State v. Griffin
| Citation | 202 S.W. 542 |
| Decision Date | 16 February 1918 |
| Docket Number | No. 20437.,20437. |
| Parties | STATE v. GRIFFIN. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Monroe County; Wm. T. Ragland, Judge.
Sewell Griffin was convicted of knowingly exhibiting the sign of an honest business at a house ordinarily used as a common assignation house, and he appeals. Affirmed.
Hays, Heather & Henwood, of Hannibal, (F. W. McAllister, of Jefferson City, of counsel), for appellant. C. P. Le Mire, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
The defendant was indicted for a violation of section 4758, R. S. 1909, and convicted in the circuit court of Monroe county. From this judgment he appeals.
The indictment alleges that on the 31st day of July, 1915, the defendant was the keeper and person in charge of a certain house in Monroe county, state of Missouri, and describes the location of the house, which house ordinarily was used as a common assignation house and common bawdyhouse; that he did feloniously expose and display and cause to be displayed on the front window of said house a certain sign of an honest occupation, to wit, "Hotel Office," by which sign a decent person might be deceived and inveigled into the house; the said honest occupation displayed by the sign being that of hotel keeper. Evidence was introduced to show the character of the house and the purpose for which people habitually resorted to it, and the relation of the defendant to the house and its management.
In the first instruction the court directed the jury that, if they found the defendant, Sewell Griffin, at any time within three years, was the keeper or person in charge of the building, describing it and is location, "and that said house was at the time ordinarily used as a common assignation house or common bawdyhouse, and that said defendant did then and there expose or display or cause to be displayed, or knowingly permitted to be exposed or displayed, upon the front window of said house and building, a certain painted or printed announcement or sign of an honest occupation or business, to wit, `Hotel Office,' whereby any decent person might be deceived or inveigled into such house so ordinarily used as a common assignation house or common bawdyhouse, if such is the fact," then they should find the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment. Another instruction defined for the jury the meaning of the terms "common assignation house or common bawdyhouse."
I. The appellant in his brief does not directly object to the sufficiency of the indictment, but attacks the first instruction, the significant part of which is set out above, claiming that it is erroneous. However, the objection to this instruction, involves a question as to the sufficiency of the indictment, which was attacked in the oral argument.
It is claimed by the appellant that the statute (section 4758) was not enacted for the protection of persons who might be inveigled into entering a house such as is described in the indictment, but that the purpose of the statute was to prevent any person, under the camouflage of a reputable sign, from conducting an unlawful business of the kind described, and therefore the instruction authorized a verdict of guilty without finding the commission of the particular offense at which the statute is aimed.
The answer to this contention is complete in the wording of the statute itself, which declares it an offense to expose, or cause or permit to be exposed or displayed, upon any outer wall, window, or door, a sign of an honest occupation or business "whereby any decent person may be deceived or inveigled into such infamous house." The case of State v. McLaughlin, 160 Mo. 33, 40, 60 S. W. 1075, 1076, was a prosecution for the violation of this statute. The indictment is almost word for word the same as the indictment here, and the principal instruction, which was approved by the court in that case, is almost identical with the instruction complained of here. The court there characterized the statute thus:
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State v. Hesselmeyer, 36220.
...40, 60 S.W. l.c. 1076.] It is not necessary that she should have had anything to do with putting them up, State v. Griffin (Mo. Div. 2), 202 S.W. 542, 544; but she must have had some control over them. The main sign bore Louis Hesselmeyer's name. He was the person in charge. Furthermore we ......
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State v. Hesselmeyer
...all the evidence was properly overruled and there was substantial evidence to justify the verdict. State v. Barr, 78 S.W.2d 105; State v. Griffin, 202 S.W. 543. Ellison, J. The appellants, husband and wife, were convicted of displaying signs of an honest occupation and business upon the ext......
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