State v. Hairston

• Decision Date: 24 August 1999
• Docket Number: No. 23414, No. 24225.
• Citation: 988 P.2d 1170,133 Idaho 496
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. James H. HAIRSTON, Defendant-Appellant. James H. Hairston, Petitioner-Appellant, v. State of Idaho, Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

988 P.2d 1170

133 Idaho 496

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. James H. HAIRSTON, Defendant-Appellant.

James H. Hairston, Petitioner-Appellant, v. State of Idaho, Respondent.

Nos. 23414, 24225.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, February 1999 Term.

August 24, 1999.

Randall D. Schulthies, Bannock County Public Defender; Thomas E. Eckert, Deputy Public Defender, Pocatello, for appellant in case no. 23414. Randall D. Schulthies argued.

Parmenter & Peterson, Bingham County Public Defender; Blackfoot, for appellant in case no. 24225. David N. Parmenter argued.

Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Kenneth M. Robins, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth M. Robins argued.

WALTERS, Justice.

James H. Hairston appeals from a death sentence imposed for the murders of William and Dalma Fuhriman at their home on Marsh Valley Road near Downey, Idaho. He also appeals from the denial of his application for post-conviction relief. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment of conviction and imposition of the death sentence. We also affirm the denial of Hairston's application for post-conviction relief.

BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

On January 6, 1996, Hairston and a companion, Richard Klipfel, were driving from Grand Junction, Colorado, to Spokane, Washington. They stopped at the Fuhrimans' ranch because they had run out of money and could not continue their journey. The Fuhrimans invited Hairston and Klipfel into their home and offered to help them find jobs. While Mr. Fuhriman was sitting at a kitchen table looking at a phone book, Hairston shot him in the head and then shot Mrs. Fuhriman. Hairston and Klipfel took $30 in cash, credit cards, and some personal property from the Fuhrimans' home and continued their journey. Hairston and Klipfel pawned some of the Fuhrimans' property. They purchased several items with the credit cards including toy remote control cars, tires, food, gas, and lodging. They also attempted to purchase a Harley Davidson motorcycle and $2500 worth of snowboarding equipment, but the credit card was rejected. Hairston and Klipfel were apprehended together near Clarkston, Washington, three days after the murders.

A jury found Hairston guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of robbery. The district court imposed a death sentence for each of the two murders and life in prison for the robbery. Hairston appealed. He also filed an application for post-conviction relief, which was denied. Hairston's direct appeal and his appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief have been consolidated for our review.

ISSUES ON DIRECT APPEAL

1. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error by allowing evidence of Hairston's participation in an uncharged shooting in Colorado two days before the Fuhriman murders?

2. Did the trial court allow the state to go beyond the scope of direct examination when cross-examining Hairston?

3. Did the trial court err by allowing the jury to hear a belatedly disclosed taped conversation between Hairston and a defense witness who visited him in jail during the trial?

4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to continue the trial?

5. Did the trial court deny Hairston a fair and impartial jury by refusing to excuse jurors for cause?

6. Does the accumulation of prosecutorial misconduct require a new trial?

7. Should this Court vacate the death sentence imposed, pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2827?

8. Are two of the aggravating circumstances found by the trial court impermissible, requiring a resentencing?

ANALYSIS

1. The trial court did not err by allowing evidence of Hairston's participation in an uncharged shooting in Colorado two days before the Fuhriman murders.

On rebuttal, the trial court allowed state witnesses to testify that Hairston shot a convenience store clerk in Grand Junction, Colorado, two days before the Fuhriman murders. The witnesses—including the victim— testified that Hairston and a juvenile entered the store while Klipfel waited outside in the car. Hairston shot the clerk in the head and then took money from the cash register. Hairston has never been charged with this shooting, and he argues that the evidence is impermissible character evidence that should have been excluded under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b).

Under Rule 404(b), evidence of uncharged misconduct is generally inadmissible when offered as evidence of the defendant's bad character. IRE 404(b); State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 745, 819 P.2d 1143, 1145 (1991). However, such evidence may be admissible when introduced "for other purposes." IRE 404(b). Rule 404(b) lists several permissible purposes such as proof of motive, intent, plan, knowledge, and identity, but this is not an exclusive list. State v. Arledge, 119 Idaho 584, 588, 808 P.2d 1329, 1333 (Ct.App.1991). Evidence offered for the purpose of impeachment may be admissible, although not listed in 404(b). Id. To be admissible, the evidence must be relevant to show something other than the defendant's character and propensity to commit the crime charged; it must be relevant to a material and disputed issue. Moore at 745, 819 P.2d at 1145. Even if relevant and introduced for a permissible purpose, evidence of uncharged misconduct is subject to exclusion under IRE 403 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id; IRE 403. The initial question of relevancy to a matter other than the defendant's character is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 766, 864 P.2d 596, 604 (1993). Balancing of probative value against prejudice and the ultimate decision to admit or exclude the evidence is within the trial court's sound discretion. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 784, 948 P.2d 127, 139 (1997).

The trial court ruled three different times prior to trial on the admissibility of the Colorado evidence. On June 10, 1996, following a hearing, the court orally granted Hairston's motion in limine and held that the Colorado evidence was inadmissible. At that time, the court expressed its uncertainty as to why the state believed the evidence was relevant. After a submission of briefs, the trial court reversed itself. The court found that the Colorado evidence was necessary for the state to connect Hairston with the gun that was used in both the Colorado shooting and the Fuhriman murders, and thus to establish Hairston's identity as the one who shot the Fuhrimans. Based upon this necessity, the court found that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the danger of prejudice on the issue of identity. The court, however, found that the evidence could not be used to show motive because there was other evidence establishing robbery as the motive and its probative value for that purpose was consequently outweighed by potential prejudice. The court also found that neither intent nor a common plan were at issue in the charges against Hairston. On August 8, 1996, following a motion for reconsideration, the court reversed itself again and held that the Colorado evidence could not be mentioned at trial. This final pretrial ruling was based upon other evidence pointed to by Hairston that could be used to connect him with the gun. Based upon this other evidence, the court found that the Colorado evidence was no longer necessary to link Hairston to the gun. The court found once again that the potential prejudice from such dramatic evidence outweighed its probative value.

After the conclusion of the defense's case-in-chief, the trial court again considered the Colorado evidence. The court decided that Hairston's testimony at trial made the Colorado evidence more probative than prejudicial and reversed its earlier ruling. The trial court held that the Colorado evidence could be used on rebuttal for impeachment, and to show identification, intent, and motive. The trial court stated:

I think in this case it would go to motive, intent, and identity.

And, also, conflicting statements—well, I'll back up a little bit. And this Court, as the trial court, is using the two-tiered analysis and the Court believes the evidence is relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged wherein the evidence the State desires to introduce would tend to establish motive, intent, and identification of the accused as a person who may have committed this crime.

This Court, as a trial court, is using my sound discretion. I believe the probative value of the evidence is now tipped. I believe the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by the unfair prejudice to the defendant.

The defendant denied shooting the gun before January 6th. He said he didn't own the gun. He said that he was shocked when he saw the Fuhrimans shot because he's never seen anyone shot before, and he said he's never seen anyone shot before more than once. He also said that he's never pointed a gun at anyone before. And, also, there's a question of the ownership and/or possession of the gun when it was left in the car in Clarkston. There was a big issue made of that.

...

So, the Court is going to allow you to introduce this evidence based on that, impeachment and prior bad acts are the reasons the Court stated.

It appears that Hairston himself opened the door for the admission of the Colorado evidence. Hairston admitted that he was at the Fuhrimans' house on January 6 when they were shot. He testified, however, that Klipfel was the one who shot them. The defense in this case was premised upon Hairston as the follower, who was shocked when Klipfel shot the Fuhrimans and only remained with Klipfel after the murders because he was scared. Once Hairston testified that he had not fired the gun prior to January 6th, that he had never seen anyone shot before, and that he had never pointed a gun at anyone, the Colorado evidence became relevant to impeach his credibility. As the Court of Appeals stated in State v. Arledge, 119...