State v. Grunewald

• Decision Date: 10 October 1941
• Docket Number: No. 32799.,32799.
• Citation: 211 Minn. 74,300 N.W. 206
• Parties: STATE v. GRUNEWALD.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

300 N.W. 206

211 Minn. 74

STATE v. GRUNEWALD.

No. 32799.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

October 10, 1941.

Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; Vince A. Day, Judge.

Charles Grunewald was convicted of willful neglect of official duty as a police officer, and he appeals from an order denying his motion for a new trial.

Order affirmed.

Harold C. Bellew and Mark J. McCabe, both of Minneapolis, for appellant.

J. A. A. Burnquist, Atty. Gen., M. Tedd Evans, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charles E. Houston, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Ed J. Goff, Co. Atty. and Per M. Larson, Asst. Co. Atty., both of Minneapolis, for respondent.

LORING, Justice.

The defendant, a police officer of the city of Minneapolis, was convicted of the crime of willful neglect of official duty in failing to arrest the keepers of a certain house of ill fame. He now appeals to this court from an order denying his motion for a new trial.

The facts in this case are essentially the same as the facts in State v. Palmersten, Minn., 299 N.W. 669, and there is no need to restate them here.

The questions presented are, (1) is the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction, and (2) did the trial court err in refusing to charge as defendant requested?

(1) After careful consideration of the record, we are of the opinion that there was abundant evidence to sustain the verdict.

(2) The defendant asked for three separate instructions, all pertaining to the "duty" of the defendant. In the first, the defendant asked the court to charge that the defendant would not have been justified in arresting the keepers of the house of ill fame here involved without "* * * having reasonable cause for believing that such felony had in fact been committed and being in possession of competent evidence to prove commission of the same."

The third request contained the statement that the defendant would not have been justified in breaking into the house of ill fame and arresting the persons found there "* * * without having reasonable grounds to believe that a felony had in fact been committed in such premises and being in possession of competent evidence for proving the commission of such felony."

The statute defining an officer's power to arrest, 2 Mason Minn.St.1927, § 10570(3), requires only that an officer arresting when a felony has been committed, as was the case here, have "reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it."

What is "reasonable cause for believing" must be determined in view of the particular facts of each case, see People v. Overton, 293 Mich. 44, 47, 291 N.W. 216, but we are of the opinion that the requests to charge requiring possession of competent evidence to convict would have been more favorable to him than the defendant was entitled to. He was bound to act if he had reasonable cause to believe that the persons described in the indictment had committed the felony there alleged. Cf. State v. Jeffrey, Minn., 300 N.W. 7, and People v. Licavoli, 245 Mich. 202, 222 N.W. 102, for cases construing similar statutes. Thus the first and ...