State v. Grimm
| Decision Date | 11 January 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 55591,No. 1,55591,1 |
| Citation | 461 S.W.2d 746 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Leon GRIMM, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Thomas H. Stahl, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
John R. Barsanti, Jr., St. Louis, for appellant.
WELBORN, Commissioner.
Appeal from denial of relief from three consecutive life sentences for murder, first degree, robbery and rape.
At about 6:00 P.M., December 5, 1962, Mrs. Betty Foster was struck in the head with a baseball bat in an alley near the parking lot at her place of employment in St. Louis. She was dragged to a nearby lot where she was raped and robbed. Her attackers then dragged her back to the parking lot and left. Mrs. Foster was found unconscious on the parking lot at around 10:30 P.M. on the date of the attack.
At about 9:30 P.M. on December 7, 1962, Leon Grimm was picked up by St. Louis police on suspicion of involvement in the attack on Mrs. Foster. He was taken to police headquarters and on questioning there, Grimm admitted that he and Ellis Coney had planned to attack Mrs. Foster in order to rob and rape her. Coney slashed a tire on her auto on the parking lot and when she got out to examine the flat tire as she was driving away from the parking lot, Coney struck her with a baseball bat and the rate and robbery followed.
On December 10, 1962, affidavits were filed in the St. Louis Court of Criminal Correction, charging Grimm with robbery in the first degree with a deadly weapon, forcible rape and assault with intent to kill with malice. Mrs. Foster died on December 16 and a charge of murder, first degree, was filed in lieu of the assault charge.
On January 3, 1963, grand jury indictments were filed charging Coney and Grimm with murder, first degree, robbery, first degree, with a deadly weapon and forcible rape.
Grimm was arraigned on the charges on January 4, 1963. At the arraignment, a Public Defender appeared with defendant and a plea of not guilty was entered to all charges.
In February, 1963, a judge of the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis ordered Grimm transferred to the State Hospital at Fulton for mental examination. Before the transfer occurred, the court appointed Mr. James W. Jeans to represent defendant. Mr. Jeans was notified of the appointment on February 14, and conferred with Grimm before the latter went to Fulton.
Examination at Fulton resulted in a diagnosis of: 'Chronic Maladjustment of Adolescence, in an impulsive, immature, intellectually and culturally deprived individual. No psychosis was found and the opinion of the hospital staff was that Grimm 'knows the difference between right and wrong * * * and is able to consult with counsel in his own defense.'
On May 9, 1963, Coney was found guilty of murder in the first degree by a jury in the St. Louis Circuit Court with a punishment of life imprisonment.
On June 17, 1963, Grimm appeared in the St. Louis Circuit Court with Mr. Jeans. The pleas of not guilty to the three charges were withdrawn, pleas of guilty entered and a life sentence imposed for each offense, the sentences to run consecutively.
Grimm filed a motion under Supreme Court Rules 27.25 and 27.26, V.A.M.R., to set aside his pleas of guilty and the judgment of conviction. An evidentiary hearing was held at which Grimm and Jeans testified. The trial court made findings adverse to appellant and this appeal followed.
On this appeal, five challenges to the trial court's findings are advanced.
1. The court erred in finding that the incriminating statement made by appellant on December 7, 1962 was not taken contrary to law, was voluntary and was given after appellant had been advised of his constitutional rights.
2. The court erred in finding that the total deprivation of legal counsel to appellant for 69 days after his arrest was not a deprivation of due process of law.
3. The court erred in finding that appellant's pleas of guilty were knowingly and voluntarily entered.
4. The court erred in failing to find that the totality of the deprivation of due process under the facts of the case required the sentences to be vacated. Circumstances which should have been considered include the questionable nature of the incriminating statement, the excessive and prejudicial publicity, the deprivation of counsel during the critical stages of the proceeding and the failure to comply with Supreme Court Rule 25.04, V.A.M.R.
5. The court erred in failing to find that the three consecutive life sentences were invalid as constituting cruel and unusual punishment.
I.
The conviction in this case having been based upon pleas of guilty, the fundamental problem presented upon the application of the appellant is whether or not the pleas were knowingly and intelligently made. The starting point for determination of such issue is the record of the proceedings at which the plea was entered. There is no necessity to set out the proceedings verbatim. The record shows that the colloquy at the plea was between the court and Mr. Jeans. No inquiry was directed to or answered by appellant. Mr. Jeans informed the court that he had fully discussed the murder charge with appellant; that he had advised Grimm that he would be entitled to a trial by jury; that he had told appellant of the various charges against him and of the range of sentence which might be imposed and had acquainted him with the possibilities available to him; that he had advised him in the murder case that if he were found guilty, there were only two possible verdicts, life imprisonment or death. The circuit attorney explained his recommendation of three successive life sentences on the basis of the life sentence imposed by the jury on Coney and the 'mental background' of appellant. The inquiry on allocution was then addressed to Mr. Jeans and when he replied that he had no legal reasons why sentence should not be pronounced, a sentence of life imprisonment for murder was imposed. The court then inquired of Mr. Jeans whether the plea of not guilty on the robbery charge was being withdrawn and whether he had discussed the matter with appellant. Upon Mr. Jeans' affirmative answer and again upon his negative reply to the inquiry on allocution, sentence of life for robbery was imposed, to run consecutively with the murder sentence. Mr. Jeans then announced withdrawal of the plea of not guilty on the rape charge and entry of a plea of guilty. Again, upon Mr. Jeans' negative response to the allocution inquiry, the court imposed a life sentence for the rape charge, to run consecutively with the first two.
Such a record does not demonstrate a knowing, voluntary plea. Nor does it meet the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 25.04, V.A.M.R. Drew v. State, Mo., 436 S.W.2d 727. We therefore must determine whether or not the evidence adduced at the hearing met the burden which the inadequate record cast upon the state to come forward with evidence to show that the pleas were knowingly and understandingly made. Davis v. Swenson, W.D., Mo., 308 F.Supp. 635; Mountjoy v. Swenson, W.D., Mo., 306 F.Supp. 379.
The evidence on behalf of the state came from Mr. Jeans, a lawyer of wide experience in the trial of civil cases. He had previously served as appointed counsel in three other criminal cases, one of which went to trial.
Jeans testified that, upon hearing of his appointment as counsel for Grimm, he visited appellant in the jail. His primary concern at that time was to become acquainted with Grimm, appraise his demeanor and character as a witness and his recollection of the facts of the offenses with which he was charged. Shortly after the appointment, Grimm went to Fulton for the previously ordered mental examination. Jeans' work was then involved largely in investigating Grimm's background and getting information from persons other than his client. He talked with Grimm's mother on three occasions. He had a very lengthy interview with a Mrs. Tolan, a teacher at a special room in a school Grimm had attended. Grimm was under her tutelage for about two years and she had used him as the subject of a paper which she was preparing in working for a Master's Degree. Jeans interviewed persons at Missouri Hills who had known Grimm during his stay at that facility. He examined Grimm's school record. He also examined the files of the two St. Louis daily newspapers and noted their articles on the case.
Jeans interviewed numerous psychiatrists in an effort to get help from that standpoint. He conferred with a welfare worker who had some dealings with Grimm and corresponded with a sister of Grimm who he thought would most likely be of help to Grimm.
Jeans conferred with the circuit attorney and obtained a copy of the statement that office took from Grimm.
Mr. Jeans' recollection was that he conferred with Grimm four to six times.
Jeans testified that from his own investigation of appellant's level of intelligence, the reports of psychiatric examinations which had been made available to him and his own consultation with psychiatrists, he concluded that no submissible defense of insanity under Missouri law at that time was possible. Jeans did state that, although he knew that Grimm's I.Q. of 68 bordered on the moronic, he felt that Grimm understood the discussions between them.
Jeans testified that in his first interview with Grimm, he...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Flood v. State, 56269
...S.W.2d 550, 553(2) (December, 1969) that Boykin would not be applied retroactively and adhered to that decision in State v. Grimm, Mo., 461 S.W.2d 746, 752(1) (January, 1971). We continue to adhere to that decision on this question and note that it is clearly in accord with that of at least......
-
State v. Motley
...provided by an otherwise constitutional statute, is not to be considered excessive. State v. Alexander, supra at 985(4); State v. Grimm, 461 S.W.2d 746, 754(7) (Mo.1971). Stated somewhat differently, "The definition and punishment of crime in general is a legislative function upon which the......
-
State v. Padilla, 9601
...Dublin v. Osborne, 388 S.W.2d 588 (Ky.1965). The imposition of consecutive sentences of life imprisonment is proper. State v. Grimm, 461 S.W.2d 746 (Mo.1971); Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 335, § 9 at 368 (1970) and cases therein Defendant recognizes that the imposition of separate sentences to run c......
-
State v. Nielsen
...who alleges that he pleaded guilty because of an inadmissible confession is not, without more, entitled to relief. State v. Grimm, 461 S.W.2d 746, 752 (Mo.1971). The voluntariness of the plea of guilty here did not rise or fall on the absence or presence of O'Connor's corroborative later di......