State v. Hambright
| Decision Date | 28 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 124,878 |
| Parties | State of Kansas, Appellee, v. Gerald D. Hambright, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; BRUCE C. BROWN, judge.
Kasper Schirer, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.
Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before SCHROEDER, P.J., WARNER and CLINE, JJ.
After Gerald D. Hambright was charged with criminal possession of a weapon, the law changed. Hambright now appeals from his conviction and sentence for one count of criminal possession of a weapon, primarily arguing the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Because we find his argument is correct and controls our resolution of this appeal, we decline to address Hambright's other claims of error. We reverse his conviction and vacate his sentence.
On March 21, 2019, Sedgwick County Sheriff's Deputy Austin Cameron was dispatched to a rural road to investigate a "suspicious character call." Cameron found Hambright resting on the side of the road. The relevant portion of their encounter was recorded on Cameron's body camera, which was admitted at trial. Hambright told Cameron he had been walking for several hours, had no place to go and no destination in mind. He also told Cameron he was dehydrated. Cameron told Hambright he had not done anything wrong and offered to drive him to a gas station in Wichita which Hambright accepted.
At Cameron's request, Hambright removed a sheathed knife from his belt and turned it over to Cameron before getting into Cameron's patrol vehicle. Cameron later discovered Hambright had previously been convicted of a felony, so he ultimately collected the knife as potential evidence. The knife and several pictures of it were admitted as evidence at trial.
The State filed charges more than a year later in May 2020, at which time Hambright was charged with a single count of criminal possession of a weapon. Based on concerns about Hambright's competency, the matter did not proceed to trial until December 2021. A week before trial, Hambright filed a motion to dismiss, arguing there was no evidence he possessed a knife within the meaning of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6304(c)(1) based on our Supreme Court's guidance in State v. Harris, 311 Kan. 816, 467 P.3d 504 (2020). Specifically, Hambright asserted the State had not shown he possessed a dagger, dirk, stiletto, switchblade, or straight-edged razor. The district court denied Hambright's motion after allowing the State to amend its complaint, charging Hambright with possession of a dagger.
Cameron was the State's only witness at trial. He repeatedly referred to the object Hambright possessed as a "knife," but at no point in his testimony did Cameron use the word "dagger," much less explain what characteristics of the knife made it a dagger. After Cameron's testimony, Hambright stipulated to a prior felony conviction, which prevented him from possessing a weapon.
The jury convicted Hambright of one count of criminal possession of a weapon. The district court sentenced him to nine months' imprisonment. Additional facts are set forth as necessary.
In relevant part, the State's amended complaint provided "Hambright . . . unlawfully [possessed] a weapon to-wit: dagger." Hambright argues the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Specifically, he asserts the State failed to present any evidence that the object he possessed was a dagger. His argument is persuasive.
" " State v. Aguirre, 313 Kan. 189, 209, 485 P.3d 576 (2021).
To some extent, this issue also requires us to interpret K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6304, which presents a question of law subject to unlimited review. State v. Stoll, 312 Kan. 726, 736, 480 P.3d 158 (2021).
K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6304(c)(1) provides a "'[k]nife' means a dagger, dirk, switchblade, stiletto, straight-edged razor or any other dangerous or deadly cutting instrument of like character." Hambright relies heavily on Harris, where our Supreme Court found the residual clause in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6304(c)(1)-"any other dangerous or deadly cutting instrument of like character"-unconstitutionally vague. 311 Kan. at 826. Hambright argues that without presenting any evidence as to what characteristics of the object he possessed made it a dagger, the State is essentially "[reducing] Harris to window dressing."
The State's amended complaint specifically alleged Hambright unlawfully possessed "a weapon, to wit: dagger." Hambright argues that by specifically alleging he possessed a dagger, the State was required to prove this fact to the jury. In support, Hambright cites State v. Trautloff, 289 Kan. 793, 802-03, 217 P.3d 15 (2009), which held: "The wording of a complaint is binding on the State in pursuing its theory before a jury." That is, by including specific language in its complaint alleging how the offense was committed, "the State limited itself to a theory that [the defendant] committed only that version of the offense." 289 Kan. at 802.
Hambright is correct. The State presented no evidence explaining what characteristics of the object made it a dagger. The State's only witness, Cameron, never used the word "dagger" in his testimony. Rather, Cameron repeatedly referred to the object as a "knife," describing it as a "fixed blade, non-serrated edge knife," with a blade approximately 4 1/2 inches long with a single sharpened edge. Photos admitted at trial reflect the object had a fixed handle; a curved blade with a single-sided, non-serrated cutting edge; and was roughly the same dimensions Cameron described.
The problem with the State's evidence is the object Hambright possessed would undoubtedly be colloquially referred to as a knife. However, as Harris recognized, there are many objects which Kansans would typically refer to as knives but do not meet the specific definition of "knife" as required by K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6304(c)(1). 311 Kan. at 816. Without presenting some evidence as to what characteristics of the object make it a "dagger," the State is effectively only paying lip service to Harris' finding the residual clause of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6304(c)(1) is unconstitutionally vague. 311 Kan. at 826. In other words, there is nothing to support the jury finding the object was actually a dagger as opposed to merely being a "dangerous or deadly cutting instrument of like character." K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6304(c)(1). This is precisely the problem Harris recognized-it leaves the jury to resolve a point of vagueness or ambiguity by its own subjective interpretation. See 311 Kan. at 822.
The central problem in this appeal is that "dagger" is not defined in K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6304. Granted, prior to Harris, this would not have been an issue as the residual clause was effectively a catch-all provision for objects which may have questionably fit within the definitions of the enumerated items prohibited by the statute. See State v. Baston, No. 119,538, 2020 WL 6533267, at *2 (Kan. App. 2020) (unpublished opinion) ( conviction for possession of machete based on residual clause). But Hambright was charged prior to Harris; thus, we must apply the statute in effect at the time. State v. Martin, 270 Kan. 603, 605, 17 P.3d 344 (2001). Going forward, our Legislature could prevent this issue by amending the statutory language in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6304.
The current codification still contains the residual clause struck down in Harris. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6304(d)(1). The reach of this statute would be clearer, and the intent of the Legislature more evident, if the Legislature removed this unconstitutional language from the statute and replaced it with clear definitions for the enumerated items listed as being prohibited therein. We note our Legislature has previously done so as it has statutorily defined other weapons based on their measurements, physical characteristics, and intended uses. For example, for purposes of Kansas' criminal use of weapons statute, K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6301, a throwing star is defined as "any instrument, without handles, consisting of a metal plate having three or more radiating points with one or more sharp edges and designed in the shape of a polygon, trefoil, cross, star, diamond or other geometric shape, manufactured for use as a weapon for throwing." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6301(m)(4). The 2011 codification of K.S.A. 21-6301 defined a switchblade knife as:
"[having] a blade that opens automatically by hand pressure applied to a button, spring or other device in the handle of the knife, or any knife having a blade that opens or falls or is ejected into position by the force of gravity or by an outward, downward or centrifugal thrust or movement." K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-6301(a)(1).
The 2011 criminal use of weapons statute also specified that ordinary pocket knives with a blade length of four inches or less were not considered dangerous knives or deadly weapons or instruments. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-6301(a)(2).
Here due to the absence of a specific statutory definition for "dagger" in K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6304, we must apply the ordinary meaning of the term as reflected by a dictionary...
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