State v. Gullick, 78-160
| Decision Date | 29 December 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 78-160,78-160 |
| Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. Ronald GULLICK. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Thomas D. Rath, Atty. Gen., and Peter W. Mosseau, Concord (Peter W. Heed, Asst. Atty. Gen., orally), for the State.
Glenn G. Geiger, Jr., Penacook, by brief and orally, for defendant.
The defendant was indicted for a burglary alleged to have been committed in Portsmouth on June 30, 1977. Before and during the course of the trial, defendant seasonably excepted to the denial of various motions, including a motion to suppress certain statements made to the police, a motion for payment of the witness expense of his sister who he "believed" was with him at the time of the alleged crime, and a motion for discovery (in part). He also excepted to certain rulings admitting and excluding evidence. Prior to trial the defendant had moved to suppress the oral statements. After the suppression hearing, the Trial Court (Cann, J.) entered the following order: "The motion to suppress is denied; exceptions noted." Following a jury trial, during which the oral statements were introduced, the defendant was found guilty. All questions of law raised by defendant's exceptions were reserved and transferred.
Defendant Gullick, an enlisted man in the United States Air Force, was ordered to report to his commanding officer. From there he was escorted to the Office of Special Investigations for an interview with two members of the Portsmouth Police Department, Charles M. Conner and William P. Mortimer. An investigator from that military office was also present. Detective Conner read the defendant his Miranda rights from the police department's waiver-of-rights form that stated:
PORTSMOUTH N.H. POLICE DEPARTMENT WAIVER OF RIGHTS
(This portion is to be read and explained by the officer)
Before I ask you any questions, you must understand your constitutional rights. I will read this list of rights to you, and explain them so you understand them. I will also make it clear that this is a form to voluntarily waive these rights. If you decide to waive them and make a statement, they will again be explained to you following the taking of your statement, so that you are sure you fully understand them. Your rights are as follows:
1. You have the right to remain silent.
2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court.
3. You have the right to talk to an attorney for advice before any questioning, and to have him with you during the questioning.
4. If you cannot afford an attorney and you desire to talk to one, one will be appointed for you before questioning.
5. If you decide to answer questions now without an attorney present, you still have the right to stop answering at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time to consult with an attorney before questioning resumes.
(this portion to be read by the subject)
I have read and have had read and explained to me the above declaration of my rights, and I fully understand what my rights are. I am willing to waive these rights at any time and make a statement and answer questions. I do not want an attorney at this time, nor do I wish to converse with one before I answer the questions. I know and understand what I am doing. No threats or promises have been made to me, and no force, pressure or coercion af (sic) any kind has been used against me.
According to the testimony of Detective Conner at the suppression hearing, the defendant started to put his signature on the waiver form, but then stopped and stated: "I'm not sure I should sign this." He was then told "(i)f you agree to talk to us and understand this, you do not have to sign, if you do not wish, as long as you understand this is what we are interested in." Detective Conner further testified that the defendant "agreed to speak to us, understanding his rights," and he was certain that the defendant was only reluctant to sign the waiver and not unwilling to speak to the police. At the suppression hearing, the defendant testified that At trial he testified as follows: ...
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...to be established beyond a reasonable doubt, see State v. Derby, 131 N.H. 760, 761, 561 A.2d 504, 504 (1989); State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. 912, 915, 396 A.2d 554, 555 (1978), and we have established special rules for evaluating waivers by juveniles, State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6, 17-19, 490 A.2......
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