State v. Groth
Decision Date | 12 November 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 01-3000-CR.,01-3000-CR. |
Citation | 655 N.W.2d 163,258 Wis.2d 889,2002 WI App 299 |
Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, v. Jeffrey R. GROTH, Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant. |
Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant-cross-respondent, the cause was submitted on the briefs of James E. Doyle, attorney general, and Sally L. Wellman, assistant attorney general.
On behalf of the defendant-respondent-cross-appellant, the cause was submitted on the combined brief of Peter M. Koneazny, assistant state public defender.
Before Wedemeyer, P.J., Fine and Schudson, JJ.
¶ 1.
The State of Wisconsin appeals from a judgment and an order, after a jury found Groth guilty of second-degree reckless homicide, party to a crime, while armed with a dangerous weapon; aiding a felon; and carrying a concealed weapon. The State argues that the trial court erred in granting Groth's postconviction motion for a new trial on the homicide charge. The State contends that the court erred in concluding that it had erred at trial in giving WIS JI—CRIMINAL 406. The State is correct and, therefore, we reverse the postconviction order for a new trial and reinstate the judgment of conviction on the homicide charge.
¶ 2. Groth cross-appeals from the judgment of conviction and the postconviction order granting his request for a new trial but denying his request for resentencing. Groth does not challenge his convictions for aiding a felon or carrying a concealed weapon. He argues, however, that: 1) he is entitled to resentencing because, he says, he was sentenced based on inaccurate information; and 2) the court erroneously exercised sentencing discretion and denied him equal protection when it imposed significantly different sentences on him and a co-defendant. He also argues that, with respect to the homicide conviction, he is entitled to a new trial in the interests of justice as a result of what he deems confusing jury instructions, an erroneous jury instruction, and the State's misleading closing argument.
¶ 3. We reject Groth's challenges to the jury instructions and the State's closing argument. We do agree, however, that Groth is entitled to resentencing because he was sentenced based, in part, on what the State concedes was information without factual basis in the record as it comes to us. Therefore, without any need to address his additional sentencing challenge, see Gross v. Hoffman, 227 Wis. 296, 300, 277 N.W. 663 (1938) ( ), we remand for resentencing.
¶ 4. In its postconviction decision, the trial court summarized the facts that, as relevant to the issues in this appeal, are essentially undisputed:
¶ 5. At the jury-instructions conference, the prosecutor requested WIS JI—CRIMINAL 406, modified to reflect the appropriate crimes. So modified, and as ultimately presented to the jury, the instruction states, in part:
¶ 6. Groth objected to the instruction. He did so, however, arguing only that the standard instructions on second-degree reckless homicide while armed, party to the crime, without any additional instruction involving second-degree recklessly endangering safety, would be easier for the jury to understand and apply. He did not argue that the evidence was insufficient to support the State's proposed instruction. He did not argue that second-degree reckless homicide was not a natural and probable consequence of second-degree reckless endangering safety under the circumstances of this case. And he did not argue that any specific language in the State's proposed instruction was inaccurate or confusing. The court granted the State's request.
¶ 7. In his postconviction motion, however, Groth contended that the instructions he had proposed more clearly distinguished his intentional aiding and abetting from Lanaghan's recklessness. Granting Groth's motion, the trial court concluded:
[Second-degree reckless homicide while armed, party to the crime] is not the natural and probable consequence of second-degree recklessly endangering safety, since there is no evidence as to what [Groth] actually intended. [Groth's] theory was that the weapons brought to the tavern were for self-defense in the event a confrontation occurred. He was not sure what would happen after he provided Lanaghan with the .38 caliber gun.
[1-3]
¶ 8. A trial court has broad discretion in instructing a jury but must exercise that discretion in order to fully and fairly inform the jury of the applicable rules of law. State v. Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d 199, 212, 556 N.W.2d 701 (1996). Whether a crime charged was a natural and probable consequence of the crime with which a defendant allegedly assisted is a factual issue for the jury. State v. Ivy, 119 Wis. 2d 591, 601, 350 N.W.2d 622 (1984). Whether a jury instruction is appropriate, under the given facts of a case, is a legal issue subject to independent review. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis.2d 627, 638, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992)
.
[4-6]
¶ 9. Whether a jury instruction violated a defendant's right to due process is a question of law subject to our de novo review. Id. at 639. In reviewing a claimed jury instruction error, we do not view the challenged words or phrases in isolation. Id. at 637. Rather, jury instructions "must be viewed in the context of the overall charge." Id. Relief is not warranted, however, unless the court is "persuaded that the instructions, when viewed as a whole, misstated the law or misdirected the jury" in the manner asserted by the challenger to the instruction. Id. at 638.
¶ 10. WISCONSIN JI—CRIMINAL 406 defines aiding-and-abetting liability in circumstances under which a person who intentionally aides and abets the commission of one crime is also guilty of any other crime (committed in the...
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