State v. Hall

• Decision Date: 30 April 1885
• Parties: THE STATE v. HALL, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

85 Mo. 669

THE STATE

v.HALL, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

April Term, 1885.

Appeal from Jackson Criminal Court.--HON. H. P. WHITE, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Frank Titus for appellant.

It is alleged the instrument stolen was a deed. There can be no deed without a grantee, and there is no sufficient description of the instrument. State v. Kroeger, 47 Mo. 530; State v. Fay, 65 Mo. 490; State v. Page, 19 Mo. 213; 3 Wash. on Real Prop. (3 Ed.) 236; 1 Bouvier, 387. The value of the property affected is alleged to be two hundred dollars, and the value of the deed should have been charged to be the same. R. S., sec. 1310; State v. Krieger, 68 Mo. 98. Defendant's objection to Ford's statement of what defendant stated to him about or before the taking of the deed, about selling his or his wife's property should have been sustained. Gamble v. Johnson, 8 Mo. 606; State v. Dominique, 30 Mo. 585; 1 Taylor's Evidence, secs. 586, 587; 21 Alb. L. J. 484, 504. The instruction asked at the close of the state's case should have been given. There was a failure to show any criminal taking or larcenous intent. Johnson v. State, 19 Cent. L. J. 114. The first instruction for the state was erroneous. There was no evidence warranting an inference of felonious taking. Witt v. State, 9 Mo. 671. The second instruction erroneously declares that although defendant obtained the deed with Ford's consent, yet, if he converted the same to his own use, he is guilty. Burnside v. Twitchell, 43 N. H. 390; Williams v. Given, 6 Gratt. 268. The court should have told the jury what constituted a conversion. State v. Sims, 71 Mo. 540.

D. H. McIntyre, Attorney General, for the state.

The deed was sufficiently described by its name and purport. R. S., 1879, sec. 1814. It was not necessary to allege that the deed was of any value. Sec. 1814, supra; R. S., sec. 1312. The ownership was properly laid in Jonathan Ford. He was in lawful possession when the deed was taken by defendant, and possession is sufficient ownership. It is not necessary to prove that the person alleged to be the owner has the legal right to the property. State v. Schatz, 71 Mo. 502.

SHERWOOD, J.

I. The defendant was indicted for the larceny of a deed charged to be the property of Ford. The indictment is bottomed on section 1312, Revised Statutes, and is sufficient, as it pursues the language of the statute and states all the constituent elements of the offence in question. The same particularity of description is not required where the larceny of an instrument is charged as where it is forgery. In the former case, if the statutory term is employed in designation of the instrument, no more minute description is requisite than the common law requires in an indictment for the larceny of an ordinary chattel. Bishop on Stat. Crim., sec. 691. Besides, section 1814, Revised Statutes, 1879, in express terms declares that: “In any indictment for * * * stealing * * * any instrument or property, it shall be sufficient to describe such instrument or property by any name or designation by which the same may be usually known.” This disposes of the objection that the indictment does not mention the name of the grantee in the deed. And the term “deed” imports ex vi termini a complete instrument. State v. Fisher, 65 Mo. 437.

And the indictment is so full in other particulars as to the description of the property to be affected by the instrument alleged to have been stolen, and as to the parties thereto, and other descriptive incidents, that no doubt can arise that the indictment fully informed the defendant of the “nature and cause of the accusation.” An indictment similar in form to the one at bar is framed on the British statutes in regard to stealing writings relating to real estate. 2 Arch. Crim. Plead. & Prac. 1253. And under the provisions of section 1312, supra, no necessity existed to allege that the instrument charged to have been stolen was possessed of any value. The plain object of the section was to protect from larcenous hands wills, deeds or instruments of writing, being or purporting to be the act of another, by which any right or interest in real or personal property shall be or purport to be transferred, or conveyed, or, in any way, changed or affected. The section is broad enough and precise enough to extend its statutory protection over a deed, whether the right or interest therein mentioned has become consummated by reason of the delivery of the deed or not. Indeed, it must be obvious that many of the evils the statute designed to prevent would not be prevented if such a narrow view were to be taken of its scope and meaning as would place outside of its domain and jurisdiction a deed not delivered or a will not probated. And it was proper for the indictment to lay the property in Ford. He was the bailee of the deed of release, had a qualified property therein, and this was sufficient. The indictment in such cases may charge the property as either the bailee's or the bailor's, or as the thief's, or as the true owner's, at the election of him...