified that he approached Graf to handcuff him after the first officer tased him. Graf stood up "chest to chest" with the second officer, at which point the second officer grabbed Graf and pushed him backwards. The second officer testified that Graf then punched him on the left side of the face.
At the close of the state's case, Graf moved for judgment of acquittal on all charges. The district court granted Graf's motion for acquittal of felony violation of an HRO and threats of violence because S.B.'s testimony was insufficient to establish the elements of those charges. The district court denied the motion for the three remaining counts. It also determined that although the HRO had been admitted into evidence as an exhibit, it would not provide a copy of the HRO to the jury during deliberations. The district court reasoned that it had granted judgment of acquittal on counts one and two, which were directly related to the HRO, and that the contents of the HRO could have a potentially prejudicial effect when the jury considered the remaining counts.
The jury found Graf guilty of fifth- and fourth-degree assault and obstruction of legal process based on his interactions with the officers. At a sentencing hearing in November 2021, the district court entered a judgment of conviction for fifth-degree assault and sentenced Graf to 30 months in prison.
Graf appeals.
On appeal, Graf argues that his conviction must be reversed because the state did not present evidence sufficient to prove that his offenses took place in Kandiyohi County or, in the alternative, that he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor committed multiple forms of misconduct in her closing argument and the district court admitted prejudicial and irrelevant evidence. We review each issue in turn.
Graf first argues that the state's evidence was insufficient to prove that the offenses took place in Kandiyohi County because the testimony presented at trial did not establish the city or county in which the offenses occurred. We disagree.
The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an alleged crime occurred in the charging county because venue is an element of every criminal offense. Minn. Const. art. I, § 6 (); State v. Bahri, 514 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn.App. 1994), rev. denied (Minn. June 15, 1994). However, the state is not required to prove venue by direct evidence. Bahri, 514 N.W.2d at 582. Rather, venue can be "determined by all the reasonable inferences arising from the totality of the surrounding circumstances." State v. Carignan, 272 N.W.2d 748, 749 (Minn. 1978). Direct evidence of venue is not necessary "if evidence of location within a county is admitted and no objection is made when the case is submitted to the jury." State v. Larsen, 442 N.W.2d 840, 842 (Minn.App. 1989).
Thus, circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to prove venue. Id.; Bahri, 514 N.W.2d at 582. We agree with Graf that the state provided only circumstantial evidence of the element of venue. Circumstantial evidence is evidence from which a fact-finder can "infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist." State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). "Circumstantial evidence always requires an inferential step to prove a fact that is not required with direct evidence." Id.
When we review the sufficiency of direct evidence for a conviction, we "carefully examine the record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). However, when a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, appellate courts apply a heightened two-step circumstantial-evidence standard of review. Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017).
First, the reviewing court must identify the circumstances the state proved at trial. State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329 (Minn. 2010). Second, we "determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt." State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). Here, our inquiry is "not simply whether the inferences that point to guilt are reasonable," because appellate courts "give no deference to the fact finder's choice between reasonable inferences." Id. (quotations omitted). We also look at the circumstantial evidence "as a whole" when completing this step of the analysis. Id.
We first identify the circumstances proved through S.B.'s and the officers' testimony. S.B. testified to the house number and street name at which she and Graf lived. The first officer testified that he was employed with the Willmar Police Department. He further testified...
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