State v. Graham

• Decision Date: 07 August 1931
• Docket Number: 13221.
• Citation: 159 S.E. 838,161 S.C. 362
• Parties: STATE v. GRAHAM.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

159 S.E. 838

161 S.C. 362

STATE v. GRAHAM.

No. 13221.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

August 7, 1931

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Horry County; S.W. G Shipp, Judge.

Luther Graham was convicted of murder, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

The charge of the trial judge, requested to be reported, follows:

Mr Foreman and Gentlemen of the jury: The indictment in this case charges that Luther Graham, with a certain shotgun, with malice aforethought did kill and murder Sam Singleton by shooting him with a gun. The defendant pleads not guilty, and that plea on his part makes it incumbent on the State, which makes this charge against him, to satisfy the jury by evidence of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

A reasonable doubt, as the term itself implies, means a strong substantial doubt that comes out of the testimony, which when you have heard, you feel in your mind a hesitancy as to what your duty is. If you feel that sort of doubt, give it to the defendant. If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether it is murder or manslaughter, you give him the benefit of the doubt and find him guilty of the lesser offense rather than the greater.

Murder is the felonious killing of a human being with malice aforethought, either expressed or implied. By the term malice--it is a term of art that implies wickedness, without just cause or excuse. When a person gets in a state of mind that he is willing to take human life under circumstances that exclude any legal right to take human life, we say he is guilty of murder, because when a person takes human life and he does it under circumstances that exclude any legal right to take it, he is guilty of murder. Malice is where a person does an intentional wrong and he does it under circumstances which show he has no legal right to do it. If the defendant here, Luther Graham, if he intentionally took the life of Sam Singleton, if he did that and he did it under circumstances that indicate that he had no legal right to take his life, then he would be guilty of murder.

Manslaughter is very different from murder. Where a person wrongfully takes human life, but he has no malice, why he is guilty of manslaughter, because our state says where a person unlawfully takes human life without malice, he is guilty of manslaughter. Sometimes when a person suddenly loses his temper-- something happens to him that causes his passion suddenly to arouse and under the influence of that passion he takes human life, the law wouldn't hold him guilty of murder, where he does it under sudden heat and passion on sufficient legal provocation, because the law recognizes that human nature is a weak thing and is liable to give way to passion, and when the passion is excited by some attack, of course the law recognizes that and would reduce the killing under such circumstances from murder to manslaughter.

It is a question for you, did he kill this man deliberately? Did he do it on purpose? Did he do it without legal excuse? If he did, he is guilty of murder. If, on the other hand, he did it on sudden impulse, sudden heat of passion, if it was brought about by some legal provocation he wouldn't be guilty of murder, but would be guilty of manslaughter, because manslaughter is where a person suddenly falls out without having any previous intention to take human life, just suddenly took human life under the influence of passion. Where a person makes up his mind to take human life, he deliberates upon it, he thinks about it and does it deliberately and does it under circumstances that exclude any excuse for taking human life, he is guilty of murder. Whether it is malice implied or expressed, it doesn't make any difference, whether it is expressed or implied malice. Expressed malice is where a person has uttered threats to take human life and in pursuance of the threats he goes and takes human life. Where a man doesn't make any expression, but he takes a deadly weapon, something he knows will probably take human life, he deliberately uses a weapon of that sort, you could imply malice from the use of the deadly weapon, if it is used intentionally and under such circumstances that the man had no legal right to use it.

Gentlemen, do you want to charge the jury on the right of self-defense?

Mr. McMillan: I am this man's lawyer. I don't think under the law as I understand, the evidence warrants an investigation or inquiry by the jury on the question of self-defense. Under the statement of the defendant on the stand, it might be proper. I'll not make any exception if you do not.

The Court: Self-defense is this, where a person is without fault in bringing on the difficulty and he feels that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or suffering serious bodily harm, and the circumstances are such that a person of ordinary reason, if he had been placed in the same situation, would have believed that his life was in danger, that he was in imminent danger of losing his life or suffering serious bodily harm--if a person shows you that, he makes out his plea of self-defense. You will see that this plea is founded on the idea of necessity. The law doesn't allow anyone to take human life unless he is compelled to do so by dire necessity, or what appeared to him at the time to be necessary. If a person has a means of avoiding taking human life, with safety to himself, it is his duty to avail himself of that. It is necessary for him to retreat if he could do so with safety to himself. If the defendant has shown you by the greater weight of the testimony that he was without fault in bringing on this trouble, and that he believed himself in imminent danger of losing his life or suffering serious bodily harm, and if any person of ordinary reason and prudence and coolness had been placed in his situation, such person would have believed it was necessary to shoot in order to save himself from imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, then he would have made out his plea of self-defense if he has proved it by the greater weight of the testimony.

If you find the defendant guilty in this case, if you believe that he took the life of Singleton deliberately and that he was actuated by malice, it would be your duty to find him guilty of murder. If you say guilty, that would mean he would suffer death in the electric chair; or, you can say guilty with recommendation to mercy, in which case the penalty would be imprisonment for life in the penitentiary or on the county works. You can say guilty of manslaughter, in which the punishment would be anywhere from two to thirty years; or you can say not guilty, if you find he has made out his plea of self-defense. On the question of mercy--wherever the law fixes the penalty of death, the law, I think very wisely, places it in the hands of the jury to set the punishment. If the jury find a man guilty of what's known as a capital offense, guilty of murder, the law places it in the hands of the jury how he must be punished. You have heard the testimony here, and if there are circumstances, if you find him guilty and there are circumstances that appeal to you, that warrant you to recommend him to mercy, that's in your province. The Court cannot give you any aid on that. If you say "guilty" it will be my duty to impose the death sentence. If you say "guilty with recommendation to mercy," it will be my duty to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life. If you say "guilty of manslaughter" it will be my duty to impose a sentence of anywhere from two to thirty years. Or you can say "not guilty," according as you view the testimony in the case.

Gentlemen, is there anything I have omitted? Do you want me to charge the jury any further?

Sherwood & McMillan, of Conway, for appellant.

L. M. Gasque, Sol., of Marion, for the State.

CARTER J.

Under an indictment charging him with the murder of one Sam Singleton, in the county of Horry, May 24, 1930, the defendant, Luther Graham, was tried in the court of general sessions for said county before his honor, Judge S.W. G. Shipp, and a jury, June 6, 1930; the trial resulting in a verdict of guilty, without recommendation to the mercy of the court. The defendant's motion for a new trial being refused, from sentence of death by electrocution the defendant has appealed to this court.

In passing upon the appeal we shall not consider the exceptions separately, but shall adopt the plan so well outlined by appellant's counsel and pass upon the questions raised by the exceptions in the order presented by counsel. However, we shall first give a brief statement of the facts leading up to the fatal tragedy. The defendant married the sister of the deceased and during the greater part of the defendant's married life resided near or with his wife's relatives. The families did not get along so well and there were often unpleasant occurrences. The feeling between the defendant and the deceased was bad, and on the morning before the killing of the deceased, the night of May 24th the defendant had unpleasantness with his wife. During that day a number of things took place which indicated that the parties, the defendant on one side and his wife's people on the other, were expecting trouble and were making preparations accordingly. About night the relatives of the wife gathered at the home of the deceased, and among the number were the defendant's wife and his three children. Some of the deceased's brothers had guns, or at least there were two or three guns there. Some time after dark, while they were sitting around the supper table, eating the evening meal, the defendant fired from the outside of the house through a window screen, killing the deceased, and immediately thereafter fired into another room, striking his wife and seriously wounding her. The...