State v. Hall
| Decision Date | 03 October 1922 |
| Docket Number | (No. 4640.) |
| Citation | 114 S.E. 250 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE. v. HALL et al. |
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Appeal from Circuit Court, Ohio County.
Suit by the State of West Virginia against Chester Hall. From a decree denying relief to the White Company, intervener, claiming to be the bona fide owner of an automobile seized by prohibition officers, intervener appeals. Reversed, rendered, and remanded.
James W. Ewing and P. J. McGinley, both of Wheeling, for appellant.
E. T. England, Atty. Gen., Charles Ritchie, Asst. Atty. Gen., and W. G. Brown, State Prohibition Com'r, of Summersville, for the State.
POFFPENBARGER, P. This is an appeal from a decree denying to the appellant, the White Company, the relief sought by its petition filed in an equity suit brought by the state to have a certain automobile truck seized by prohibition officers declared a common and public nuisance and sold for the benefit of the state. The seizure of the property, the proceeding for sale thereof, and the filing of the petition for its release, by the appellant claiming to be the bona fide owner thereof, are all based upon provisions of section 14 of chapter 108 of the Acts of 1919.
Only the question of title in the appellant is seriously involved. Even though title in an applicant is clearly shown, in such a case, he is not entitled to a release of the property, if he knew of, consented to, or acquiesced in, its unlawful use in respect of intoxicating liquors, or had cause to believe it was being, or was intended to be, so used. Nothing is relied upon here as evidence of such knowledge, except the presence of a memorandum attached to the contract of lease of the truck, making the deferred rentals immediately due and payable and forfeiting the lease, in the event of such unlawful use. In this stipulation, we find no evidence of purpose or intent to permit the truck to be unlawfully used, or of knowledge, or reason to believe, that it would be so used. It is strange argument to say one contracting against liability intended therebyto incur it. The appellant is a large manufacturing and selling concern, having sales offices in many large cities of the country. In addition to its sales of trucks and cars, it leases trucks, in Instances in which persons and firms needing them are unable to comply with the terms of sale. In making these contracts by the hundreds, throughout the country, it is not unreasonable to suspect or fear that some lessee may make unlawful use of the truck, to the prejudice of the lessor, in various ways, or that such use might occur without his knowledge or consent. Such a stipulation, therefore, is nothing more than a businesslike precaution against a possible contingency. It constitutes no evidence of knowledge of intent or purpose on the part of the lessee, to make improper use of the particular car leased. There is uncontradicted evidence that the rider in question was used in all cases of the leasing or rental of trucks. The plain purpose of this rider was provision against a mere contingency, not something suspected or feared as an impending actuality. Facts and circumstances disclosed indicate that the truck had been extensively and vigorously used in illicit transportation of liquors during the period of less than two months, of its alleged bailment by the owner, but there was nothing in them or any other evidence tending to prove any knowledge of such use on the part of the alleged bailor and owner. These circumstances do not seem to be relied upon in the argument, and we see no probative value in them, respecting the good faith of the appellant.
It is contended, however, that good faith on its part is negatived by the provisions of the written contract, showing the actual relations of the parties to the property. In other words, it is claimed the alleged lessee was in point of fact the beneficial owner, whether he was in law or not. The contract was made between the White Company and one C. M. Kinder, at Pittsburgh, Pa., August 29, 1921, and it stipulated that the place of performance should be in the state of Pennsylvania, and that it should be construed and enforced according to the laws of that state, and not otherwise. For and in consideration of $2,325.95 in hand paid, and six installments of rent to be paid monthly, and amounting to $2,116.55, the White Company leased the truck to Kinder for the period of six months, beginning with the date of the...
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Lee v. Saliga
...(1975)." See also Pemco Corp. v. Rose, 163 W.Va. 420, 257 S.E.2d 885 (1979). This rule, which was derived from Syllabus Point 3 of State v. Hall, 91 W.Va. 648, 114 S.E. 250 (1922), 12 assumes that the contract was both made and to be performed in another state. It is quite apparent, however......
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Nadler v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
...if it is contrary to its own public policy. Paul v. National Life Ins. Co., [177 W.Va. 427, 352 S.E.2d 550 (1986) ]; State v. Hall, 91 W.Va. 648, 114 S.E. 250 (1922); 2 Couch on Insurance § 16.48 (2d ed. 1984)." No public policy issue was raised in Lee, however, and we offered no further di......
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CITY OF BLUEFIELD, W. VA. v. Autotrol Corp., Civ. A. No. 1:86-0742
...the contract was made and performed governs, has traditionally determined the applicable law as to contract claims. State v. Hall, 91 W.Va. 648, 114 S.E. 250 (1922). More recently, however, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, recognizing the paucity of West Virginia law in this area......
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Dean BOYD v. Pancake Realty Co.
...of the contract are to be determined in accordance with the laws of this State. Klinck v. Price, 4 W. Va. 4; State v. Hall and White Co., 91 W. Va. 648, 653, 114 S. E. 250. However, the acts of performance under the contract, to be done by defendant, were to have taken place in the State of......