State v. Greenfield
| Decision Date | 04 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. COA17-802,COA17-802 |
| Citation | 262 N.C.App. 631,822 S.E.2d 477 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Tyler Deion GREENFIELD, Defendant. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Jess D. Mekeel, for the State.
Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Kathryn L. VandenBerg, for the Defendant.
Defendant appeals his convictions for first-degree felony murder and for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury (AWDWIKISI). For the following reasons we reverse the judgments and remand as follows: (1) with respect to the AWDWIKISI conviction, Defendant is entitled to a new trial; and (2) with respect to the first-degree felony murder conviction, the trial court shall vacate that judgment and enter judgment convicting Defendant of second-degree murder.
Defendant was convicted of assault and murder for shooting two victims, killing one of them, during a drug deal gone bad.
On 2 February 2015, Defendant was at Jon's1 home to buy marijuana. Jon's girlfriend, Beth, was also there. The State's evidence tended to show that Defendant shot Jon and Beth while trying to rob Jon.
Defendant, however, testified as follows: Defendant went to buy marijuana from Jon. While in Jon's living room, Defendant picked up a gun from Jon's coffee table which he thought "looked cool." As Defendant was inspecting Jon's gun, Beth became nervous and pointed a gun at Defendant. Defendant then threatened to shoot Beth if Beth did not put her gun down. Beth put down her gun, and Defendant turned to leave. As Defendant was leaving, Jon shot at Defendant. Fearing for his life, Defendant returned fire, intending to shoot Jon but not intending to shoot Beth. Some of Defendant's return fire killed Jon and injured Beth.
Defendant was tried for killing Jon and for assaulting Beth. The jury was instructed on the doctrine of "transferred intent." The jury was also instructed on "self-defense" as to the murder charge but not the assault.
For Jon's death, the jury indicated on the verdict sheet that it had found Defendant guilty of both first-degree felony murder (based on the felony of AWDWIKISI) and of second-degree murder. Based on this verdict, the trial court entered judgment convicting Defendant of the greater charge, first-degree felony murder.
For the assault on Beth, the jury found Defendant guilty of AWDWIKISI. The trial court entered judgment based on this verdict.
The trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without parole. Defendant timely appealed.
Defendant argues that the trial court committed four errors. We conclude that, except with respect to error in the jury instruction, the trial court did not commit reversible error, as explained in Section II. A. below.
We conclude that the trial court did commit reversible error in its jury instructions resulting in Defendant's convictions for the assault of Beth and the first-degree felony murder of Jon. However, we conclude that the error did not affect the jury's verdict that Defendant had committed second-degree murder when he shot Jon. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in Section II. B. below, we vacate the judgments entered convicting Defendant of assault and first-degree felony murder and remand for a new trial on the assault charge for the assault on Beth and for entry of judgment for second-degree murder for the death of Jon.
Defendant makes three arguments, unrelated to the jury instructions, which we conclude do not warrant relief on appeal. We address each in turn.
Defendant argues that the trial court failed to intervene ex mero motu concerning two statements made by the prosecutor during closing arguments.
Defendant complains of the prosecutor's statement that "[t]he reason we're here [is that] the defendant will not accept responsibility for his actions." Defendant argues that "[t]he prosecutor's statement invited the jury to hold against [Defendant] his invocation of his constitutional right to plead not guilty and to stand trial before an impartial jury." Our Supreme Court, however, has held that constitutional arguments regarding closing instructions which are not objected to are waived:
State v. Phillips , 365 N.C. 103, 135, 711 S.E.2d 122, 145 (2011).
Here, Defendant did not object to the prosecutor's statement. Therefore, we are compelled to conclude that Defendant has failed to preserve any constitutional argument concerning the prosecutor's statement. And unlike the defendant in Phillips , Defendant here has not made any argument under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1230. Further, we conclude that any error in this regard did not amount to plain error. Therefore, Defendant's argument concerning this statement is overruled.
Defendant also complains of the prosecutor's statement that "[p]erhaps [Defendant] had [the weapon] in some other robbery [and] discharged it then." This statement suggests that Defendant may have committed another offense, though there is no evidence that he had done so. The State contends the statement was relevant to the prosecution's theory that Defendant had disposed of the weapon shortly after the shooting, which was evidence of Defendant's guilt.
Defendant did not object to the statement. Where there is no objection, our standard of review is whether the remarks were "so grossly improper that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to intervene ex mero motu ." State v. Trull , 349 N.C. 428, 451, 509 S.E.2d 178, 193 (1998).
We have reviewed the prosecutor's statement in context with the entire closing argument, and we conclude that the statement, if improper, was not so grossly improper to require intervention by the trial court. In so holding, we note other cases where similar or more inflammatory statements were held not to require intervention by the trial court. See, e.g., State v. Marino , 229 N.C. App. 130, 135, 747 S.E.2d 633, 637 (2013) (). See also State v. Oxendine , 330 N.C. 419, 423, 410 S.E.2d 884, 886 (1991). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not commit reversible error by failing to intervene ex mero motu during the prosecutor's closing argument.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that the deceased victim (Jon) was a gang leader, had a "thug" tattoo, and had previously been convicted of armed robbery. Defendant contends that he had offered this evidence to show Jon's violent character which would be relevant to his self-defense argument. Defendant argues that the evidence was admissible under Rules 404(a) and 405(b) of our Rules of Evidence and that the trial court's refusal violated his constitutional right to present his defense.
Rule 404(a) provides that an accused may offer evidence of "a pertinent trait of [the victim's] character." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(a) (2017). Our Supreme Court has stated that a defendant claiming self-defense "may produce evidence of the victim's character tending to show [ ] that the victim was the aggressor" and may be done so "through testimony concerning the victim's general reputation for violence[.]" State v. Corn , 307 N.C. 79, 85, 296 S.E.2d 261, 265-66 (1982).
Rule 405 of our Rules of Evidence provides how character evidence may be offered. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 405 (2017). Rule 405(a) states that evidence concerning the victim's reputation may be offered. Id. Rule 405(b) states that evidence concerning "specific instances of [the victim's] conduct" may be offered. Id. Defendant specifically argues that his evidence concerning Jon's character was admissible under Rule 405(b) ; he makes no argument under Rule 405(a).
We conclude that the evidence concerning Jon's gang membership, his possession of firearms, and his tattoo do not involve "specific instances of conduct" admissible under Rule 405(b). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err by excluding this evidence. Further, we note that there was evidence presented to the jury that Jon was a drug dealer and possessed multiple guns in his residence at the time of the shooting.
Regarding the victim's prior conviction for armed robbery, the trial court specifically ruled that the evidence was inadmissible under Rule 403, based on its conclusion that unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value of the evidence. State v. Coffey , 345 N.C. 389, 404, 480 S.E.2d 664, 673 (1997) (). Whether otherwise admissible evidence should be excluded under Rule 403 is left to the sound discretion of the court. State v. Hoffman , 349 N.C. 167, 184, 505 S.E.2d 80, 90-91 (1998). Here, Defendant has made no argument that the trial court erred in excluding Jon's prior conviction under Rule 403. Therefore, we conclude that Defendant failed to meet his burden on appeal as to this issue.
Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error by allowing a detective testifying for the State to...
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...that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on self-defense with regard to the assault charge. State v. Greenfield , 262 N.C. App. 631, 642, 822 S.E.2d 477, 485 (2018). Specifically, the Court of Appeals reasoned that based on the evidence at trial, "[d]efendant was entitled to a......
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