State v. Hall

• Decision Date: 21 March 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00CA23.,00CA23.
• Citation: 752 NE 2d 318,141 Ohio App.3d 561
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. HALL, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

141 Ohio App.3d 561

752 NE 2d 318

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. HALL, Appellant.

No. 00CA23.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Lawrence County.

Decided March 21, 2001.

Jeffrey M. Smith, Lawrence County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Evans, St. Clair & Bainter, L.L.P., and J. Michael Evans,¹ for appellant.

PETER B. ABELE, Presiding Judge.

This is an appeal from a Lawrence County Common Pleas Court judgment denying a request by Todd M. Hall, defendant below and appellant herein, to seal his court-ordered psychiatric evaluation(s) and to excuse his presence from all future commitment hearings.² The following errors are assigned for our review:

First Assignment of Error:

"The trial court erred to the prejudice of defendant by its denial of defendantappellant's motion to seal medical records, which violated defendant-appellant's right of privacy, the physician-patient privilege, and the dictates of O.R.C. Section 5122.31."

Second Assignment of Error:

"The trial court erred to the prejudice of defendant-appellant by its denial of his motion to hold hearings without requiring his presence. Defendant-appellant has the right to waive his appearance at R.C. Section 2945.401 hearings, and that right can be exercised by his guardian."

The record reveals the following facts pertinent to this appeal. On the afternoon of July 3, 1996, appellant walked into the "Ohio River Fireworks" store in Scottstown, Ohio, with a lit cigarette in his mouth. He nonchalantly walked to the back of the store and held the lit cigarette to one of the fireworks. The firework ignited and, in turn, ignited other fireworks and turned the building into an inferno. As a result of the ensuing carnage, nine people died and various other people received injuries.

In August 1996, the Lawrence County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging appellant with one count of aggravated arson in violation of R.C. 2909.02(A)(2), three counts of aggravated arson in violation of R.C. 2909.02(A)(1), and nine counts of involuntary manslaughter in violation of R.C. 2903.04(A). Appellant pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity to all charges.

Early in the proceedings it came to the court's attention that appellant suffered from some rather serious cognitive problems. A September 1996 competency evaluation revealed that appellant had experienced a "skateboard mishap" when he was a teenager that left him with a "basilar skull fracture." As a result of that injury, appellant spent two and one half months in a coma as a result of that "mishap" and eventually underwent "a right temporal and frontal lobectomy" as treatment for his injuries. The surgery left appellant with "severe behavioral problems," which, over the years, were alternatively diagnosed as "Organic Brain Syndrome," "frontal lobe syndrome," "Organic Personality Disorder, Explosive type," and "Organic Mental Disorder Secondary to Head Trauma."

Gary Bevin, M.D., a psychiatrist with the Shawnee Forensic Center, reviewed appellant's medical records and conducted his own examination. Dr. Bevin concluded that appellant was "psychiatrically ill and mentally disordered." Dr. Bevin related that the prior injury to appellant's frontal lobes had produced perfect textbook examples of expected symptoms such as "lack of judgment or foresight, facetiousness, disinhibitation, and euphoria." He continued that, as a result of these problems, appellant would require "life-long psychiatric, neurological and psychological treatment" as well as extensive "psychotropic" medication. Dr. Bevin opined that appellant (1) was not competent to proceed to trial, (2) did not demonstrate an adequate understanding of the nature of the proceedings against him, and (3) would be unable to assist in his own defense.³ Dr. Bevin recommended that appellant be confined to the "Central Ohio Psychiatric Hospital's maximum security forensic unit," where he could be treated in an attempt to restore competency.

The matter came on for hearing at which time both parties stipulated to the competency evaluation. On September 18, 1996, the trial court concluded that appellant was incompetent to stand trial and ordered that he undergo treatment at the recommended facility in hopes of restoring competency. The court revisited the matter in December 1996 and June 1997. Both times, the court ordered that appellant remain hospitalized and continue to receive treatment.

On September 12, 1997, the state filed a motion, pursuant to R.C. 2945.39(A)(2), asking the trial court to retain jurisdiction over the case.⁴ Howard Sokolov, M.D., Consulting Forensic Psychiatrist, reviewed appellant's medical records, met with him, evaluated his condition, and concluded that appellant remained incompetent to stand trial. Dr. Sokolov related that appellant demonstrated residual effects from his childhood head injury and exhibited severe "distractability, hyperactivity and impulsiveness" that seriously impair his ability to understand the proceeding against him or to assist in his own defense. Dr. Sokolov recommended that appellant remain hospitalized in the "maximum security unit" at the "Twin Valley Psychiatric System."

Once again, both parties stipulated to the psychiatric evaluation. On September 17, 1997, the trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) appellant had perpetrated the offenses with which he had been charged, and (2) that appellant remained mentally ill and subject to hospitalization. Accordingly, the court retained jurisdiction and ordered appellant's continued commitment to the hospital where he was receiving treatment. The matter came on for further consideration in March 1998 and March 2000. Each time the court determined that continued commitment and treatment were appropriate.

On April 3, 2000, appellant filed a motion requesting that the court "permanently seal" his psychiatric evaluations and any other medical records included in this case. Appellant argued that R.C. 5122.31 mandates that such records be kept confidential and that, in any event, he had a right of privacy therein. He also asked that he be allowed to remain absent from any further commitment hearings. Appellant averred that he had repeatedly been found incompetent and unable to assist his counsel. Thus, it would be "counterproductive" to treatment and serve "no good purpose" to continue to require appellant's presence at court hearings.

The state's memorandum in opposition that appellant's court-ordered psychiatric evaluations were public records to which the public had a right of access under both "Ohio's Open Records Act," as well as the general principle that judicial proceedings and records thereof should be open to the public. Further, the state objected to appellant being excused in advance from future competency hearings. The state argued that "[n]o evidence had been presented which would suggest that his attendance at these proceedings [was] detrimental," and that appellant's right to be present "should be judiciously guarded." The state noted that the failure to do so could haunt the court in later proceedings.⁵

On May 5, 2000, the trial court overruled appellant's motion in its entirety. The court found that appellant's medical reports and evaluations, kept as part of these proceedings, were "public records" and could not be sealed or kept confidential. Further, with respect to appellant's "waiver" of his right to be present at future competency hearings, the court reasoned that he had been deemed incompetent and thus could not knowingly waive that right. This appeal followed.

I

Appellant argues in his first assignment of error that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to "seal" his "medical records." We begin our analysis of that argument by defining the issue posited for our review. There are, in fact, no "medical records" in the file of this case. Rather, there are psychiatric evaluations prepared so that the trial court could determine appellant's competency to stand trial. The psychiatric evaluations are the reports appellant seeks to seal from public view. He has not sought, and does not request, an order to seal the records maintained by the psychiatric hospital where he has been committed and is receiving treatment.

Historically, a common-law right of access exists with respect to judicial records and documents. See State ex rel. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Juv. Div. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 19, 22, 652 N.E.2d 179, 183; See also State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Clermont Cty. Court of Common Pleas (May 2, 1988), Clermont App. No. CA88-04-033, unreported, 1988 WL 41541. Ohio's Public Records Act also requires that "public records" be made available for inspection. R.C. 149.43(B)(1). It is well settled that any document pertaining to a court proceeding, or any record necessary to the execution of the responsibilities of a governmental unit, is a "public record" within the meaning of R.C. 149.43. Such record must be made available for public inspection unless there is a specific statutory exclusion which applies. State ex rel. Mothers Against Drunk Drivers v. Gosser (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 30, 20 OBR 279, 485 N.E.2d 706, at paragraph one of the syllabus; Potchen v. Kelly (1998), 130 Ohio App.3d 21, 26, 719 N.E.2d 570, 573; State ex rel. Swigart v. Barber (1997), 118 Ohio App.3d 238, 240, 692 N.E.2d 639, 640.

We believe that the psychiatric evaluations at issue in the instant case are judicial records or documents submitted to the court to assist it in its responsibility to determine whether appellant is competent to stand trial. As such, the evaluations are "public records" that must remain open to inspection, under both common law and R.C. 149.43, unless appellant can show some authority to the contrary.

Appellant argues that his psychiatric evaluations should be exempted from the Public Records Act because they are "medical records." We...