State v. Haight, 93APA08-1133
| Decision Date | 15 November 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93APA08-1133,93APA08-1133 |
| Citation | 649 N.E.2d 294,98 Ohio App.3d 639 |
| Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. HAIGHT, Appellant. * |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Michael Miller, Franklin County Pros. Atty., Joyce Anderson and Susan E. Day, Asst. Pros. Attys., for appellee.
Judith M. Stevenson, Franklin County Public Defender, and John W. Keeling, Asst. Public Defender, Turner & Wright and Carol A. Wright, Columbus, for appellant.
On June 14, 1991, Carl Friend Haight was indicted on two counts of aggravated murder with death penalty specifications, one count of aggravated burglary and one count of aggravated robbery. The aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery charges each included prior offense specifications as a result of Haight's previous conviction for aggravated burglary.
When indicted, Haight was already in custody at the Franklin County Corrections Center. As a result, he was served the indictment on the same day it was filed. He was arraigned on the charges on June 19, 1991. He entered a plea of not guilty at arraignment.
The case was initially set for trial on July 22, 1991. The trial judge assigned to the case continued the case to October 25, 1991 "Upon motion of the Defendant." The entry continuing the case was signed by an attorney in a space on a preprinted form and was not signed by Haight. As of the date the entry was filed, no attorney had been appropriately assigned to represent Haight.
On July 31, 1991, the attorney filed a demand for discovery on behalf of Haight. The attorney also filed a request for notice of intention to use evidence.
On or after August 1, 1991, trial counsel were officially appointed. The lead counsel indicated that he had been appointed July 17, 1991--five days before the first trial date. Cocounsel indicated that he was appointed on August 1, 1991.
On September 10, 1991, the two attorneys filed the only significant motion they would file before Haight was found guilty of aggravated murder with death penalty specifications. The motion was a motion to compel discovery. No ruling on the motion was ever journalized.
Apparently, at least some discovery was provided since the prosecution filed its own demand for discovery on September 11, 1991.
The case did not proceed to trial on October 25, 1991. No entry continuing the case was filed until January 10, 1992. The entry continued the case until February 10, 1992. Apparently, the entry was filed after it was prepared by an assistant prosecuting attorney. The signature of one of the defense counsel is affixed "per phone authority."
On January 16, 1992, a judgment entry was filed which indicates that the issue of Haight's competence to stand trial had been raised. Therefore, Haight was scheduled for a psychiatric examination. A second entry filed the same day called for Haight to be examined "pursuant to defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity." No such plea is present in the record.
On January 21, 1992, another entry, this time continuing the case to April 20, 1992, was filed.
On February 26, 1992, the trial court signed an entry appointing a mitigation specialist to assist in the defense of Haight. The individual appointed was authorized at that time to work a maximum of forty hours with pay.
On March 26, 1992, the services of a psychiatrist, Lewis Lindner, M.D., were authorized by the trial court. Lindner was also labeled as a "mitigation specialist."
Since the case was scheduled for a jury trial on April 20, a special venire was drawn. As part of the trial preparation, the records of Franklin County Children Services regarding Haight were obtained.
On April 20, 1992, another psychiatric examination was ordered by the trial court "pursuant to defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity." Again, no such plea is present in the record. Apparently, five days before trial, defense counsel had presented the prosecuting attorney's office and the trial court a report indicating that Haight had been legally insane at the time of the offenses. As a result, the case was continued on the motion of both parties to May 26, 1992. A second special venire was drawn for the May 26, 1992 trial date.
The second pretrial motion filed on behalf of Haight was filed on May 22, 1992. It allowed Haight to be transported from the Franklin County Corrections Center to a funeral home to view the body of his stepfather.
On May 26, 1992, Haight appeared and acknowledged that he had signed a written waiver of trial by jury. The issues of Haight's competency to stand trial and his sanity were not discussed on the record. The direct questions asked of Haight by the originally assigned trial judge were:
Apparently, the originally assigned trial judge intended to ask Haight if he was willing to waive his right to a trial by jury. However, the conversation got diverted to the fact that one of the three judges who would hear the case had been an attorney in the office of the prosecuting attorney at the time that Haight was indicted. Haight never was asked more about his willingness to waive his right to a trial by jury.
The two attorneys appointed to represent Haight, however, indicated their willingness for the recently appointed judge to sit in judgment on the case.
Neither the office of the prosecuting attorney nor defense counsel revealed to the trial judges at that time that a significant reason why defense counsel were urging Haight to waive his right to a trial by jury was that an agreement had been reached between the prosecution and the defense that if Haight waived his right to a trial by jury and minimized objections to certain evidence in the prosecution's case, the prosecution would inform the three-judge panel during the mitigation phase of the trial that the prosecution and the next of kin were not in favor of the death penalty being imposed on Haight. More details of this agreement are set forth under our discussion of the third assignment of error below.
To cement the jury waiver and cause the trial to have commenced, immediately after the discussion of the written waiver a witness was called. This first witness was Alan Brown, an officer with the Columbus Division of Police. Office Brown had been involved in discovering the body of Terry Tagg at 1535 Union Avenue in Columbus on June 5, 1991.
The trial was continued for two days after Office Brown testified.
Records filed with the court indicate that the attorney appointed as cocounsel to represent Haight spent a total of less than seven hours working on Haight's case during the first five months of representation. He claimed he spent an additional 46.75 hours during calendar year 1992 before the day the trial commenced. Of the 46.75 hours claimed, 17.5 hours are listed as travel, leaving less than thirty additional hours for all other kinds of pretrial preparation, including interviews, investigation, research, writing, negotiations, conferences and miscellaneous other time expenditures.
The lead counsel has apparently not sought payment for the services he rendered, so we are unable to ascertain completely what effort he put into Haight's defense other than fifteen hours of trial time during the guilt-innocence phase of the proceedings and the 3.5 hours of hearing time during the mitigation phase of the proceedings claimed by cocounsel in his affidavit for payment. Some inferences can be drawn from the minimal filing of pretrial motions.
The trial resumed on May 28, 1992, with a detailed opening statement from the prosecution. Lead defense counsel asked to defer the opening statement for the defense until the conclusion of the state's case. The court granted permission to defer the opening statement. At the conclusion of the state's evidence, lead counsel was asked whether he now wished to make an opening statement. He responded simply, "No, your Honor." As a result, no opening statement was made at the guilt-innocence phase of the proceedings on behalf of Haight.
The state then resumed its presentation of evidence, following a stipulation that permitted the prosecution to enter approximately one hundred photographs and approximately forty other exhibits into evidence through the testimony of witnesses who would not otherwise be able to testify about the photographs and/or exhibits because of a lack of personal knowledge. Officer Steven Thrall of the Crime Scene Search Unit of the Columbus Division of Police then testified about evidence collected at the scene of the homicide and in regard to the scene.
The third prosecution witness was Dana Norman, formerly a member of the Crime Scene Search Unit of the Columbus Division of Police. Sergeant Norman testified about a radio found near the body of Terry Tagg and a set of locking pliers found near a car in the garage at 1535 Union Avenue. Sergeant Norman had been responsible for collecting as evidence a sledgehammer which had been used to beat Tagg to death. Sergeant Norman also helped collect tiles and other items with blood on them, including bloody footprints. He and his partner had processed several items for latent lifts and had found fingerprints (which were identified as coming from Haight) on the radio. Haight's fingerprints were also found on a mirror cabinet door at 1535 Union Avenue, on the car in the garage and on a television stolen from the house. A fingerprint on the sledgehammer did not contain sufficient detail to allow for comparison.
The fourth state's witness was Edward K. Kallay, Jr., a homicide detective with the Columbus Division of Police. Detective Kallay went to the homicide scene in the early hours of June 5, 1991. He specifically noticed that although blood splatters were located all...
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