State v. Hall

• Decision Date: 21 January 2022
• Docket Number: No. 19-1616,19-1616
• Citation: 969 N.W.2d 299
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Kourtney Shontez HALL, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

969 N.W.2d 299

STATE of Iowa, Appellee,

v.Kourtney Shontez HALL, Appellant.

No. 19-1616

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Submitted November 17, 2021

Filed January 21, 2022

John J. Sullivan (argued) of Sullivan Law Office, P.C., Oelwein (until withdrawal), and Theresa R. Wilson, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines (argued), Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.

McDONALD, Justice.

"Just because you don't go to church doesn't mean that you're gonna go to jail," said defendant Kourtney Hall to his former girlfriend Emily Bowers, during a jail visitation Bowers had with Hall while Hall was being detained on a parole violation and pending charges. In a second visitation later that same day, Hall reiterated to Bowers that she should not go to "church" and that she would not be in trouble if she did not go to church. Bowers understood Hall was making a coded request that Bowers dishonor a subpoena and not attend a deposition in which she was expected to give testimony criminating Hall. Despite Hall's repeated entreaties and assurances, Bowers attended the deposition and gave truthful testimony criminating Hall. The State charged Hall with two counts of suborning perjury and two counts of obstructing prosecution arising out of his coded requests. The jury found Hall guilty of all charges, and Hall filed this appeal. Hall contends there was insufficient evidence to sustain the convictions.

I.

In May 2019, Hall was detained in the Polk County Jail on a parole violation and pending charges. On Friday, May 3, Hall attended the deposition of Detective Christopher Vesey. During the deposition, Detective Vesey stated that Emily Bowers had been subpoenaed for a deposition to be held the following Monday, May 6, in the pending criminal case against Hall. According to Detective Vesey, Bowers was an important witness in the case and was expected to place Hall at the scene of a crime.

Hall and Bowers had dated from May of 2018 until February 2019. Although they had officially broken up by May of 2019, Hall and Bowers were still in a "gray area" and involved with each other in some way. On Sunday, May 5, Bowers had two electronic visitations with Hall using the Polk County Jail's iWeb visitation system. All visitations over the iWeb visitation system were recorded. During the two recorded visitations with Bowers, Hall repeatedly requested that Bowers not attend "church" and repeatedly assured Bowers that she would not be in trouble for not attending "church." Hall tried to coax Bowers's nonattendance at "church" with vague statements regarding their future together. For example, Hall said, "Where's the first place you want to go when we get out? That's what I think about.... You aren't going to church tonight are you?" Bowers interpreted Hall's statements to be coded requests that she should "not ... go to the deposition on May 6 to give [her] testimony."

Despite Hall's coded requests and assurances, Bowers attended the deposition and gave testimony in Hall's presence. She told the truth and criminated Hall with respect to the pending criminal case. Bowers testified it was "very hard." Hall and Bowers visited on iWeb after the deposition. Hall's attitude towards Bowers was very different during this third visitation. He was "very upset with [Bowers], very upset, very angry, kind of acting like it was [her] fault for everything."

The State charged Hall with two counts of suborning perjury, in violation of Iowa Code section 720.3 (2019), arising out of his conduct during the first two iWeb visitations with Bowers. Iowa Code section 720.3 provides:

A person who procures or offers any inducement to another to make a statement under oath or affirmation in any proceeding or other matter in which statements under oath or affirmation are required or authorized, with the intent that such person will make a false statement, or who procures or offers any inducement to one who the person reasonably believes will be called upon for a statement in any such proceeding or matter, to conceal material facts known to such person, commits a class "D" felony.

The State also charged Hall with two counts of obstructing prosecution, in violation of Iowa Code section 719.3(2). That statute provides:

A person who, with intent to prevent the apprehension or obstruct the prosecution or defense of any person, knowingly does any of the following acts, commits an aggravated misdemeanor:

....

2. Induces a witness having knowledge material to the subject at issue to leave the state or hide, or to fail to appear when subpoenaed.

At trial, the State called Detective Vesey and Bowers as witnesses and introduced into evidence the three recorded iWeb visitations. No one disputed that Hall's references to church were coded requests that Bowers not attend her deposition. At trial, during cross-examination of Bowers, Hall's lawyer acknowledged as much:

Q. And let's cut to the chase on this.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. When Mr. Hall said "church," he meant the depositions, didn't he?

A. Yes.

Q. And there's no question about that?

A. No.

Q. And he likely didn't want you to go; isn't that right?

A. Correct.

While Bowers testified Hall's references to church were coded requests that she not attend the deposition, she also testified Hall never asked her to lie or withhold information while under oath:

Q. Did Mr. Hall ever tell you to lie about what you had seen?

A. No.

Q. Did Mr. Hall ever tell you to appear at depositions and lie?

A. No, he did not.

Q. Did he ever tell you to withhold statements or information from the State?

A. No.

Q. Did he ever tell you to lie or withhold information from the police?

A. No.

Q. Did he ever tell you to, when under oath, not tell the full truth?

A. No.

Q. Mr. Hall never made any threats or promises to you related to going to depositions; isn't that correct?

A. No. He told me not to go to church, which I interpreted as not going to depositions.

Hall moved for directed verdict and judgment of acquittal. With respect to the counts of suborning perjury, Hall argued that even if his statements to Bowers were coded requests that she not attend the deposition, those coded requests did not constitute suborning perjury as a matter of law:

In Counts I and II for suborning perjury, no witness has testified in any stretch of the imagination that Mr. Hall told Emily Bowers not to provide information after being placed under oath.

The only indication that the State has argued in this case is that he encouraged her not to be present at court, and that does not meet the definition of suborning perjury.

This code section is written to attack the behavior of people, to manipulate a witness to appear and then not give truthful information. That is what perjury is about, and to suborn perjury is to encourage that.

There's simply no evidence that's indicated that Mr. Hall told Emily Bowers to be present and then not give full and complete information. There's no evidence that she was told to show up at trial and lie. None of that information has been presented. None of that information has been indicated.

Now, I believe that the State's indication of how they want to proceed with this is by telling somebody not to appear is that they would then be withholding material information, but that does not meet all of the elements of suborning perjury. You must be placed under oath and then not do it, to have all of the factors together and required.

With respect to the charges of obstructing prosecution, Hall argued there was insufficient evidence of inducement given that, among other things, Bowers actually appeared for her deposition. The district court denied Hall's motions, and the jury found him guilty as charged.

Hall timely appealed, and we transferred the matter to the court of appeals. The court of appeals rejected Hall's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. The court of appeals reasoned that Hall's coded requests to Bowers that she not attend the deposition, coupled with Hall's statements regarding their relationship, was sufficient evidence to establish criminal liability. The court of appeals also rejected two additional claims Hall raised on appeal: that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the recorded video visitations into evidence and abused its discretion in denying his motion for new trial.

We granted Hall's application for further review. Because we find Hall's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence dispositive, we need not address his remaining assignments of error.

II.

This court reviews sufficiency of evidence claims for the correction of errors at law. State v. Sanford , 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012). "We will uphold the district court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal if there is substantial evidence in the record to support the defendant's conviction." State v. McPhillips , 580 N.W.2d 748, 752 (Iowa 1998). Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Sanford , 814 N.W.2d at 615. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including "all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the evidence." McPhillips , 580 N.W.2d at 753.

III.

We first address Hall's challenge to his convictions for suborning perjury. Hall contends that even if his references to church were coded requests that Bowers not appear for her deposition, those requests do not constitute suborning perjury within the meaning of Iowa Code section 720.3. Hall contends the statute criminalizes only a request that the witness provide false testimony while under oath or affirmation and not a request that the witness not appear. The State disagrees. The State contends the statute also criminalizes a request that the witness not appear because the witness's failure to appear would necessarily conceal material facts known to the witness.

The parties’...