State v. Groves
| Docket Number | A-1-CA-40176 |
| Decision Date | 08 November 2023 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELEXUS JOLAINE GROVES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
1
STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ELEXUS JOLAINE GROVES, Defendant-Appellant.
No. A-1-CA-40176
Court of Appeals of New Mexico
November 8, 2023
Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY Brett Loveless, District Court Judge
Raul Torrez, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM Meryl E. Francolini, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellee
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender Allison H. Jaramillo, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant
MEMORANDUM OPINION
JAW B. YQHALEM, Judge
{¶1} Defendant Elexus Jolaine Groves appeals her convictions for seven offenses arising from the death of two persons and the serious injury of a third in an automobile collision, which occurred as Defendant fled law enforcement officers who had signaled her to stop. Defendant continued to flee after the collision, without
assisting the victims. On appeal, Defendant raises nine issues (two of which we consider together): (1) whether there was a striking violation of Defendant's speedy trial right justifying review for fundamental error; (2) whether the district court properly instructed the jury on the elements of aggravated fleeing and whether there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction for aggravated fleeing; (3) whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to exclude a witness; (4) whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for a change of venue based on pretrial publicity; (5) whether the district court judge was biased against Defendant; (6) whether the district court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress a statement that she made to police on the date of her arrest; (7) whether the district court erred in imposing six-year sentences for Defendant's convictions for reckless vehicular homicide and knowingly leaving the scene of an accident resulting in great bodily harm or death; and (8) whether the district court abused its discretion in designating Defendant's convictions for reckless vehicular homicide and great bodily injury by vehicle as serious violent offenses for purposes of the Earned Meritorious Deductions Act (EMDA). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
{¶2} On January 18, 2017, Defendant and another individual, Paul Garcia ("Mr. Garcia"), ingested methamphetamine and then stole a van. The van was reported
stolen and law enforcement officers located the van in traffic on a city street. Defendant was driving and Mr. Garcia was sitting in the passenger seat. Officers followed Defendant and engaged their emergency lights, signaling Defendant to stop. Defendant ignored the officers' signals and continued driving with officers in pursuit. As the pursuit continued, Defendant increased the speed of the van. The officers, pursuant to law enforcement policy, eventually disengaged their emergency lights and stopped pursuing Defendant. Defendant continued at a high rate of speed, running a stop sign and colliding with another vehicle. The collision resulted in the death of two individuals and injury to a third person. Defendant and Mr. Garcia fled the scene on foot without assisting the victims. The pair stole another truck and eluded officers.
{¶3} Two days after the collision, law enforcement officers located and arrested Defendant. At the police station, Defendant made a statement to detectives regarding a letter of remorse that she had written to the family of the victims of the collision.
{¶4} Defendant was indicted on the following counts: (1) two counts of first degree felony murder, or in the alternative, reckless vehicular homicide; (2) two counts of unlawful taking of a motor vehicle; (3) two counts of conspiracy to commit an unlawful taking of a motor vehicle; (4) knowingly leaving the scene of an accident resulting in great bodily harm or death; (5) great bodily injury by vehicle; and (6)
aggravated fleeing of a law enforcement officer. Mr. Garcia was indicted on similar counts, and Defendant and Mr. Garcia's cases were joined.
{¶5} During the pretrial stage of the case, Defendant filed various motions, including, in relevant part, a motion to suppress the statement that she made to detectives on the date of her arrest, and a motion for a change of venue due to the pretrial publicity surrounding the case. The district court denied both motions. Defendant also filed a motion to dismiss the two counts of first degree felony murder brought against her. The district court granted the motion. The State appealed the district court's decision to our Supreme Court, and the case was stayed pending the appeal. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision, and reinstated the felony murder charges against Defendant. See State v. Groves, 2021-NMSC-003, ¶ 40, 478 P.3d 915. The mandate on appeal was issued on December 18, 2020, nearly three years after the filing of the State's notice of appeal. Upon remand, the district court set an August 16, 2021, trial date and the case moved forward.
{¶6} Approximately a month before Defendant's trial, Mr. Garcia informed the State that he wanted to enter into a plea deal. Mr. Garcia then filed a motion to sever his case and Defendant's case, which the district court granted. The State then amended its witness list, specifically naming Mr. Garcia as a witness at Defendant's trial. Defendant filed a motion to exclude Mr. Garcia as a witness based on untimely notice, which the district court denied.
{¶7} Defendant's trial began August 10, 2021, approximately four years after her arrest. Following trial, Defendant was convicted of the following seven offenses: two counts of reckless vehicular homicide, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 66-8101 (2016); unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-16D-1(A)(1) (2009); conspiracy to commit an unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-28-2 (1979); knowingly leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Sections 66-7-201 (1989), -203 (1978); great bodily injury by vehicle, pursuant to Section 66-8-101; and aggravated fleeing of a law enforcement officer, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-1.1 (2003, amended 2022). The district court sentenced Defendant to serve twenty-five and a half years in prison, assigning six-year sentences to Defendant's convictions for reckless vehicular homicide and knowingly leaving the scene of an accident resulting in great bodily harm or death. The district court also designated Defendant's convictions for reckless vehicular homicide and great bodily injury by vehicle as serious violent offenses for purposes of the EMDA. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Defendant's Unpreserved Speedy Trial Claim Does Not Support Reversal for Fundamental Error
{¶8} The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution establish an accused's right to a speedy
trial. Defendant contends that her right to a speedy trial was violated by the delay of four years, six months, and twenty days that elapsed from the date of her arrest to her trial. Defendant acknowledges that her speedy trial claim was not preserved in the district court and asks this Court to exercise its discretion to review for fundamental error. See State v. Garcia, 2019-NMCA-056, ¶ 38, 450 P.3d 418 (explaining that this Court has the discretion to review an unpreserved speedy trial argument for fundamental error).
{¶9} We review a speedy trial claim for fundamental error only where there has been a "striking violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial." State v. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 53, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendant argues that the length of delay in this case, the bulk of which was due to the State's pursuit of an interlocutory appeal, is alone sufficient to constitute a striking violation of her right to a speedy trial. We disagree and explain.
{10} To determine whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated, New Mexico courts apply the Barker balancing test to the particular facts and circumstances of the case. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); see also State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 13, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. The Barker test allows us to balance the parties' interest in the prompt resolution of the case with the countervailing interests in deliberate public justice. See Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905) ("The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent
with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice."). We, therefore, under the Barker test, review the conduct of both the prosecution and the defense guided by four factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and (4) the actual prejudice that the defendant suffered due to the delay. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 13 (listing the factors in Barker, 407 U.S. at 530).
{¶11} The first Barker factor, length of delay, is an objective factor that serves two functions: (1) first, the length of delay "acts as a triggering mechanism for considering the four Barker factors if the delay crosses the threshold of being 'presumptively prejudicial'"; and (2) second, the length of delay "is an independent factor to consider in evaluating whether a speedy trial violation has occurred." State v. Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 22, 366 P.3d 1121. A delay is considered presumptively prejudicial ...
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