State v. Hamann

• Decision Date: 12 December 1899
• Parties: STATE OF IOWA v. GUSTAV HAMANN, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

80 N.W. 1064

109 Iowa 646

STATE OF IOWA v. GUSTAV HAMANN, Appellant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

December 12, 1899

Appeal from Lyon District Court.--HON. WILLIAM HUTCHINSON, Judge.

THE defendant was convicted of the crime of seduction, and judgment of imprisonment rendered against him, from which he appeals.

Reversed.

Parsons & Riniker and E. J. Skewis for appellant.

Milton Remley, Attorney General, Simon Fisher, County Attorney, W D. Boies, and O. D. Reiniger for the state.

GIVEN J. GRANGER, J., not sitting.

OPINION

GIVEN, J.

I.

One ground of defendant's motion for a new trial was that, for the reasons stated in the motion, the court erred in giving the part of the second instruction set out; and the overruling of the motion on this ground is assigned as error. It is claimed on behalf of the state that, as no exception was taken to the instruction, the error assigned cannot be considered; and State v. Hathaway, 100 Iowa 225, 69 N.W. 449, is cited. In that case the complaint was of an omission to instruct, and no instruction was asked on the subject omitted. In the motion for a new trial it was said, "The court erred in giving the fifth instruction as given by the court." This court said, "That did not suggest the error of omission, but, rather, that the instruction was erroneous in its statement of the law." In this case the complaint is that the court erroneously stated the law, and the claim which was presented in the motion for a new trial, filed within the time allotted, specifically brought it to the attention of the court. The cited case is not applicable, and appellant is entitled to a review of the case as to this alleged error.

II. The part of the instruction complained of is as follows: "To constitute this offense, it must appear from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that the complainant witness yielded her person, and submitted to have sexual intercourse by reason of some promise or inducement held out to her by the defendant, and that by reason of such promise or inducement she was drawn aside from the path of virtue, yielded to the defendant, and had sexual intercourse with him. If, therefore, an unmarried man, by his visits and attentions to an unmarried woman of previously chaste character, gains her affections and confidence, and importunes her to have sexual intercourse with him, and she, through her love for and confidence in him, yields to his solicitations, this is seduction." Appellant's counsel contend that, under this instruction, "any promise whatever, followed by sexual intercourse, is sufficient to constitute seduction," and that it excludes from the crime the necessary element of false promise, artifice, or deceit. "There is no legal standard by which to determine what false promises, artifices, and deceptions are sufficient to constitute the crime of seduction. Of course, mere unlawful commerce, for a consideration paid, is not seduction. There must be some artifice or false promise by which the virtuous female is induced to surrender her person to the accused." State v. Fitzgerald, 63 Iowa 268, 19 N.W. 202. "It has often been held that, to sustain a charge of seduction, it must be made to appear that the intercourse was accomplished by some artifice or deception. Something more than a mere appeal to the lust or passion of the woman must be shown before the law will inflict the penalty prescribed for that crime, or afford her a remedy." Hawn v. Banghart, 76 Iowa 683, 39 N.W. 251. "It is not...