State v. Graves, 89-453

Decision Date02 March 1990
Docket NumberNo. 89-453,89-453
Citation788 P.2d 311,47 St.Rep. 483,241 Mont. 533
PartiesSTATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Charles M. GRAVES, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

Barbara E. Bell, Bell & Marra, Great Falls, for defendant and appellant.

Marc Racicot, Atty. Gen., James Yellowtail, Asst. Atty. Gen., Helena, Patrick L. Paul, County Atty., J. Kim Schulke, Deputy, Great Falls, for plaintiff and respondent.

HUNT, Justice.

A jury empaneled in the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County, found Charles M. Graves, defendant, guilty on two counts of burglary in violation of § 45-6-204(1), MCA, one count of theft in violation of § 45-6-301, MCA, and one count of attempt in violation of § 45-4-103, MCA. The District Court sentenced defendant to 15 years in the Montana State Prison on each count of burglary, 10 years on the theft count and 6 months on the attempt count. All sentences were to run concurrently. The court suspended five years on each burglary count and 6 months on the attempt count subject to conditions. Defendant was designated a persistent felony offender under § 46-18-501, MCA, and sentenced to 10 additional years under the designation in accordance with § 46-18-502, MCA, to run consecutively with prior sentences imposed. Under § 46-18-404, MCA, defendant was designated a nondangerous offender for the purposes of parole eligibility and was given credit for time served. Defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

The issues raised on appeal are:

1. Whether the District Court erred in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.

2. Whether the District Court erred in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial.

3. Whether the District Court erred in denying defendant's motion for a separate trial.

4. Whether defendant was afforded effective assistance of counsel.

5. Whether defendant's sentence was improperly enhanced under the persistent felony offender statute.

On December 16, 1988, defendant was charged by information with two counts of burglary in violation of § 45-6-204(1), MCA, one count of theft in violation of § 45-6-301, MCA, and one count of attempt in violation of § 45-4-103, MCA. The information was once amended on March 16, 1989. Daniel E. Radi, co-defendant, was similarly charged.

Counsel was appointed for defendant. On March 21, 1989, defendant's counsel filed a motion for separate trials. A similar motion had been previously filed by defendant, pro se. A hearing was conducted on the motion on March 24, 1989. The motion was denied and defendant was tried jointly with Radi on March 27, 1989.

Defendant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal at the conclusion of the State's evidence upon the contention that the evidence was insufficient. When the motion was denied, counsel for Radi gave his opening statement, which had been earlier reserved. Radi did not testify. Portions of the assertions presented in the opening were unsupported by evidence. Subsequently, defendant moved for a mistrial upon the contention that he had been implicated by Radi's opening statement. The motion was denied.

The first issue raised on appeal is whether the District Court erred in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal upon conclusion of the State's case. Defendant made the motion upon the contention that the evidence tying defendant to the burglaries in question was insufficient in one instance and nonexistant in another. We disagree.

Section 46-16-403, MCA, provides in part:

When, at the close of the state's evidence ... the evidence is insufficient to support a finding or verdict of guilty, the court may, on its own motion or on the motion of the defendant, dismiss the action and discharge the defendant. (Emphasis ours.)

The decision of whether or not to dismiss a charge at this stage lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. See State v. Goltz (1982), 197 Mont. 361, 372, 642 P.2d 1079, 1085. Moreover, a directed verdict of acquittal may only be granted in instances where no evidence exists to support a guilty verdict. State v. Courville (Mont.1989), 769 P.2d 44, 47, 46 St.Rep. 338, 342; State v. Matson (1987), 227 Mont. 36, 42, 736 P.2d 971, 974.

The State submitted, as evidence, the testimony of several witnesses and introduced numerous exhibits. Witnesses for the State included the first burglary victim, Arvin Otter; Officer Michael Stimac; store clerk, Gerald Byington; Detective James Olson; and the second burglary victim, Demaris Renville.

Arvin Otter testified that on December 11, 1988, at approximately 8:00 p.m., he and Janet Krantz were returning to their residence at 1401 Tenth Avenue Northwest when they observed a yellow vehicle in their driveway. As the couple approached, two men drove away in the vehicle. They observed that their garage door, which had been closed and locked when they left their house, was open. The garage door and the door frame were broken. They also observed a muddy footprint on the door. In their absence, the kitchen light had been turned on, the master bedroom doors opened, and contents in a closet disturbed. Nothing had been taken.

Otter further testified that, while Krantz called the police, he followed the yellow vehicle to a nearby convenience store where he recorded the license plate number of the vehicle on the back of his hand. He observed the occupants of the yellow vehicle at that time. A white male, later identified as Radi, pumped gasoline into the vehicle while a black male, later identified as the defendant, entered the store. Otter then returned to his residence.

Police Officer Michael Stimac testified that he responded to the call from the Otter residence on the night in question. Otter told him that the suspects had been observed by Otter at a nearby convenience store. Otter relayed the license plate number that he earlier recorded to the officer. Officer Stimac called in the number and vehicle description to the police dispatcher, who broadcast the information.

Officer Stimac testified that he went to the convenience store where he spoke with the store clerk, Gerald Byington. Byington told the officer that, less than ten minutes before the officer arrived, two men in a yellow vehicle had purchased gasoline. Byington also testified to that effect as well as to the fact that defendant paid for the gasoline partially with rare coined money. Byington identified defendant at trial as the black male in the yellow vehicle who had purchased the gasoline.

Shortly thereafter, the yellow vehicle was stopped by the police. Officer Stimac drove to the scene of the stop. He testified that at that time he observed that the pattern on the sole of Radi's shoe was similar to the footprint on Otter's garage door. Detective Jim Olson testified, as an expert, that the footprint was indeed made by the same type of shoe Radi wore that evening. Defendant and Radi were then placed under arrest. Detective Timothy Shanks testified that Radi made post-arrest statements to him in which Radi stated that defendant had been present when Radi kicked in the door of the Otter residence.

At approximately 10:00 p.m. the same evening, the police received a report of another burglary. Demaris Renville testified that, when she and her husband returned to their residence at 101 Sixteenth Avenue Northwest that evening, they observed that their door was open, the door frame was broken and a muddy footprint was on the door. Detective Olson testified that the footprint was also made by the same type of shoe Radi wore that evening. Renville further testified that several documents and her son's coin collection were missing. A search of the yellow vehicle that defendant and Radi were arrested in revealed the coin collection. Detective Shanks also testified that Radi made a post-arrest statement to him in which Radi said that he found the coins on the frozen river.

As noted, a directed verdict of acquittal is proper only when no evidence exists to support a guilty verdict. Courville, 769 P.2d at 47. In light of the above evidence presented by the State, we cannot say that no evidence existed to support a guilty verdict at the close of the State's case. There was no error.

The second issue raised on appeal is whether the District Court erred in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial. The motion was based on the opening statement of Radi's counsel that contained assertions implicating defendant, which were unsupported by evidence.

Radi's counsel made an opening statement at the conclusion of the State's case which included the assertion that Radi kicked in Otter's garage door and that defendant and Radi were in possession of the stolen coins in question but only after finding them on the frozen river. Radi's counsel called three witnesses--two of the witnesses stated that defendant and Radi were with them until approximately 6:30 p.m. on the day of the burglaries. One of the witnesses stated that nothing had been taken from the Otter residence. Radi did not testify. No testimony was given concerning the assertions set forth in the opening statement. Defendant argues that Radi's opening statement, therefore, prejudiced his case.

However, ...

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7 cases
  • State v. Mummey
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • March 17, 1994
    ...the sound discretion of the trial court and is not disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. See State v. Graves (1990), 241 Mont. 533, 535, 788 P.2d 311, 313. The statutes governing practice and procedure in criminal proceedings do not provide for judgment notwithstanding the......
  • State v. Turner
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • December 10, 1993
    ...P.2d 331, 338. The decision whether to grant a severance is within the sound discretion of the district court. State v. Graves (1990), 241 Mont. 533, 538, 788 P.2d 311, 314. This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the district court. State v. Campbell (1980), 189 Mont. 107, ......
  • State v. Byers
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • November 4, 1993
    ...witness and because any inappropriate testimony was inadvertent. A trial court has the discretion to grant a mistrial. State v. Graves (1990), 241 Mont. 533, 788 P.2d 311. Where there has been no abuse of discretion, this Court must not disturb the district court's decision. Graves, 241 Mon......
  • State v. Enright, 99-545.
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • December 28, 2000
    ...the defendants. We agree. ¶ 12 The decision to join or sever a trial is within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Graves (1990), 241 Mont. 533, 538, 788 P.2d 311, 314. Therefore, we review such a decision for abuse of discretion. State v. Turner (1993), 262 Mont. 39, 53, 864 P.2d 2......
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