State v. Grant
Decision Date | 28 August 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 26871.,26871. |
Citation | 928 A.2d 1247,103 Conn.App. 456 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Peter GRANT. |
Kathryn Ward Bare, special deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state's attorney, and Anne F. Mahoney, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
DiPENTIMA, GRUENDEL and BERDON, Js.
The defendant, Peter Grant, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-56 (a)(1).1 On appeal, the defendant claims that the jury's verdict of guilty on the charge of manslaughter in the second degree was legally and logically inconsistent with its verdict of not guilty on the charge of carrying a dangerous weapon in violation of General Statutes § 53-206.2 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In the middle of the day on Sunday, July 21, 2002, the defendant was walking on Albany Avenue in Hartford when he saw the victim, Garfield Walker, outside of Carlton's Jamaican Restaurant. The defendant and the victim, both citizens of Jamaica, had known each other for several years and had come to Connecticut at the same time in 1999. During the week preceding the incident, the defendant and the victim had worked on a farm in Avon, where they earned an hourly wage. With the defendant's consent, the victim had collected the money owed to them; they had arranged for the victim to borrow $80 of the defendant's $110 to pay his rent, which would be paid back to the defendant in $40 installments. When the defendant saw the victim outside the restaurant, he asked him for the remaining $30, but the victim told him that he did not have it and was waiting to meet someone, after which time he would possess the money. The defendant told the victim that he would try to return in order to collect the money and entered the car of a friend to drive to Hartford High School for a church event.
Approximately forty-five minutes to one hour later, the defendant returned, called for the victim and entered the restaurant, despite its being closed on Sunday. The victim, who had been in the kitchen talking with the proprietor, emerged.3 The defendant testified that the victim was brandishing a knife, which he was forced to wrest from the victim's right hand. Because the defendant was blocked from behind when he retrieved the knife, and because the victim was immediately approaching, the defendant stabbed him. The defendant then backed out of the restaurant with the knife in his possession, in order to prevent the victim's pursuit, and walked west on Albany Avenue. Because his right hand was cut and bleeding, the defendant went to a friend's house to clean his wound after dropping the knife in some bushes. Although he did not tell the friend about the incident, he did inform two others whom he encountered on his way home at about 3 o'clock that afternoon. The victim ultimately died as a result of the stabbing.
The police visited the defendant at approximately midnight that night at his apartment. He willingly cooperated with them and drew a map of the location, indicating where they would be able to find the knife in the bushes. The defendant was arrested and charged with murder and carrying a dangerous weapon. Evidence was presented to the jury on March 28, 29 and 30 and April 4, 2005. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the charge of manslaughter in the second degree and not guilty on the charge of carrying a dangerous weapon. On April 18, 2005, the defendant filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal, which the court denied on July 1, 2005. On July 8, 2005, the defendant was sentenced to eight years imprisonment, execution suspended after four years, and five years probation. This appeal followed.
We begin our analysis of the defendant's claim by setting forth the applicable standard of review. (Citation omitted.) State v. Flowers, 85 Conn.App. 681, 694, 858 A.2d 827 (2004), rev'd on other grounds, 278 Conn. 533, 898 A.2d 789 (2006). The defendant's sole claim on appeal is that his conviction of manslaughter in the second degree was both legally and logically inconsistent with his acquittal on the charge of carrying a dangerous weapon. We disagree.
Regarding the defendant's claim that the verdict was legally inconsistent, our Supreme Court observed in State v. DeCaro, 252 Conn. 229, 745 A.2d 800 (2000), that "[w]here the inconsistent verdicts claim involves a simultaneous conviction and acquittal on different offenses, the court, in testing the verdict of guilty for inconsistency as a matter of law, is necessarily limited to an examination of the offense charged in the information and the verdict rendered thereon without regard to what evidence the jury had for consideration. . . . . If the offenses charged contain different elements, then a conviction of one offense is not inconsistent on its face with an acquittal of the other." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 244, 745 A.2d 800.4
The court accurately charged the jury on the elements of both crimes. During its charge on manslaughter in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a56, the court stated: 5 As part of its charge on carrying a dangerous weapon, the court instructed:
The court further thoroughly defined each of the elements for both crimes. It is beyond dispute that the offenses charged contain purely distinct elements, and therefore "a conviction of one offense is not inconsistent on its face with an acquittal of the other." State v. DeCaro, supra, 252 Conn. at 244, 745 A.2d 800. The defendant's claim that his conviction of manslaughter in the second degree is legally inconsistent with the judgment of acquittal of carrying a dangerous weapon therefore fails.6
The defendant additionally claims that the conviction of manslaughter in the second degree and judgment of acquittal on the charge of carrying a dangerous weapon are logically inconsistent. The crux of the defendant's claim involves the court's jury instructions regarding the two crimes. In reference to the charge of manslaughter in the second degree, the court stated that "to establish the first essential element of manslaughter in the second degree, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that by stabbing [the victim] with a knife, if you find that he did so, the defendant contributed directly and materially to [the victim's] death." The defendant also emphasizes a particular part of the court's definition of carrying a dangerous weapon:
The defendant claims that it would be illogical to convict him of manslaughter in the second degree, due to a stabbing of the victim, yet acquit him of carrying the knife with which the stabbing was presumably committed. To bolster his argument, the defendant...
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