State v. Guity
| Decision Date | 06 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | SCWC-12-0000287 |
| Citation | 445 P.3d 138 |
| Parties | STATE of Hawai‘i, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Walter GUITY, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Shawn A. Luiz (Brian A. Costa on the briefs and application), Honolulu, for Petitioner
Stephen K. Tsushima, Honolulu, for Respondent
After having entered a plea agreement, but prior to sentencing, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Walter Guity ("Guity"), representing himself, orally moved in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit ("circuit court") to withdraw guilty pleas in his global plea agreement to two criminal offenses—one charged in the family district court ("family court case") that was legally impossible for him to have committed under the law in effect at the time of his plea. The second offense was charged in the circuit court ("circuit court case"). At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court denied Guity's oral motion to withdraw pleas in both cases and entered a sentence pursuant to the plea agreement.
Because both of Guity's pleas were encompassed in a global plea agreement, and the Intermediate Court of Appeals ("ICA") correctly concluded that Guity was entitled to withdraw his plea in the family court case, the ICA should have also held that Guity was permitted to withdraw his plea in the circuit court case. Accordingly, we vacate the ICA's judgment on appeal, the circuit court's judgments, and the circuit court's order denying Guity's motion to withdraw pleas and remand to the circuit court with instructions to accept Guity's withdrawal of both pleas.
In May 2010, Guity was charged in the family court with multiple counts relating to an incident with his wife, including attempted first-degree sexual assault. In March 2011, while awaiting trial in the family court case, Guity was charged in the circuit court with multiple counts of second-degree and fourth-degree sexual assault in an incident involving another woman.
In May 2011, Guity entered a plea agreement in the circuit court encompassing both cases. In that agreement, he pleaded guilty to the reduced charge of third-degree sexual assault in the family court case, and pleaded guilty to second-degree sexual assault in the circuit court case. In return, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts in both cases.
At the time of the plea agreement, it was legally impossible for Guity to have committed the crime to which he had pleaded guilty in the family court case relating to his wife. Hawai‘i Revised Statutes ("HRS") § 707-732(1)(f) (2014) (); HRS § 707-700 (2014) ().1 As the transcript of the change of plea hearing makes clear, the State, Guity, and the court accepting his plea were all aware at the time of his plea that third-degree sexual assault excluded an offense involving a spouse.2
Guity was represented by private counsel during his plea negotiations and at his change of plea hearing. He subsequently became dissatisfied with his attorney, who withdrew. Guity was appointed a deputy public defender; he, too, subsequently withdrew from representing Guity. On December 10, 2011, Guity notified the circuit court he wanted to represent himself.
On January 17, 2012, the circuit court held a hearing in which it inquired into Guity's desire to represent himself on a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.3 Guity's explanation of his motives and readiness to represent himself was ambiguous. For example, at the very end of the hearing, the circuit court asked, "I take it that you're making a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent decision that you do not want [court-appointed counsel] to actually handle this, or you do not want to exercise your right to a lawyer and you want do it yourself." In response to that question, Guity stated, "I need a lawyer, your Honor." The circuit court responded, "[l]ook, I'm not going to play games, Mr. Guity." Nonetheless, the court agreed to allow him to represent himself with the assistance of stand-by appointed counsel. Yet the court's permission for Guity to represent himself was itself ambiguous, since the court closed the hearing by saying, 4
Three days later, on January 20, 2012, the circuit court heard Guity's oral motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. He argued the motion pro se, with court-appointed counsel operating as stand-by counsel. Guity argued, inter alia, that during the plea negotiations (and at the change of plea hearing) his private attorney had failed to explain to him the nature of the law, including the fact that he was pleading guilty to a crime he could not legally commit in the family court case. The circuit court denied Guity's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The court later sentenced him to a one-year term of imprisonment for the family court case, an eighteen-month term of imprisonment for the circuit court case, and concurrent five-year terms of probation for each count pursuant to the plea agreement.
The ICA's opinion first discussed Guity's challenge to the factual basis of the pleas to the charge in the family court case. The ICA held that the circuit court had "clearly violated [Hawai‘i Rules of Penal Procedure ("HRPP") ] Rule 11(g)" because it knew "there was no factual basis" for that plea, and it "affirmatively knew that it was legally impossible for Guity to have committed this offense." State v. Guity, No. CAAP-12-0000287, 2016 WL 6427681, at *7 (App. Oct. 31, 2016) (mem.). Given that the plea in the family court case violated HRPP Rule 11(g), the ICA concluded that the circuit court "should not have accepted his guilty plea to this offense." Id. The ICA next addressed the State's argument that Guity had waived the defect in his guilty plea in the family court case. The ICA observed that allowing a defendant to plead guilty to a crime he could not legally commit "implicates the integrity of the judicial system." Id. at *8. The court concluded that allowing such a plea "would be contrary to the truth-seeking function of the criminal justice system and would serve to undermine the integrity of the system and public confidence in the system." Id. For that reason, "Guity's challenge to his guilty plea could not be barred by waiver." Id.
The ICA also concluded that the circuit court erred in allowing Guity to represent himself at the motion to withdraw his guilty pleas because the circuit court had failed to first obtain a valid waiver of his right to counsel. Id. "Because Guity did not validly waive his right to counsel prior to the hearing, the results of the hearing were tainted and the Circuit Court's rulings cannot stand." Id. at *10.
The ICA vacated the judgment in the circuit court case and vacated, as well, the judgment in the case involving Guity's plea in the family court case. Id. at *10. The ICA found that Guity's plea in the latter, to a crime he could not legally have committed, could never form part of a valid plea agreement. Id. at *8. Accordingly, the ICA remanded to the circuit court with instructions to permit Guity to withdraw that plea. Id. at *10. In contrast, the ICA found that Guity's plea in the circuit court case was an otherwise valid plea tainted only by the fact that the record did "not reflect a valid waiver of counsel" at the time he appeared pro se to argue his motion to withdraw guilty pleas. Id. at *8.
Thus, with respect to Guity's plea to a legally impossible crime, the ICA remanded to the circuit court with instructions to permit Guity to withdraw that plea. Id. at *10. But with respect to Guity's plea in the circuit court case, the ICA remanded to the circuit court with instructions to allow the State to exercise one of two options. Id.
The first option allowed the State to enforce the remainder of the plea agreement involving the circuit court case. Id. If the State elected that first option, Guity would be entitled to a new hearing on his motion to withdraw the remaining guilty plea. Id. If his motion to withdraw plea in the new hearing was granted, Guity would be able to withdraw the plea. If, however, his motion in the new hearing was denied, Guity would be held to his plea in the circuit court case. The second option would allow the State to withdraw from the plea agreement altogether and pursue all the original charges in both cases. Id.
While it is not entirely clear, the ICA appeared to base its articulation of those two options on remand concerning the plea in the circuit court case upon the premise that "the State did not breach the plea agreement" and therefore as the non-breaching party it "retains" those two options. Id. The ICA provided no explanation, and no citation to any legal authority, justifying or explaining its adoption of those two options.
A trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea made prior to sentencing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Garcia, 135 Hawai‘i 361, 368, 351 P.3d 588, 595 (2015). A court abuses its discretion when, among other things, it "has disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant." Id. (quoting State v. Merino, 81 Hawai‘i 198, 211, 915 P.2d 672, 685 (1996) ).
The ICA vacated both convictions arising from Guity's guilty pleas. First, the ICA vacated the judgment in the family court case based on Guity's plea to a crime he could not have legally committed. Guity, 2016 WL 6427681, at *10. Second, with respect to his plea in the circuit court case, the ICA concluded that Guity had not...
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