State v. Granville
| Decision Date | 01 May 1975 |
| Citation | 336 A.2d 861 |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Karen GRANVILLE. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
David M. Cox, County Atty., Bangor, for plaintiff.
Paine, Lynch & Weatherbee by Peter M. Weatherbee, Errol K. Paine, Bangor, for defendant.
Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and POMEROY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD and DELAHANTY, JJ.
This appeal from a judgment entered on a jury-waived trial finding of guilty of violation of 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312 (), raises a single issue.
The arresting officer testified that after he had placed the defendant under arrest, he read to her from a card as follows:
The question becomes, was this statement sufficient in its content to authorize the admission into evidence of a breathalator test taken after the reading of this statement and after consent to the taking of the breath test was given?
We hold that it was not.
29 M.R.S.A. § 1312 provides in part as follows:
It is noted the statute employs the plural 'consequences.' The reference statute provides in part in subsection 2, that
The statute makes it clear, (a) that a suspension for refusal to take a test is mandatory, (b) that the first refusal to take such test mandates a suspension for a period of 3 months, and (c) that for any second or subsequent refusal to take a test a suspension for a period of 6 months results.
Whether such statutory provision be considered penal or merely prohibitory would assume importance if there were ambiguity in the statute. This is so because a penal statute requires a strict construction. Duncan v. State, 158 Me. 265, 183 A.2d 209 (1962).
In the case now before us there is no ambiguity in the statute.
Its meaning is clear.
'Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation, and the court has no right to look for or impose another meaning.' Chase v. Edgar, Me., 259 A.2d 30, 32 (1969).
The Legislature made it clear by the language used in enacting the statute that the decision to avail oneself of a blood or breath test after one is lawfully arrested for violation of 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312 is upon the person arrested.
A consent to the taking of the test must be an informed consent....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Heald
...of appeal. It is a well recognized principle of statutory construction that penal statutes are to be construed strictly. State v. Granville, Me., 336 A.2d 861 (1975); Duncan v. State, 158 Me. 265, 183 A.2d 209 (1962), cert. den., 371 U.S. 867, 83 S.Ct. 129, 9 L.Ed.2d This rule, however, is ......
-
State v. Bellino
...Bellino of the specific consequences to which his refusal to submit to such a test would subject him. As stated in State v. Granville, Me., 336 A.2d 861, 863 (1975): "The statute itself declares that if the law enforcement officer fails to comply with this prerequisite, i. e., fails to info......
-
State v. Buckingham
...comply with the procedural steps will render the test results inadmissible, as do some implied consent statutes, see, e.g., State v. Granville, Me., 336 A.2d 861. Implicit in our implied consent statute, however, is the right to refuse to submit to a test and, a fortiori, the requirement th......
-
State v. Goyette
...be construed strictly. State v. Millett, Me., 392 A.2d 521, 525 (1978); State v. Snow, Me., 383 A.2d 1385, 1388 (1978); State v. Granville, Me., 336 A.2d 861, 863 (1975). But, the cardinal rule to which all other rules are subordinated is that the intent of the Legislature controls. Legisla......