State v. Halfhill
| Decision Date | 10 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 77246-5-I,77246-5-I |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. SCOTT LINDSAY HALFHILL, Appellant. |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
APPELWICK, C.J. — Halfhill appeals his conviction for second degree murder. He argues that the State failed to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt. He argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress and abused its discretion by not admitting other suspect evidence. And, he asserts that the search warrants in the case were unconstitutionally overbroad. We affirm.
FACTS
Donald Meyer lived in a lower level, one bedroom apartment in Ballard, Washington. He sold marijuana and controlled substances out of his home. The last time his friends heard from him was on June 17, 2011.
People that knew Meyer testified that Scott Halfhill became Meyer's roommate before he disappeared. Halfhill, on the other hand, told a detective that he was not Meyer's roommate. He stated that Meyer let him store his vehicle in his driveway for two months, that he had Meyer's keys for about a week during the first part of June, and that he stayed one or two nights at Meyer's apartment. Meyer's neighbor, Katie Blackstock, testified that it seemed like Halfhill was either sleeping in a van in Meyer's driveway or inside Meyer's apartment.
Between February 2011 and June 2011, Blackstock saw Halfhill going in and out of Meyer's apartment or heard him talking to Meyer every day. She sometimes heard what sounded like arguments between the two.
On June 17, 2011, Meyer called Katherine Marshall and left a message. Meyer also called Matthew Dehart. Dehart told Meyer he would come by the next day, June 18. When Dehart went to Meyer's apartment the next morning, Meyer did not answer his door, and his phone went to voicemail. Dehart faintly heard two people talking inside the apartment and knocked again, but left after no one answered.
On June 17, Eric Martin called Meyer and went to his door. Meyer did not answer either the phone or his door. Martin also went to Meyer's apartment around 10:00 a.m. the next day, and knocked on his door. After a few minutes, Halfhill opened the door and told Martin that Meyer was not there.
On July 6, 2011, police entered Meyer's apartment with a search warrant. Lieutenant Brian Stampfl noted that the wall in the bedroom appeared haphazardly painted and that it looked like there was something under the surface of some of the painted areas. He also noted that there appeared to be small specks of blood on the lower, unpainted portion of the wall, and a circular stain on the concrete floor. The stain appeared to be paint.
Police applied "Bluestar," a chemical that helps look for blood that cannot be seen, to the bedroom floor. The painted area of the floor reacted to the Bluestar.Bluestar was also applied in the bathroom and kitchen, and showed positive results.
On July 8, 2011, Meyer's torso was found in a plastic bag at CDL Recycling in Seattle, Washington. Several months later, volunteers with Heroes for Homeless found body parts under the Ship Canal Bridge. The body parts were later identified as Meyer's. A medical examiner concluded that Meyer's cause of death was homicidal violence of unknown etiology.
On August 19, 2011, a detective interviewed Halfhill about Meyer's death. At the start of the interview, the detective informed Halfhill of his right to silence and right to counsel. Halfhill stated that he understood his rights, and participated in the interview. He was released at the end of the interview. A few weeks later, Halfhill's attorney faxed the detective Halfhill's assertion of his right to remain silent and right to counsel.
Several days later, police executed a search warrant on Halfhill's storage unit in Elma, Washington. At the unit, they found a Tic Tac box with a Velcro strip on the back. Meyer occasionally sold methadone pills, which he packaged in Tic Tac containers. He would Velcro the containers underneath his counters.
A search warrant was issued for Halfhill's DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) on August 13, 2012. Police found him on July 8, 2013, and brought him to headquarters. After getting a new warrant for his DNA, a detective interviewed Halfhill again. The detective informed him of his right to counsel and right to remain silent. Halfhill stated that he understood his rights, and participated in the interview. He was released at the end of the interview. A few days later, Halfhill'sattorney again faxed the detective Halfhill's assertion of his right to remain silent and right to counsel.
On January 2, 2015, the State charged Halfhill with one count of murder in the second degree pursuant to RCW 9A.32.050(1)(a) and .050(1)(b). Prior to trial, he moved to suppress his July 8, 2013 statement to police. He argued that he did not waive his right to counsel when police questioned him again in 2013. At the CrR 3.5 hearing, the trial court found his statement admissible, and denied the motion. Halfhill also asked the trial court to admit other suspect evidence. In an offer of proof, he listed evidence concerning a man named Ron Varney. The trial court denied his request.
A jury found Halfhill guilty of murder in the second degree. Halfhill appeals.
DISCUSSION
Halfhill makes four arguments. First, he argues that because the State did not establish Meyer's cause of death, it did not prove an essential element of the crime—intent—beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, he argues that the trial court erred by admitting his July 2013 statement to police into evidence, because he invoked his right to silence and right to counsel. Third, he argues that the trial court erred by not allowing him to present evidence suggesting that another person killed Meyer. Fourth, in a statement of additional grounds for review, he argues that every search warrant in the case that described the items to be seized as "evidence of the crime of Murder" was unconstitutionally overbroad.
Halfhill argues that the State did not prove how Meyer died, and therefore failed to establish that his death was the result of an intentional act. He argues that to prove second degree murder, the State was required to prove that Meyer died as a result of Halfhill's intentional acts. He states that the fact that Meyer's body was dismembered and concealed is not sufficient to prove he died as a result of an intentionally violent act, and any other evidence of intent was speculative and equivocal.
The sufficiency of the evidence is a question of constitutional law that this court reviews de novo. State v. Rich, 184 Wn.2d 897, 903, 365 P.3d 746 (2016). Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it permits any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). "A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom." Id. Circumstantial and direct evidence are equally reliable. State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980). A defendant's criminal intent "may be inferred from circumstantial evidence . . . or from conduct, where the intent is plainly indicated as a matter of logical probability." State v. Billups, 62 Wn. App. 122, 126, 813 P.2d 149 (1991). We defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of the evidence. State v. Walton, 64 Wn. App. 410, 415-16, 824 P.2d 533 (1992), abrogated on othergrounds by In re Pers. Restraint of Cross, 180 Wn.2d 664, 681 n.8, 327 P.3d 660 (2014).
The instructions defined assault in the second degree as "intentionally assault[ing] another and thereby recklessly inflict[ing] substantial bodily harm or assault[ing] another with a deadly weapon or assault[ing] another with intent to commit a felony or assault[ing] another by strangulation or assault[ing] another by suffocation."
Halfhill argues that the fact that Meyer's body was dismembered does not alone establish that he died as a result of an intentionally violent act. He does not cite authority to support his argument that the State must prove how a victim died in order to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim died from an intentionalact. Instead, he relies on State v. Hummel, 196 Wn. App. 329, 383 P.3d 592 (2016).
A jury convicted Hummel of premeditated murder in the first degree of his spouse, Alice. Id. at 331. This court found that, even if the evidence supported an inference that a confrontation between Hummel and Alice occurred, there was no evidence to show deliberation or reflection before Hummel killed Alice. Id. at 356. It reasoned that evidence that Hummel disposed of her body, concealed her death, and fraudulently obtained her disability checks after she died may be evidence of guilt, but not premeditation. Id. at 356-57. Accordingly, this court held that no reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hummel killed Alice with premeditated intent. Id. at 358-59.
Halfhill argues that,...
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