State v. Grimm

• Decision Date: 10 June 1912
• Citation: 148 S.W. 868
• Parties: STATE ex rel. HUNT et al. v. GRIMM et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

148 S.W. 868

STATE ex rel. HUNT et al. v. GRIMM et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

June 10, 1912.

1. COURTS (§ 18) — JURISDICTION — LOCATION OF REAL PROPERTY.

The circuit court has no jurisdiction of an action to cancel for fraud a recorded deed to lands in the state of Virginia, since such an action affects title to real estate which under the statute must be brought in the county where the real estate is situated.

2. COURTS (§ 18) — JURISDICTION — LOCATION OF LAND.

That the fraud for which cancellation of a deed to land in Virginia is asked consists in the change of the name of the grantee after execution does not give jurisdiction of an action for its cancellation to the courts of this state.

3. FORGERY (§ 10) — ELEMENTS — ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS

A change in the name of a grantee in a deed subsequent to its execution is forgery.

4. COURTS (§ 18) — JURISDICTION — LOCATION OF REAL PROPERTY.

In an action to cancel a deed to land in another state claimed to have been forged, a demand in the petition for the impounding of the forged deed alleged to be in this state does not give jurisdiction to the courts of this state, since such relief is merely incidental, and could not be granted alone.

Lamm and Kennish, JJ., dissenting.

In Banc. Prohibition by the State, on the relation of Daniel D. Hunt and another, against J. Hugo Grimm and others. Writ granted.

Seddon & Holland, for relators. R. M. Nichols, for respondents.

GRAVES, J.

Action in prohibition, purpose of which is to determine the right of Hon. Hugo Grimm, one of the judges of the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, to proceed further with a case pending in his court entitled, Greer Real Estate & Investment Co., Plaintiff, v. Daniel D. Hunt and Mabel R. Hunt, Defendants. In the case pending in the circuit court the plaintiff therein filed its amended petition. To this petition the defendants in that cause, relators here, filed a demurrer, challenging the jurisdiction of that court, and, said demurrer being overruled by the respondent in this cause, an application for a writ of prohibition was made to this court and an order to show cause was made. Respondent filed his return to our preliminary rule, and relators thereupon moved for judgment upon the pleadings, and the questions of law thus raised have been argued and submitted for our decision.

The facts charged and pleaded in the petition in the circuit court case become of essence here. The petition is long, but the facts pleaded are few. These facts are: That the Greer Real Estate & Investment Company was the owner of certain lands in Albermarle county, in the state of Virginia. That by certain named fraudulent acts the defendants in that case, relators here, induced the said company to make a deed for said lands to Mabel A. Hunt, for the agreed consideration of $16,000. That defendants in that case, relators here, after the delivery of that deed, and before its record, fraudulently changed the name of the grantee from "Mabel A. Hunt" to "Mabel R. Hunt." That thereafter such fraudulent deed was placed of record in Albermarle county, in the state of Virginia, by the relators in this cause. That the name "Mabel A. Hunt," grantee in the deed by the corporation, was fictitious, and known to be so by the relators in this cause, but not known by the corporation at the execution of the deed. That the relators here fraudulently devised this scheme to get the title of the land in question in the name of the relator Mabel R. Hunt. That the corporation has never received the consideration of $16,000. That the relator Daniel D. Hunt was a stockholder in the corporation, and, having its confidence, was enabled to perpetrate the alleged fraud upon the corporation. After charging these facts, the petition in the circuit court thus concludes: "And that the said conveyance as placed upon the records of conveyances of Albermarle county, Va., constitutes and is a cloud upon the title to plaintiff's said property; that the plaintiff has the possession of said property, and has no adequate remedy at law to redress the wrongs and grievances complained of. Wherefore and by reason of the premises plaintiff prays for an order canceling the said deed aforesaid, that the said deed made by the plaintiff to said property be ordered surrendered up and impounded in the records of this court in this case, and the plaintiff prays for such further and other orders, judgments, and decrees in the premises as may be just and proper, together with its costs in this behalf expended, and for this it will ever pray." In the application for the writ of prohibition it is charged that the said plaintiff in the action pending in the circuit court had, since the filing of the petition in this state as aforesaid, filed a similar petition in the proper court of Albermarle county, state of Virginia, and had procured service upon these relators, as defendants in that action, and that thereby these relators were called upon to defend two actions covering the same subject-matter and seeking the same relief. This allegation stands in effect admitted by the return of respondent, and was admitted in oral argument. This sufficiently outlines the facts.

1. A reading of the petition on file in the court over which respondent presides shows beyond doubt that the action is one to annul and cancel a deed, and thereby remove the apparent cloud upon the plaintiffs' alleged title to the real estate described in the petition. It is true the prayer of the petition asks for the impounding of the alleged forged deed, but this does not change the legal effect of the petition. Impounding a deed already of record would avail plaintiff nothing. But we need not pursue this further at this point. The only fair interpretation of the petition and its purpose is as above indicated. The question, then, is, Has the circuit court of the city of St. Louis jurisdiction to hear and determine a case, the purpose of which is the cancellation, for alleged fraud, of a deed to lands in the state of Virginia? This question we discuss next.

2. The petition in respondent's court states a cause of action, but it goes further, and states facts which show that such cause of action is not cognizable by the courts of this state. A court of equity in Missouri has no jurisdiction to cancel for fraud a deed to lands in the state of Virginia.

Nor has such court any greater right to cancel such deed because there is an allegation of a fraudulent change in the name of the grantee. Fraud of any kind, if proven, obviates and vitiates the deed, but the hearing of the question of fraud or no fraud, forgery or no forgery, must be in a court having jurisdiction of the particular case.

We say "forgery or no forgery" because the changing of the name of a grantee in a deed is not only a fraud, but by law is forgery. The cancellation of a recorded deed is an act which affects the title to real estate. Such cancellation is the destruction of a muniment of title. It involves directly the title to real estate. The decree annulling the deed acts directly upon the land and the title thereto. A cloud upon the title as alleged in this petition is "a title or incumbrance apparently valid, but in fact invalid." 7 Cyc. 256. In such case the courts of one state have no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit, where it is alleged in the petition that the land to be affected lies within the jurisdiction of another state. The jurisdiction of the subject-matter of such action is in the proper court of the state wherein the land is situated. And this is true notwithstanding the general rule that courts of equity act in personam. This exception to the general rule is recognized by statutes in many states, as well as by the common law.

In this state the case of Castleman v. Castleman, 184 Mo., loc. cit. 438, 83 S. W. 757, is in point. That was an action to cancel two deeds to land lying in Cooper county. The suit was brought in Cooper county where the land was, but where defendants did not reside. Defendants challenged the jurisdiction of the court in this equitable action. Through Valliant, J., we then said: "The position of appellant on this point is that this is a personal suit, and could be brought only in the county of his residence, or `where the plaintiff resides and the defendant may be found.' Appellant is correct in his general proposition that a court of equity acts in personam. And, since the suit is personal in its character, it must seek the person to be affected in the county of his residence, regardless of where the thing in controversy may be. State ex rel. v. Zachritz, 166 Mo. 313 [65 S. W. 999, 89 Am. St. Rep. 711]. But our statute (section 564, R. S. 1899) has ingrafted one exception to...