State v. Grier

• Citation: 11 Wash. 244,39 P. 874
• Parties: STATE v. GRIER.
• Decision Date: 20 February 1895
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington

39 P. 874

11 Wash. 244

STATE v. GRIER.

Supreme Court of Washington

February 20, 1895

Appeal from superior court, Spokane county; Norman Buck, Judge.

Helen Grier was convicted of murder in the second degree, and appeals. Affirmed.

W. T. Stoll and S. P. Domer, for appellant.

James E. Fenton, for the State.

HOYT C.J.

The information in this case charged the defendant with the crime of murder in the first degree by the administration of poison. A verdict of murder in the second degree was returned by the jury, and, after motion for new trial had been made and overruled, judgment was rendered thereon, and the defendant sentenced to imprisonment for the period of 10 years. Thereafter a motion in arrest of judgment was made and denied, and an appeal from the judgment and sentence prosecuted to this court. Three assignments of error are relied upon: First, that the court erred, because the verdict found the defendant guilty of a crime not charged in the information, and of which the defendant had no notice second, that the court erred in hearing and denying appellant's motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment in the absence of the defendant; and third, that the court erred in allowing the deputy prosecuting attorney to conduct himself in the presence of the jury, as is stated and set forth in the affidavits of Stoll and Domer.

The record upon appeal contains no statement of facts or bill of exceptions by the aid of which the doings of the court and jury shown by the transcript can be interpreted. It follows that every reasonable presumption which can be indulged must be invoked to aid such doings before the judgment and sentence will be reversed on account thereof. If the facts shown by the record would warrant us in entering into an investigation of the argument in reference thereto, the first assignment of error would present questions of importance for our decision. In such argument it is contended that under the provisions of our statute murder in the first degree by the administration of poison is a distinct statutory offense complete in itself, and without any crime lesser than the principal one being included therein. If the definition of this crime stood by itself, and had no connection with murder in the first degree, as otherwise defined, there would be force in this contention. But murder in the first degree however it may be committed, is the crime which is defined in the section, which provides that one of the methods by which it may be committed is by causing the death of a person by the administration of poison. Such being the fact, there is no distinction between the crime of murder in the first degree when so committed and the crime of murder in the first degree when committed by other means. The language of the statute is that every person who shall kill another under certain circumstances shall be guilty of murder in the first degree, and there is no distinction as to the crime growing out of the means employed for its commission. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the crime set out in the statute is a single one, and that, by whatever means it may have been committed, it includes the crime of murder in the second degree, and manslaughter as thereafter defined in the statute. The sections defining these crimes, when construed with section 1319 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that "upon an indictment or information for an offense consisting of different degrees, the jury may find the defendant not guilty of the degree...