State v. Hall

• Decision Date: 21 October 1997
• Docket Number: No. 79106,79106
• Citation: 955 S.W.2d 198
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Stanley HALL, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 198

955 S.W.2d 198

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Stanley HALL, Appellant.

No. 79106.

Supreme Court of Missouri En Banc.

Oct. 21, 1997.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 25, 1997.

Joseph L. Green, St. Charles, for Appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Cassandra K. Dolgin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for Respondent.

WHITE, Judge.

A jury convicted defendant Stanley Hall of murder in the first degree, kidnapping, robbery in the first degree, and two counts of armed criminal action. The jury recommended a sentence of death. The trial court followed the recommendation. This Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal. Mo. Const. art. V, section 3. We affirm the judgment.

I. FACTS

This Court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Shurn, 866 S.W.2d 447, 455 (Mo. banc 1993).

On the evening of January 15, 1994, Stanley Hall and Rance Burton borrowed a car and drove to the South County Shopping Center in St. Louis, Missouri. They were searching for a vehicle to steal. Hall and Burton got out of their car and approached Barbara Jo Wood's car as she pulled into the parking lot. They forced her at gunpoint to the passenger side and then drove her in her car to the McKinley Bridge.

Wood was forced out of the car, and there was a struggle on the bridge. At some point she was wounded--witnesses in a passing car saw her bleeding. Burton got back in Wood's car and drove away. Wood, pleading for her life, was still holding on to Hall as he tried to lift her over the bridge railing. He eventually succeeded, and Wood fell ninety feet to the river.

Meanwhile, the two witnesses in the car had notified the Venice, Illinois police department. The police arrived and captured Hall moments after he pushed Wood off the bridge. The icy condition of the river impeded search and rescue attempts.

Both witnesses identified Hall as the man they had seen struggling with Wood. After waiving his Miranda ¹ rights, Hall identified Barbara Jo Wood from a picture as the woman he had forced over the guardrail. Seven-and-a-half months later, the lower portion of a torso matching Wood's physical description was found in the Mississippi River.

II. PRETRIAL MOTIONS

A. Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement

On May 10, 1994, Hall entered a plea of not guilty to murder in the first degree, kidnapping, robbery in the first degree, and three ² counts of armed criminal action. On March 15, 1996, three days before Hall's trial was set to begin, Hall filed a "Motion to Enforce the Negotiated Plea Agreement" seeking to enter a plea of guilty in exchange for a life sentence. Hall alleged that the State had negotiated a plea agreement with him, that he had completed the conditions required of him, and that the State was refusing to honor the agreement. Hall maintained that the terms of the agreement were that the State would recommend a life sentence on the following conditions: (1) that Hall provide complete and truthful information about the crime and all those involved, specifically Rance Burton, (2) that he pass a lie detector test, and (3) that the State independently corroborate his information about Burton.

In support of his allegations, Hall offered his meeting with St. Louis County police officers in November 1995. The record reflects that the court approved transportation for such a meeting. Hall claimed that this meeting was pursuant to the plea agreement, and that he told the police everything he knew and took a lie detector test. Hall conceded in his motion that the results from that test were inconclusive, but submitted that he passed a second test that he arranged with a retired police officer. Hall did not produce any written agreement with the State. The trial court overruled the motion without a hearing. Hall appeals, seeking specific performance of the alleged promise--a life sentence.

There is no absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted by the trial court, even when the State and the defendant have reached an agreement and have presented it to the court in writing. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 498-99, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971); Rule 24.02(d)(2). "A plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere executory agreement which, until embodied in the judgment of a court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected interest." Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2546, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984). If a trial court refuses to enforce an existing plea agreement, therefore, the defendant is not prejudiced. See State v. Strauss, 779 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Mo.App.1989). If the State receives a confession through promises of leniency, however, and then the State reneges, that confession cannot be used at trial. State v. Hoopes, 534 S.W.2d 26, 37 (Mo. banc 1976).

On March 7, 1994, a year and eight months before Hall gave his statement pursuant to the alleged plea agreement, he gave the St. Louis County police a complete confession. Hall gave a detailed account of his trip to the mall, the kidnapping of Barbara Jo Woods, and the theft of her car. He recounted how Woods was pleading for her life as he struggled with her on the bridge. He described how, first, she grabbed on to the car door; then she was shot; next she grabbed hold of Hall; and finally, she clung to the bridge itself as Hall struggled to lift her over the guardrail. Hall confessed that he was the one who pushed her until she finally went over the railing.

Hall alleges that in November 1995, he confessed again pursuant to the purported plea agreement. The motion to enforce the plea agreement does not allege that the first and second confessions differed in any respect, however. The motion does not summarize the second confession other than to state that Hall gave the police "a complete and truthful account." Though Hall requested to make an offer of proof on other issues, he never offered to prove the contents of the second confession. Even if there had been a plea agreement, and the State breached it after obtaining a second confession, and Hall did pass a lie detector test, Hall's only relief would be the exclusion of the second confession. ³ Id. The trial court did not have before it any allegations or offers of proof regarding any information the State may have gained through the second confession. As it was not detrimental to Hall to repeat an earlier confession and the State did not unjustly benefit by hearing the confession a second time, the record supports the trial court's ruling.

B. Motion to Provide Care for Dependents of Jurors

Hall claims that the trial court erred in overruling his pretrial motion requesting care for the dependents of those selected to serve on the jury. He argues that failing to provide such a service effectively and unconstitutionally prevents minorities and the poor from serving as jurors. This Court rejected this argument in State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 510 (Mo. banc 1992), stating:

While many Missourians--particularly the poor, minorities, and women--need child care, any disparate impact on minorities by the scarcity of child care is unintentional. Government as a whole, including the judiciary, faces severe constraints on resources. The decision not to provide child care is a rational decision, facially neutral with regard to race and gender. As there is no intention to discriminate, the disproportionate impact on minorities and women is not sufficient to violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor Article I, Section 2 of the Missouri Constitution.... Likewise, poverty is not a suspect class requiring strict scrutiny....

Unfortunately, familial obligations prevent individuals from serving on juries.... Solutions to these problems are not, however, within this Court's jurisdiction, but rather lie within the jurisdiction of those bodies with budgetary authority.

(citations omitted). The trial court did not err in overruling the motion.

III. JURY SELECTION

A. Voir Dire Questions

Hall contends that the trial court erred in sustaining the State's objection to using the definition of first-degree murder during voir dire. Hall's counsel wanted to ask the members of the venirepanel if they could recommend a sentence of life imprisonment for a defendant who had "deliberated" and "coolly reflected" before committing a murder. The trial court ruled that the question was improper in voir dire, as it is the role of the court to instruct the persons who eventually serve on the jury as to the legal definitions regarding intent. The trial court then instructed defense counsel to limit this line of questioning to whether the veniremembers could consider the full range of punishment for first-degree murder authorized by law--life imprisonment without parole and the death penalty.

A trial court's ruling on whether to allow a voir dire question will be reversed only for abuse of discretion. State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886, 892 (Mo. banc 1995). During voir dire, neither side may tell the panel what law will be applied in the case. State v. Brown, 902 S.W.2d 278, 286 (Mo. banc 1995). Voir dire is not the proper arena for the legal definitions that appear in jury instructions as the venirepanel is not the jury, nor does it have evidence before it. The trial court correctly sustained the State's objection.

B. State's Motions to Remove for Cause

Hall claims that the trial court erred in sustaining the State's motion to remove Zereta Washington and Joann Kurland from the venirepanel. Cause for removal exists if a prospective juror's views on capital punishment would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of [that person's] duties as a juror in accordance with [the jury] instructions and [the juror's] oath." Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1...