State v. Gregory

• Decision Date: 07 December 1910
• Citation: 69 S.E. 674,153 N.C. 646
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. GREGORY.

69 S.E. 674

(153 N.C. 646)

STATE

v.GREGORY.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 7, 1910.

1. Criminal Law (§ 1144^*)—Appeal—Presumptions.

A court on appeal in reviewing the sufficiency of the verdict, where the record states that the court fully informed the jury as to the law upon all phases of the evidence, will assume that the trial court gave proper instructions and limited the case to the one charged in the indictment and proved by the evidence.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Dec. Dig. § 1144.*]

2. Criminal Law (§ 893*)—Verdict— Sufficiency.

A verdict must be read in connection with the issue on trial and the evidence and the instructions.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2089, 2527; Dee. Dig. § 893.*]

3. Criminal Law (§ 893*)—Verdict—Sufficiency.

A verdict must receive a reasonable construction and will not be avoided except from necessity.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2089, 2527; Dec. Dig. § 893.*]

4. Criminal Law (§ 881*)—Verdict—Sufficiency.

Where the evidence and the instructions were directed to the particular crime alleged in the second count in an indictment, charging the crime of receiving stolen goods, a verdict, "We find the defendant guilty of receiving the goods, knowing them to be stolen, " was sufficient as finding defendant guilty of the crime charged.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Dec. Dig. § 881.*]

Appeal from Superior Court, Henderson County; Webb, Judge.

B. Gregory was convicted of receiving stolen goods, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Chas. F. Toms, Staton & Rector, and H. G. Ewart, for appellant.

Attorney General Bickett, Geo. L. Jones, and Michael Schenck, for the State.

WALKER, J. The defendant was indicted in the court below for larceny and receiving stolen goods, the property of the Henderson Wholesale Grocery Company. He was tried for receiving the goods knowing them to be stolen. The evidence tended to show that the goods had been stolen by Dave Harris and received by the defendant with the guilty knowledge. The evidence and charge of the court were all directed to the particular crime alleged in the second count; that is, the one for receiving. There was no evidence of any other crime having been committed by the defendant, and, as it is stated that the court fully informed the jury as to the law "upon all phases of the evidence, " we must assume the judge gave proper instructions and told the jury that, unless they found beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant had received the goods described in the indictment knowing them to have been stolen, they should acquit him, and they could convict only if they found that he was guilty as charged in the count for receiving. This charge, of course, confined the jury, in the consideration of the case, to the single question whether the defendant was guilty of the offense, in manner and form, as alleged in the second count of the indictment. The jury returned the following verdict: "We find the defendant guilty of receiving goods, knowing them to be stolen." The defendant moved for a new trial because the verdict is defective, in that it is not found to whom the goods belonged, nor does the verdict show that the defendant has been convicted of the crime alleged in the indictment. He also moved to arrest the judgment The court refused both motions, and, from the judgment upon the verdict, the defendant appealed.

It is contended that the jury may have convicted the defendant of receiving stolen goods other than those described in the bill. The verdict should be read in connection with the issue being tried, the evidence, and the charge of the court Greenleaf v. Railroad, 91 N. C. 33. This is so in a civil action, and we do not see why the same rule should not apply to an indictment. State v. Long, 52 N. C. 24. We have frequently held that where there are several counts in a bill, and a general verdict is rendered without specifying the count upon which it is given, we can look to the evidence and to the charge, and, if it is found from them that the trial related to only one of the counts, the verdict will be restricted to that count. State v. Long, supra; Morehead v. Brown, 51 N. C. 367; State v. Leak, 80 N. C. 403; State v. Thompson, 95 N. C. 596; State v. Gilchrist, 113 N. C. 673, 18 S. E. 319; State v. McKay, 150 N. C. 816, 63 S. E. 1059. The verdict is to have a reasonable intendment and should receive a reasonable construction. It should not be avoided except from necessity. Clark, Cr. Proc. 486, and cases cited. Why should we infer that the jury intended to convict the defendant of an offense which was not stated in the bill and of which there was no evidence? Is it not more reasonable and sensible to conclude that they obeyed the judge's instructions and considered only the evidence in the case?

In State v. May, 132 N. C. 1020, 43 S. E. 819, it is said by Douglas, J., that "when an indictment contains two counts, but the evidence, instructions of the court, and the argument of counsel refer to one of the counts only, it will be presumed that the verdict followed the trial and related to such count." If the presumption was...