State v. Hairston

• Decision Date: 02 May 2019
• Docket Number: No. 2017-1505,2017-1505
• Citation: 156 Ohio St.3d 363,126 N.E.3d 1132,2019 Ohio 1622
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. HAIRSTON, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

156 Ohio St.3d 363

126 N.E.3d 1132

2019 Ohio 1622

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant,

v.HAIRSTON, Appellee.

No. 2017-1505

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted January 29, 2019

Decided May 2, 2019

Ron O'Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sheryl L. Prichard, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.

Yeura R. Venters, Franklin County Public Defender, and Timothy E. Pierce and Zachary D. Mayo, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellee.

Hunter, Carnahan, Shoub, Byard & Harshman, Russell E. Carnahan, and Robert M. Cody, urging reversal for amicus curiae Fraternal Order of Police, Capital City Lodge No. 9.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Nikki Trautman Baszynski, Assistant Public Defender; Jacqueline C. Greene ; David A. Singleton ; Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Joshua A. Thompson, Assistant Public Defender; Theresa G. Haire, Montgomery County Public Defender, and Christopher W. Thompson, Assistant Public Defender; Erin E. Davies; and Sarah J. Gelsomino, urging affirmance for amici curiae Office of the Ohio Public Defender, Ohio Chapter of the National Lawyers Guild, Ohio Justice and Policy Center, Hamilton County Public Defender, Montgomery County Public Defender, Juvenile Justice Coalition, and Friedman & Gilbert, L.L.C.

DeWine, J. {¶ 1} As they were responding to a radio call one night, two police officers heard the sound of nearby gunshots. They immediately drove a short distance to the area where the shots seemed to be coming from and, with guns drawn, detained the only person in the area. A pat-down of the man revealed a handgun. The question before us is whether this stop—a so-called Terry stop—violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, see Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The court of appeals held that it did and concluded that the trial court should have granted a defense motion to suppress the handgun and other evidence obtained during the stop. We disagree; we find no violation of the Fourth Amendment and reverse the judgment below.

I. Police respond to the sounds of gunshots, pat down the only person in the area, and recover a concealed firearm

{¶ 2} Columbus Police Officer Samuel Moore testified to the events that are at the center of this case during the trial court's hearing on the motion to suppress. As Officer Moore recounted the incident, at about 9:20 one evening in March 2015, he and his partner responded to a police dispatch about a domestic dispute. As they were getting out of their police cruiser, they heard the sound of four or five gunshots. The shots "weren't faint"; rather, "they appeared to be close." The officers immediately jumped back in their car and rushed to the area where the shots seemed to be coming from—outside a nearby elementary school.

{¶ 3} It took the officers about 30 to 60 seconds to get to an intersection just outside the school—a distance by car of about four-tenths of a mile. As they approached the intersection, they spotted an individual whom they later identified as Jaonte Hairston, walking away from the school into a crosswalk while talking on a cell phone. There was no one else around. The officers got out of the car and with weapons drawn ordered Hairston to stop. Officer Moore asked Hairston if he had heard the gunshots. Hairston replied that he had. Officer Moore then asked Hairston whether he was carrying any weapons. Hairston said he had a gun and nodded toward his jacket pocket. Officer Moore patted Hairston down and retrieved a handgun from his jacket. According to Officer Moore, at the time of the stop, Hairston talked to the officers calmly but "was somewhat nervous."

{¶ 4} Following the arrest, Officer Moore wrote a police report stating that when the officers were exiting their cruiser, "they heard 4 to 5 gun shots west of their location" and that they "responded to the area where they heard the gun shots from." In explaining his actions, Officer Moore testified that he had patrolled the zone where he was working that night for his entire six-year police career. Drug activity—as well as assaults, robberies, and domestic violence—frequently occurred in the area around the school during the evening hours. He had previously made arrests there for those types of crimes, including gun-related arrests.

{¶ 5} Hairston was charged with carrying a concealed weapon in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A). He filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop on the basis that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him.

{¶ 6} Following the hearing, at which Officer Moore was the only witness to testify, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. Applying the United States Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the court concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion to perform an investigative stop.

{¶ 7} The Tenth District Court of Appeals saw it differently. The court reasoned that the sound of gunfire only implied that "someone, somewhere, had shot a gun." 2017-Ohio-7612, 97 N.E.3d 784, ¶ 13. It determined that there was no particularized connection between the gunshots and Hairston: "Hairston was simply the first person the officers saw after driving nearly one-half mile from where they stood when they heard the gunshots." Id. Nor did Hairston's actions before the stop and the surrounding contextual factors—Hairston's presence in an area with a high crime rate, his nervousness, or the time of night—amount to reasonable suspicion. Id. at ¶ 14-15. The appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

{¶ 8} We accepted the state's discretionary appeal. 152 Ohio St.3d 1420, 2018-Ohio-923, 93 N.E.3d 1002.

II. The officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Hairston

{¶ 9} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Accord Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 14.¹ Its protections extend to brief investigative stops that fall short of traditional arrests. United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). An officer may perform such a stop when the officer has a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that criminal behavior has occurred or is imminent. Terry , 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. And when the officer is "justified in believing" that an individual may be "armed and presently dangerous," the officer may conduct a limited protective search of the individual for concealed weapons. Id. at 24, 88 S.Ct. 1868 ; Adams v. Williams , 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).

{¶ 10} The reasonable-suspicion standard is less demanding than the probable-cause standard used when analyzing an arrest. United States v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). The determination whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop must be based on the totality of circumstances "viewed through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold." State v. Andrews , 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88, 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991). An assessment of the totality of the circumstances "does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities." United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). We consider the cumulative facts "not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement." Id.

{¶ 11} Here, the cumulative facts support the conclusion that the officers had a reasonable suspicion to stop Hairston. First, Officer Moore personally heard the sound of gunshots—the gunshots were not faint and sounded close-by. This is not a case in which the officers relied on a radio dispatch or other secondhand information about shots being fired, e.g. , In re D.W. , 184 Ohio App.3d 627, 2009-Ohio-5406, 921 N.E.2d 1114, ¶ 32 (2d Dist.), but one in which they heard and immediately reacted to the sound of nearby gunfire.

{¶ 12} Second, Officer Moore knew from personal experience that crime often occurred at night in the area where the stop took place. Officer Moore had worked the same beat for six years. He was familiar with drug and other criminal activity near the school, and he had made arrests for illegal weapons and other crimes there in the past. An officer's experience with criminal activity in an area and an area's reputation for criminal activity are factors we have found relevant to the reasonable-suspicion analysis. Andrews at 88, 565 N.E.2d 1271 ; State v. Bobo , 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 179, 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988). Further, the stop occurred after dark—another circumstance we have found to be of some significance in the reasonable-suspicion analysis. Bobo at 179, 524 N.E.2d 489.

{¶ 13} But the most important considerations here are that the stop occurred very close in time to the gunshots and Hairston was the only person in the area from which the shots emanated. Officer Moore testified that upon hearing the shots, the officers immediately jumped in the cruiser and that it took them only 30 to 60 seconds to get to the intersection outside the school. When they arrived, Hairston—and no one else—was there.

{¶ 14} We conclude that these facts, taken together and viewed in relation to each other, rise to the level of reasonable suspicion. In holding otherwise, the court of appeals went through these factors individually and discounted the significance of each one. It determined that the facts that the officers heard the gunshots and stopped the only person in the area were of little moment because there was no "particularized connection" between the gunshots and Hairston. 2017-Ohio-7612, 97 N.E.3d 784, at ¶ 13. It further reasoned that the contextual factors asserted by the state—that the stop occurred at night and in an area known to the officers for criminal activity—provided "no...