State v. Griffin, No. 42094.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
• Writing for the Court: KINDIG
• Citation: 254 N.W. 841,218 Iowa 1301
• Parties: STATE v. GRIFFIN.
• Decision Date: 15 May 1934
• Docket Number: No. 42094.

218 Iowa 1301
254 N.W. 841

STATE
v.
GRIFFIN.

No. 42094.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 15, 1934.

Appeal from District Court, Black Hawk County; Geo. W. Wood, Judge.

Pat Griffin, the defendant-appellant, was informed against and tried for, and convicted of, murder in the first degree. The jury recommended the death penalty, and accordingly the district court entered judgment. From that judgment, the defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

John L. McCartney and Herbert A. Greenhouse, both of Waterloo, and James W. Fay, of Emmetsburg, for appellant.

Edward L. O'Connor, Atty. Gen., Walter F. Maley, Asst. Atty. Gen., and John W. Gwynne, Co. Atty., and Burr C. Towne, Asst. Co. Atty., both of Waterloo, for the State.

KINDIG, Justice.

On December 16, 1932, Elmer Brewer shot and killed William F. Dilworth, a deputy

[254 N.W. 842]

sheriff of Black Hawk county. For this offense, Brewer was informed against, tried, and convicted of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to be hanged. See State v. Brewer, 254 N. W. 834, determined at the present session of this court.

The crime was committed near the city of Waterloo. Pat Griffin, the defendant-appellant in the case at bar, accompanied, and it is claimed by the state aided and abetted, the said Elmer Brewer at the time of the murder. Section 12895 of the 1931 Code provides: “The distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal is abrogated, and all persons concerned in the commission of a public offense, whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet its commission, though not present, must hereafter be indicted, tried, and punished as principals.” Accordingly, the defendant, Pat Griffin, was informed against and tried for murder as a principal, but the state proved its charge against the defendant by showing that he knowingly aided and abetted the said Elmer Brewer in committing murder. A verdict of guilty was returned by the jury on January 5, 1933. It was found by that body that the defendant committed murder in the first degree, and that he should be punished “with death.” Section 12914 of the 1931 Code. So, on January 16, 1933, the district court sentenced the defendant in accordance with the jury's verdict. From the judgment imposing the sentence, the defendant appeals.

Numerous propositions are argued on the appeal. Our attention now will be directed to them.

[1] I. Throughout his argument, the defendant insists that the district court erred in permitting the jury to consider the issue of murder in the first degree. Such error appears, the defendant concludes, because there is no evidence of premeditation or deliberation. See section 12911 of the 1931 Code.

Assuming, without deciding, that, in order to convict the defendant of murder in the first degree, it is necessary for the state to prove that the act of Elmer Brewer in killing the deputy sheriff was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and further conceding, without determining, that, in order for the state to prove the defendant in the case at bar guilty of murder in the first degree under the information and instructions, it is necessary to show that the aiding and abetting were with the willful, deliberate, and premeditated intent of assisting the said Elmer Brewer in committing murder, nevertheless a review of the record reveals that there is ample evidence to sustain the jury's finding that the part played by each participant in the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.

The jury was warranted in finding the following facts at this juncture: Elmer Brewer and the defendant, some days previous to the murder, while armed with revolvers, robbed the Hill Packing Company, at Topeka, Kan., of approximately $125. After the robbery, Brewer and the defendant went to Kansas City, Mo., in an automobile which they abandoned and left standing on the streets of that city. On the next day, Brewer and the defendant left Kansas City and rode on a freight train to Chicago, where they remained for approximately two weeks. They then drove a car, with an Illinois license, from Chicago to Waterloo, where they arrived December 14, 1932.

Frank Graves and his wife lived in a two-room shack about a quarter of a mile south of highway No. 20, near the east limits of Waterloo. Brewer and the defendant spent some time at the Graves home. Pat Griffin, the defendant, stayed at the Graves home on the night of December 14th, but Brewer did not stay there. Both Brewer and the defendant remained at the Graves home on the night of the 15th. The defendant and Brewer ate breakfast at the Graves home Friday morning, December 16th. Following the breakfast, they went to Waterloo, but came back about 1 o'clock in the afternoon. Upon returning to the Graves home, Brewer and the defendant went into the house. Soon after going into the house, Brewer lay down on a cot, covered himself with his overcoat, and went to sleep. When Brewer went to sleep, the defendant watched for officers. He told Mrs. Graves that, if any one came and made inquiry about the automobile standing outside, she was to falsely tell the inquirer that it belonged to hunters. At that time one D. E. McBride, an acquaintance of the Graves family, was in the house with Mrs. Graves, Brewer, and the defendant.

H. T. Wagner, the sheriff of Black Hawk county at that time, had a warrant for the arrest of Brewer on a “blanket charge.” Accordingly, the sheriff sent two of his deputies to locate and interview Brewer, with the instructions that, if “they found anything worth while, they were to bring him in.” The deputies thus sent for Brewer were Dilworth and Mitchell. So, at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, the two deputy sheriffs got into a car and drove to the Graves home.

[254 N.W. 843]

As they were driving up the lane from highway No. 20, the defendant saw them and remarked: “It is the law.” Then the defendant awoke Brewer, who was sleeping on the cot. Brewer threw his overcoat on the floor, and the revolver fell out of a pocket. He picked up the revolver and put it back into his overcoat pocket. Both Brewer and the defendant went into the bedroom of the house, and they, or Mrs. Graves, placed a beaver board door over the opening between the two rooms. About that time the officers came to the house and rapped at the door. They first asked for Mr. Graves. Mrs. Graves replied that he was “up town.” At this time, the officers informed Mrs. Graves as to who they were. She invited the officers into the house. During this conversation, the officers inquired about the car with the Illinois license, and Mrs. Graves, as she had been instructed, falsely told them that the automobile belonged to hunters; whereupon the officers asked if Brewer was in the house, and Mrs. Graves, as directed, falsely said “No.”

One of the officers looked over at the beaver board door and asked Mrs. Graves if he could look into that room. When in the house, the officers had on their overcoats, which were buttoned up. As one of the officers started toward the beaver board door, Brewer and the defendant, with drawn revolvers, pushed the door aside, stepped into the room where the officers were, and said: “Stick 'em up.” Immediately the officers obeyed, and put up their hands. At the very instant when Brewer and the defendant said “Stick 'em up” they commenced shooting at the officers. The defendant shot at Officer Dilworth, and the bullet struck the belt buckle at the officer's waist line, and then glanced off into the flesh. According to the record, this bullet would have been fatal had it not been for the belt buckle. Almost instantaneously with the defendant's shot, Brewer also fired at Officer Dilworth, and the bullet entered through his head and killed him. Then immediately afterward the defendant shot Officer Mitchell through the abdomen, but he later recovered from the wound thus inflicted.

Thereupon Brewer and the defendant left the Graves home and wandered through the fields for a considerable time until they were finally apprehended by other officers. Following the capture, Brewer and the defendant were taken to the county jail, where the defendant admitted that he and Brewer shot Officer Dilworth. When talking to the sheriff of Black Hawk county, the defendant was asked this question: “You fellows (defendant and Brewer) must have been wanted for something in order to do what you did this afternoon (shoot the officers).” To that interrogatory the defendant made the following answer: “Yes. That they (we) (meaning the defendant and Brewer) had been in Topeka, Kansas, and pulled a robbery there. They (we) had robbed the safe of the Hill Packing Company of $125, more or less, and figured when they (we) saw the officers coming at this time (up the lane toward the Graves home, just before the shooting) that they (we) (Brewer and the defendant) were going to be picked up for that robbery.” On different occasions the defendant stated that he and Brewer intended to “beat the rap” for the Kansas crime. When the officers came up the lane toward the Graves house, Brewer and the defendant thought they were after them for the Kansas crime.

Obviously under the record there is ample evidence upon which the jury could base its finding that the killing of Officer Dilworth was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. State v. Woodmansee, 212 Iowa, 596, 233 N. W. 725;State v. Troy, 206 Iowa, 859, 220 N. W. 95;State v. Kneeskern, 203 Iowa, 929, 210 N. W. 465;State v. Browman, 191 Iowa, 608, 182 N. W. 823;State v. Fuller, 125 Iowa, 212, 100 N. W. 1114.

[2] II. At least a part of the evidence relating to the robbery in Kansas was shown by the cross-examination of the defendant. This, he says, is reversible error because the subject was not sufficiently gone into on his direct examination to warrant a cross-examination of such extended scope. Moreover, the defendant admitted that he previously had been convicted of a felony, and therefore he argues that it was not proper to further...