State v. Hall, 20426
| Decision Date | 12 May 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 20426,20426 |
| Citation | 268 S.C. 524,235 S.E.2d 112 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Richard HALL, Appellant. |
William D. Richardson, of Richardson & Johnson, Greenville, for appellant.
Solicitor William W. Wilkins, Greenville, Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Atty. Gen. Brian P. Gibbes, Columbia, for respondent.
The appellant, Richard Hall, was convicted in Greenville County of murder (two counts), assault and battery with intent to kill, armed robbery and carrying a concealed weapon; the jury found him not guilty of murder while in the commission of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon (two counts). He was sentenced by the trial court to death by electrocution and, in the event the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, 1 he was also sentenced to serve a combined total of forty-five years and thirty days for the remainder of his crimes.
The pertinent facts of this case are that on June 18, 1975, the appellant entered the Friendship Lounge in Greenville at approximately 11:00 p.m. Around 12:00 he went out to his truck, picked up a gun and returned to the Lounge, announcing that a holdup was taking place. Shortly thereafter he shot three persons, two of whom were killed; Caroline Shanks was severely wounded. After the shooting and the robbery, the appellant abducted Shanks and proceeded on Highway I-85 towards Atlanta. He later pulled over onto the side of the road and a highway patrolman stopped to see if he needed assistance. Upon discovering the condition of Shanks, the patrolman placed appellant under arrest.
A major part of the appellant's defense below was that of insanity; before trial, he underwent fairly extensive testing and evaluation. The results of those tests as well as the testimony of those involved in administering and interpreting the tests were admitted, to a certain extent, into evidence. The appellant has assigned several errors of law to that portion of the trial dealing with the question of insanity. It is those alleged errors to which we first turn our attention.
The appellant argues the trial court erred in refusing to allow Dr. Earl McFadden, a psychiatrist, to testify as to (1) certain background information concerning the earlier life of the appellant (related to the doctor by the appellant himself), and (2) conversations had with past employers of the appellant. The court found the testimony concerning the appellant's early life irrelevant, and testimony by the doctor as to his conversations with third persons inadmissible.
As this Court noted in Gentry v. Watkins-Carolina Trucking Co.,249 S.C. 316, 154 S.E.2d 112 (1967), whether or not testimony of a physician as to statements made to him by the patient post litem motam should be excluded is a matter dependent upon the circumstances of each case and to be left to the trial court's discretion. While Gentry is factually distinguishable from the present case, the rule is certainly still applicable. We cannot say that as a matter of law the trial court abused its discretion in deciding to exclude testimony concerning the appellant's apparently normal childhood. Unlike the testimony involved in Gentry, Dr. McFadden's testimony failed to prove relevant to the appellant's alleged mental affliction.
Further, we are of the opinion that the trial court committed no error in refusing to allow Dr. McFadden to testify as to his conversations with several former employers of the appellant. The doctor was permitted to give his full psychiatric evaluation based on the accumulation of data acquired from all sources and, accordingly, the jury had the benefit of his expert opinion.
Citing the fact that the appellant was found guilty of the separate offenses of murder and armed robbery, but not guilty of murder while in the commission of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, it is next argued that these were inconsistent verdicts entitling the appellant to a new trial. Multiple verdicts are inconsistent if the essential elements of the count of which the defendant is acquitted are identical and necessary to prove the count of which the defendant is convicted. State v. Amerson, 244 S.C. 374, 137 S.E.2d 284 (1964).
Upon examination of the record before us, it is apparent that the appellant did in fact commit murder while in the commission of an armed robbery; the verdicts are obviously inconsistent. Nevertheless, under the facts, the inconsistency of the verdicts could not be construed as...
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State v. Powers
...contends this ruling conflicts with our holdings in State v. Miller, 289 S.C. 316, 345 S.E.2d 489 (1986) and State v. Hall, 268 S.C. 524, 530, 235 S.E.2d 112, 114 (1977). We In Miller, we held it is error to require, prior to trial, that the defendant supply the state with a list of his wit......
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State v. Tyner
...to sequester rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge. State v. Jackson, 265 S.C. 278, 217 S.E.2d 794 (1975); State v. Hall, 268 S.C. 524, 235 S.E.2d 112 (1977). When questioned by the trial judge, appellant was unable to explain how failure to sequester the witnesses would prejudic......
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State v. Alexander
...In one case we found inconsistency in the verdicts but determined that the defendant had suffered no prejudice from it. State v. Hall, 268 S.C. 524, 235 S.E.2d 112 (1977). Alexander has cited no case, and we can locate none, in which we have applied a rule prohibiting inconsistent verdicts ......
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State v. LaBarge
...We do not agree. "Whether witnesses are sequestered or not is a matter for the discretion of the trial judge." State v. Hall, 268 S.C. 524, 235 S.E.2d 112, 114 (1977). We find no abuse of the trial judge's discretion. On the retrial of the case, LaBarge may renew his motion and attempt to s......