State v. Graff
| Decision Date | 13 February 1940 |
| Docket Number | 44218. |
| Citation | 290 N.W. 97,228 Iowa 159 |
| Parties | STATE v. GRAFF. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Floyd County; Henry N. Graven, Judge.
Defendant was charged by information with the crime of manslaughter. Trial was had to a jury, resulting in his conviction and sentence. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Superseding opinion in 282 N.W. 745.
In prosecution for manslaughter by automobile, instructions that " involuntary manslaughter" is unintentional killing of another by an unlawful act in such a manner as to show wanton and reckless disregard and indifference for safety of other persons who might be reasonably expected to be injured thereby, and that state must prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant committed certain unlawful acts in operation of automobile in such a manner as to show wanton and reckless disregard and indifference to safety of others, and that death of deceased was natural and proximate result thereof, were proper.
Fred D. Everett, Atty. Gen., Weston E. Jones, Co. Atty. of Charles City, and Jens Grothe, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
James W. Taylor, of Waterloo, and John F. Droz and W. G. Henke both of Charles City, for appellant.
This cause has been submitted to us for reconsideration after the granting of a rehearing. For our former opinion, see State v. Graff, 282 N.W. 745.Such opinion is now withdrawn, and the following substituted in lieu thereof.
About one a. m. April 7, 1937, Helen Despard, in company with two other women and three men, namely, Marian Sullivan, Mildred Schuster, Ray Martin, Floyd Anderson and Fred Ford, was travelling in a Ford car, owned by Anderson, in a westerly direction on Highway 18, toward Mason City. While so proceeding the car was stopped upon the highway within the corporate limits of Nora Springs, to permit Miss Despard to alight for the purpose of answering a call of nature. When she alighted, Ford and Martin also got out of the car. The car stopped on the north side of the pavement, and the three occupants that alighted from it did so on the north or right hand side thereof. Miss Despard walked around to the rear of the car, as did Ford. Martin stood near the middle of the car. While the car was so parked, and while Miss Despard and Ford were at the rear of it, the defendant, driving alone approached from the east at a speed of between 35 and 40 miles per hour, drove into the Anderson car, fatally injurying Miss Despard and seriously injuring Ford. On the following day, the county attorney filed an information, accusing defendant of the crime of manslaughter. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial was had to a jury, resulting in a verdict of guilty. Defendant was sentenced to the state penitentiary for an indeterminate term not exceeding eight years. From such judgment he appeals.
At the close of the evidence, the defendant moved for a directed verdict. The motion was overruled. A motion for arrest of judgment, for a new trial, and exceptions to the instructions were filed and overruled. One of the principal contentions of appellant is that the evidence did not warrant submission of the cause to the jury, and does not sustain the verdict of guilty.
At the time of this fatal injury, it was a dark night and had been raining. There was testimony that the visibility was poor, although it was not raining at the time and there was no fog. The evidence shows that the headlights and taillight on the Anderson car were all lighted. The car was on the right hand side of the pavement. There was no other vehicle approaching from the opposite direction. There was a slight hill or upgrade to the east for about 450 feet. The jury was warranted in finding that, from the brow of this hill or crest, the Anderson car could be seen by the defendant as he approached. It was parked within the corporate limits of Nora Springs, but toward the eastern edge thereof. In other words, the Anderson car and defendant's car were approaching the town and had just entered the corporate limits. There was no speed sign at the eastern corporate limit. There was a sign 510 feet west of the scene of the accident, which indicated a residence zone, and fixed the speed limit at 25 miles per hour. Accordingly, the only speed standard, which defendant was required to comply with at the time of the tragedy, was that fixed by Section 5029 of the Code, 1935.
As heretofore stated, the speed of the defendant's car, as he approached the Anderson car, was estimated at between 35 and 40 miles an hour. Defendant's car came in a straight course, without slowing up, and struck the Anderson car in the back, pushing it forward. Miss Despard was apparently caught between the front bumper of defendant's car and the rear bumper of the Anderson car. Both of her legs were badly crushed below the knees, one of them was severed. Both of Ford's legs were also broken below the knees, but the flesh was not crushed. The Anderson car was driven forward some 6 or 8 feet and stopped near the right edge of the pavement, parallel to it. Defendant's car stopped on the pavement, with the right front wheel one or two feet from the north edge thereof, and the right rear wheel on the shoulder within two feet of the edge of the pavement.
Counsel disagree in their interpretation of the evidence on the question how far Miss Despard had proceeded toward the south around the Anderson car. Appellant contends that she had proceeded to such a point that her body obscured the taillight, whereas the attorney general contends that the taillight was in plain view to the defendant as he approached. It was a question for the jury whether or not defendant could and should have seen the taillight on the Anderson car as he approached it. There was also evidence that defendant had been drinking during the evening preceding the tragedy, but the evidence was not sufficient to justify the jury finding that defendant was intoxicated at the time of the collision.
In passing upon the contentions of counsel regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, we think that the situation may be clarified by first considering the theory upon which the court submitted the case to the jury.
The court defined the crime charged in the information by Instruction 3, as follows: " The crime charged against the defendant in this case is what is known in law as involuntary manslaughter, which is the unintentional killing of another by an unlawful act or acts, in such a manner as to show a wanton and reckless disregard and indifference for the safety of other persons who might be reasonably expected to be injured thereby." In Instructions 4 and 4 1/2, the court advised the jury the speed standard fixed by Section 5029 of the Code, including the requirement that the defendant be able to bring his car to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead, which was said to be " within the distance that discernible objects may be seen ahead of him" . In Instruction 5, the jury was advised as follows:
The evidence regarding the use of intoxicating liquor by the defendant was commented upon by Instruction 8, as follows:
The attorney general contends that Instructions 3 and 5 are more favorable to the defendant than the law requires, whereas the appellant contends that the evidence fails to sustain the burden cast upon the state by Instruction 5. It is the contention of the attorney general that this court has overruled its former decisions regarding the definition of manslaughter in traffic cases, and that the state is no longer required to show wanton and reckless disregard and indifference to the safety of others. The state relies upon certain cases wherein we define manslaughter as the accidental killing of a human being while engaged in the doing of an unlawful act. The substance of its contention is that if the jury found that the defendant violated the law as defined in Instruction 4 (the requirements of Section 5029) and the death of Helen Despard was the proximate result thereof, her death resulted from the doing of an unlawful act, and the defendant was guilty of manslaughter. We find no merit in the contentions of the attorney general in this regard.
We have...
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