State v. Grimm, 40539.

• Decision Date: 20 June 1931
• Docket Number: No. 40539.,40539.
• Citation: 212 Iowa 1193,237 N.W. 451
• Parties: STATE v. GRIMM.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

212 Iowa 1193

237 N.W. 451

STATE

v.GRIMM.^a1

No. 40539.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 20, 1931.

Appeal from District Court, Butler County; M. H. Kepler, Judge.

The defendant was indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced of a charge of statutory rape.

Affirmed.

John H. Meyers, of Waterloo, for appellant.

John Fletcher, Atty. Gen., and Neill Garrett, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. H. Graven, Co. Atty., of Greene, and C. G. Burling, Special Prosecutor, of Clarksville, for the State.

ALBERT, J.

The first error complained of is that the court failed to define the crime of rape and included offenses.

[1] By reading the instructions it will be found that while the court did not, in terms, give a definition of the crime of rape or assault with intent to commit rape, yet in the instructions given the court enumerated each and all of the elements that constituted either of these crimes. Under the circumstances, therefore, we hold there was no necessity, in the absence of a request from the defendant, for a specific definition of each of these crimes.

[2] The instructions also covered assault and battery and simple assault. These two latter crimes were not defined, nor were the elements thereof set out in the instructions, but in the light of the verdict, we do not think there was prejudicial error in failing to define these latter crimes.

As above stated, after having set out the elements of the crime of rape and instructing thereon, the court then set out the elements of the crime of assault with intent to commit rape and instructed thereon. If the jury had any doubt as to defendant's guilt of the crime of rape, the court then told them if the evidence warranted, they might find the defendant guilty of assault with intent to commit rape. This protected the interests and rights of the defendant so far as was necessary, and the failure of the court to define assault and battery and assault, under these circumstances, was not prejudicial error.

[3] When defendant's wife was on the stand in his behalf, she was asked if she did not hear the prosecuting witness tell the sheriff that “Arthur Grimm was responsible for her pregnant condition.” This was objected to and sustained by the court. She was then asked “whether or not, at the time and place, at her father's home, on Wednesday morning, being in March and being the day her husband was arrested, did you say to the sheriff, Burma, in words or substance, that you believed your husband was guilty of the crime charged against him by Ardath Copeland.” This question was objected to and the objection sustained. The prosecuting attorney then said he wanted to use this as a basis for a further question of impeachment. To this, defendant's counsel objected and the court said, “The ruling may stand. It is incompetent and not proper impeachment.”

This condition of the record does not warrant us in saying that the conduct of counsel was reprehensible and should be a basis for prejudicial error.

[4] The principal basis of defendant's assault on the proceeding is that there was no testimony corroborating the prosecuting witness as segregating or pointing out the defendant as the person who committed the crime. It is a settled rule in this state that the testimony of the prosecutrix alone is sufficient to prove that a rape had been committed on her. The last expression of the court on this matter is in State v. Speck, 202 Iowa, 732, 210 N. W. 913. But this does not, in itself, make a case for the state. Her testimony must be corroborated. Section 13900, Code 1927, provides as to the crimes of this character, the defendant “can not be convicted upon the testimony of the person injured, unless she be corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.”

[5] It is to be noted here that the corroboration required is not a corroboration of the testatrix' testimony as to the fact that rape has been committed on her, but when she testifies that the defendant is the man who perpetrated the crime, she must be corroborated in this respect. In other words, the corroboration required is such testimony, as, aside from the testimony of the prosecutrix, points to the defendant as the guilty party. Her saying that he is the party is not sufficient. Aside from her testimony, there must be other and outside testimony which points out the defendant as the guilty party. State v. Robinson, 170 Iowa, 267, 152 N. W. 590;State v. Kessler, 189 Iowa, 567, 178 N. W. 513;State v. Speck, 202 Iowa, 732, 210 N. W. 913, and cases therein cited. We therefore turn to the record in this case to see whether this required corroboration is shown.

Ardath Copeland, the prosecutrix, is a sister-in-law of the defendant, Arthur E. Grimm. At the time in controversy herein, she was 15 years of age and the defendant 33. The defendant was married to the prosecutrix' sister, Helen, in 1923. He was engaged as a janitor in a bank and two churches at Parkersburg, Iowa, where he...