State v. Griffin
| Decision Date | 17 October 1984 |
| Citation | 487 A.2d 247 |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. David W. GRIFFIN. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Michael Povich, Dist. Atty., Edward McSweeney, III, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), Ellsworth, for the State.
Stern & Goldsmith, J. Hilary Billings (orally), Bangor, for defendant.
Before McKUSICK, C.J., and NICHOLS, VIOLETTE, WATHEN, GLASSMAN and SCOLNIK, JJ.
On June 9, 1982, the Hancock County Grand Jury indicted David W. Griffin, the defendant, on a count of assault with a dangerous weapon, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 208(1)(B) (1983), and on a count of criminal threatening with the use of a dangerous weapon, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 209 (1983). At trial in the Superior Court, the jury found the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of simple assault on the first count and guilty of criminal threatening with the use of a dangerous weapon. On appeal the defendant contends that omissions from the presiding justice's instructions to the jury constitute obvious reversible error, that the jury's verdict is internally inconsistent and contrary to state law, and that the presiding justice improperly restricted the scope of cross-examination. We conclude that the presiding justice failed to instruct the jury on an essential element of the crime of criminal threatening with the use of a dangerous weapon. We affirm the defendant's conviction for simple assault and vacate the defendant's conviction for criminal threatening with the use of a dangerous weapon.
Essentially two versions of the facts were presented at trial; no one disputes, however, that on May 23, 1982, the defendant and his friend, Herbert Wentworth, arrived at the house of the defendant's estranged wife, Joanne Griffin, in Southwest Harbor, Maine. The State contends that the defendant burst into Joanne Griffin's house uninvited and without her consent, and dragged his wife from the kitchen to the hall where he asked Mr. Wentworth to get him a knife. Joanne Griffin escaped her husband's grasp and ran across the street to the Dunbars' house where the defendant grabbed her and held a knife to the back of her neck. Although Joanne Griffin heard the defendant ask for a knife and she felt what she thought was a knife on her neck, she never actually saw the defendant holding a knife. Jane Dunbar, however, saw the defendant hold his wife by the hair with his left hand while he was holding a butcher knife in his right hand. Randy Dunbar, alerted to the incident by his mother Jane Dunbar, never saw the defendant holding a knife, but shortly after the defendant and Joanne Griffin were separated, Randy Dunbar found a butcher knife under a tree about two feet from where the defendant had been holding his wife. Although the defendant admits to chasing his wife to the Dunbars' and grabbing hold of her, he denies threatening her with a knife. He asserts that Joanne Griffin attacked him with a butcher knife which he wrested from her and immediately "tossed" to Mr. Wentworth who in turn "tossed" it out the door.
After the jury returned its verdicts, defendant moved pursuant to M.R.Crim.P. 29(b) for judgment of acquittal on the criminal threatening count on the ground of inconsistent verdicts. The presiding justice denied the motion and sentenced the defendant to terms of one year on the assault conviction 1 and eighteen months on the criminal threatening with the use of a dangerous weapon conviction, the sentences to be served concurrently. The defendant immediately filed a notice of appeal to the Law Court.
On this appeal, the defendant assigns as error, despite no objection at the time, the presiding justice's failure to define the terms "use of a dangerous weapon", an essential element of the crime of criminal threatening with the use of a dangerous weapon, and "bodily injury", an essential element of the crime of simple assault. No party shall assign as error any omission from jury instructions unless he objects before the jury retires. M.R.Crim.P. 30(b). An exception to the general rule is M.R.Crim.P. 52(b), which permits the Law Court to notice obvious errors affecting substantial rights even though no objection was made at trial.
In review, the Law Court will not scrutinize instructions for isolated shortcomings, instead we consider the effect of all the instructions in context, particularly in an obvious error situation. State v. Daley, 440 A.2d 1053, 1056 (Me.1982). The presiding justice's failure to define the phrase "use of a dangerous weapon" prejudicially affects substantial rights of the defendant. "Use of a dangerous weapon" means:
the use of a firearm or other weapon, device, instrument or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which, in the manner it is used or threatened to be used is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.
17-A M.R.S.A. § 2(9)(A) (1983). "Serious bodily injury" referred to in the definition of "use of a dangerous weapon", and undefined by the presiding justice's instructions, means:
a bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement or loss or substantial impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or extended convalescence necessary for recovery of physical health.
17-A M.R.S.A. § 2(23) (1983).
Although the jury had the opportunity to view the butcher knife and hear testimony about its use, the jury could not determine by means of common sense the meaning of the phrases "use of a dangerous weapon" and "serious bodily injury", indeed the jury may never have heard the phrase "serious bodily injury" during the trial. In fact, the presiding justice instructed the jury that on neither charge were they to be concerned with the quantum of bodily injury. The jury may have incorrectly thought that by merely holding a knife in his hand the defendant used a dangerous weapon when the definition requires a use or threatened use which is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. Because we vacate the defendant's conviction of criminal threatening with the use of a dangerous weapon, we do not reach the issue whether the Superior Court's failure to instruct on the lesser included offense of simple criminal threatening was reversible error.
Unlike the failure to define "use of a dangerous weapon" and "serious bodily injury", the failure to define "bodily injury", as used in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 207(1) simple assault, did not prejudicially affect substantial rights of the defendant. Neither 17-A M.R.S.A. § 2(5) (1983) defining bodily injury, nor § 207(1) itself, requires any particular level or quantum of pain, illness, or impairment. If anything, the common sense understanding of the phrase "bodily injury" is more restrictive than its statutory meaning.
The defendant's motion for acquittal contended that because the jury did not follow the presiding justice's instructions on the...
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In re Scott S.
...a jury, did not make an essential finding. Cf. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999); State v. Griffin, 487 A.2d 247, 249 (Me.1984). Although, even such a failure to find an essential fact may be harmless error. Neder, 527 U.S. at 18-20, 119 S.Ct. 1827. H......
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